is God necessarily triune?

About a month ago, we were discussing identity in my metaphysics class. What's interesting about identity is that because it is so difficult to define, it can more easily be defined by what it is not (ie: identity can include things such as separability/inseparability, dependence/independence, cause/effect, but it is not in every case defined by those things). We eventually discussed whether or not identity can really be separated from the idea of otherness, or if we can only really know identity by knowing otherness. Somewhere in the conversation, one of the student's attempted to use God as a counterexample, by saying that God can know himself (identity) without experiencing otherness. Following that comment, someone else used the otherness of the persons of the trinity to argue against the aforementioned claim. In responding, one of my professors offhandedly mentioned that he thought that God didn't have to exist in three persons, that he could have existed as one if he had so chosen. i'm curious what anyone else has to say in response to this. Maybe it's just me, but something seems very wrong about that statement. anyone have any critiques? comments?

My Solution to Hume: An Addendum to My Journal on the Problem of Induction

I believe that Hume's skepticism then, is completely justified when it comes to induction in the broad sense. For example: looking at one (or one million - what does it matter?) crows and reasoning that all crows are black. Or interacting with one (or one million) females and concluding that every female is irrational. These conclusions may be reasonable, but they are not certain.

But I think we can save, or maybe strengthen, the sciences (at least in part). The difficulty is that when it comes to geometry or algebra, one can investigate these things a priori. But with the physical world, the only way we can even possibly find out about physical laws (e.g. whether matter and energy are conserved) is to examine the evidence. Although not necessarily within the category of Empiricism, science is empirical: a posteriori.

So what I would like to do is posit an a priori grounds for science. I believe I have already laid the foundation for it.

If it is true that the nature of the necessarily existing order is necessary (i.e. if it is not arbitrary that this order is the order), then, not only does science help us to learn about the order (just as a teacher helps me learn about calculus), but it helps us discover which possible world this one is.

So, we can know that there is order a priori. We can know about order a priori. We can even speculate about different potential types of physical matter or all the different possible worlds a priori. But, we cannot know which of the possible worlds is the actual world a priori. In fact, as soon as we open our eyes we have already participated in a sensory experience, rendering our enterprise an a posteriori one.

So science is about aiding our naked eyes with instruments, gathering in information about the contingent world. When we generalize the behaviors of physical objects, we are actually describing two things. First, we are describing the nature and constitution of the physical objects in question. Next, we are describing the laws by which they relate to each other (and my position as of this writing is that these laws are inherent in reality and therefore necessary). This second thing is actually compound. The way things relate to one another is determined both by the inherent order of reality AND by the constitution of the objects. It is difficult to describe the physical nature of something without analyzing how it behaves. Therefore science involves BOTH a priori and a posteriori tasks, but its foundation is laid a priori.

What about laws that have exceptions? If a law is shown to have exceptions to it, then we are not describing the ultimate enough reality. For example, if a white crow is found in Pasadena, then it is demonstrated that it never was actually a law that all crows are black. Laws describe the ultimate reality, where exceptions don't truly exist. If free agency and miracles are real, then the underlying laws are somehow setup to allow for these things. The reasons for their rarity may be accounted for by contingent factors (e.g. stars very rarely explode. In fact, we have no human record of our sun ever exploding. However we know that it will if left alone for long enough. Just because we haven't found out how it might be possible for a man to synthesize wine from water without modern tools, doesn't mean that it is impossible. To conclude so would be an argument from ignorance unless it is shown precisely why it is logically incoherent.). It cannot ever be that a true law, one accurate to the inherent order of things, gets broken. Chaos (randomness, chance, probability) is metaphysically impossible. When thinking about crows, one can see that they are contingent beings. So to incorporate them into the description of a law is problematic from the outset. This problem will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid in science, however. But we should want to get at broader and broader generalizations.

So we are justified in performing scientific tasks, because we know a priori that the order inherent in reality is necessary. Science has as its goals, firstly to help us learn about order (God), secondly to help us learn about this world (creation).

Scattered Thoughts on Crow Blackness Likelihood, Solipsism, and Order

I have been musing about crows, blackness, and probability since I met with Derek von Barandy and James Gibson about Hume and Bonjour last Thursday night. Let me share a snippet of my thoughts with you, as writing it down helps me to work it out in my mind.

This is not meant as an argument, but my own unorganized ponderings.

There are ten birds in a cage, five of which are white. The likelihood of me selecting a white bird with my eyes closed is 5/10. In a bird cage whose total number of birds is unknown to me, I cannot calculate the likelihood of white bird selection.

Such is the case in our world, whose total number of crows is unknown to me. If I examine 1 crow and find it to be black, my probability of selecting a black crow in the future becomes 1/X. If I examine 2 black crows, I increase my odds, but I can never reach a point at which it is true to say that my odds make it more likely that I will select another black crow for examination. For it is an epistemic possibility for me that there exist but 2 black crows in a world whose crow population remains unknown.

After selecting 2 black crows I can truthfully say that, on account of my experience, it is more likely that another black crow is found (in this case "more" is a term relating to my first trial). This is so because last time my odds were 1/X, and this time my odds are 2/X (we are assuming X is a finite number - there are only so many crows that exist at the time of the exam).

Thus, although I am able to increase my epistemic odds by examination, I am unable to know my actual odds.

Advancing from black crow selection to crow population description raises the problem I want to illumine. Suppose I want to support the claim "all crows are black". To do this I can examine one million crows, lending support to my hypothesis and perhaps rendering it a theory. The "odds" of blindly selecting a black crow after such an experiment are 1,000,000/X.

Terms like "probability" as applied to the truthfulness of my theory are problematic. I cannot say that my theory is "probably true", as I cannot express it as probabilities are expressed. What I can say is that now that my hypothesis is a theory it is relatively more probable to be true that it was when it was a mere hypothesis. I am not telling the truth if I say that my theory is "probably true".

Actual probability calculated for such a claim defeats the relevancy of such calculation. This is so for all exhaustive claims about reality. To start with, I cannot find terms to fit the probability schema. What is to be the numerator? What is to be the denominator? If this world is the numerator (i.e., if it is true that all crows are black in this world), then my numerator is 1. If I somehow know the number of possible worlds (assuming that it is a finite number), then I suppose I can use it for my denominator. I would also have to know the number of possible worlds whose entire crow population is black (never mind the difficulty in examining every crow in every possible world).

But in discovering what I can truthfully place in the numerator position I have found the relevant information. I will have had to find out already whether all crows are black in this world. In discovering this truth I have eliminated the need for me to calculate how probable it is that all crows are black (in this world).

Perhaps it would be helpful on another front to learn how narrow the parameters are that our world lies within. If the denominator of our "probability", or number of trials (i.e. number of possible worlds), is large relative to the numerator, or number of possible worlds that only have black crows, then we can count it remarkable that our world is one in which all crows are black. For example, if we can somehow learn that 12 out of 1,000,000 possible worlds have naught but black crows, then we should marvel at the fact that our world lies within the parameter of 'having only black crows'.

If we are careful, we can see that actual probabilities do not exist. If it is true that all crows are black, then the probability is 1. There is no crap shoot.

But what about the probability of this world being the one that occurred? Isn't that an actual probability? Here is where care must be taken. We must not mistake probability with possibility. Let's examine what it means for something to be possible.

There are four categories that a thing can fall into:

1. Necessary
2. Contingent
3. Possible
4. Impossible

Necessary things are those that cannot be otherwise than they are. They exist in every possible world.

Contingent things are those that can be otherwise than they are. They exist in this world, but not in every possible world.

Possible things are those that can be. They exist in at least one possible world, and they do not exist in at least one possible world.

Impossible things are those that cannot be. They do not exist in any possible world.

Although it may be true that all crows are white in some possible world, it may not be so that any crows are white in this world. What I mean is that the truth of my theory, that all crows are black (in this world), does not depend on whether the contrary is possible in another world. In fact, the truth of my theory depends on whether it is true in this world.

In discovering whether it is true in this world, I do not eliminate the possibility of its falsehood in another world. But whether it is true in this world is not probabilistic. This world is this world, and our tomorrow is not arbitrarily selected from among possibilities. Rather, tomorrow is created by the state of affairs that exist today, combined with personal determination.

Let me show you what I mean. If all crows are black in this world, and it is because of something in crow genetics that doesn't change as time advances, then it will be so tomorrow that all the crows in this world will be black. Crows will mate, the earth will rotate on its axis and advance its revolution 1/365.25th, and we will examine all new crows spawned and find them all to be black.

I say that personal determination is the other force that creates tomorrow because, as a certain set of meteorological circumstances yields a rainstorm, I can choose to operate upon the immediate sky above Los Angeles and alter the outcome of today. I could do this by creating a large fan, blowing the warm front out of the course of the cold front. While physical states of affairs are deterministic of their following physical states of affairs, personal agency can alter states of affairs. Such agency is not arbitrary, but it is not itself determined. Rather, it is determining. The nature of its ability to determine rests upon the power and authority whereby it determines, as well as its options in determining. Thus all things have as their first cause (a) choice(s) made by (a) person(s). My physics/metaphysics is not the key, however.

What is the key is that what produces tomorrow does so determiningly and according to a framework, not probabilistically and/or without boundaries. Thus, in cases that are produced within systems of pure physical causation, the outcome may be predicted. For example, once a pair of dice are thrown, if a physicist is given the opportunity to measure the velocity and spin of the dice, as well as their distance to the ground and the shape and exact physical nature of any obstacles, he is capable of predicting the outcome. The outcome is not probable, it is certain.

In systems that contain personal forces, outcomes are not produced probabilistically either. A person's choices are not made for them arbitrarily or randomly. The person is responsible for determining the choice. Moreover, he must do so with the burden of forces and compulsions influencing his will. The decision must also be one of available decisions to make, and it must be according to the laws in operation.

If you do not accept my physics/metaphysics, then it is even easier for you to see the non-arbitrary, or non-probabilistic nature of outcomes. For it may be that even personal decisions are nothing more than the tantamount of complex and layered physical phenomena.

In the case of the dice roll, outcomes are not probable, they are certain and fixed. Outcomes are, however, possible. If our epistemic situation is limited (i.e., we are not aware of the initial states and governing laws of the dice), then we call given outcomes probable according to what we know is possible. There are six sides to a die, and only one will be facing upwards at the end of the roll. We call this a probability, but it is only one epistemically. The trajectory of the dice will be determined by the person, and the rest is up to physical states of affairs that are reliable (the size of the dice and the force of gravity, etc.).

In the case of my theory that all crows (in this world) are black, it either is so or it isn't. My theory is possibly true, but it cannot accurately be said to be probably true, unless by this we only mean that we have warrant to believe in it and our warrant increases with every black crow that is found.

We therefore cannot ever elevate a theory contingent upon experience to the status of certain truth. To be rational, we must therefore choose to believe what we find to be the most epistemically probable truth (when it comes to some beliefs, warrant may consist of both empirical and logical evidence). This is what I call faith: belief in a proposition for which evidence exists, but irrefutable proof one way or the other is not observed. It is an active belief, but should not be held without reason.

When considering whether to believe in something, one ought to consider first the evidence in favor of it, and then consequences of accepting such a belief. This is what Jesus speaks of at the end of chapter 14 of Luke's gospel when He says, "Whoever does not carry his own cross and come after Me cannot be My disciple. For which one of you, when he wants to build a tower, does not first sit down and calculate the cost to see if he has enough to complete it?"

An issue entangled in this pondering is the reliability of science. Hume argued that for inductive enterprises (such as physics), in contrast to a priori enterprises (such as mathematics - within which domain we are able to fully examine just a single case of 2 + 2 equally 4 and make justified conclusions about all instances of 2 + 2), there cannot be found rational justification. In other words, why do we assume causation, and expect that the future will resemble the past? Couldn't it just be coincidence that the cue ball was accelerating South at 3 miles per hour, and when it reached the eight ball it lost its energy, and then the eight ball (unconnectedly) assumed the same amount of energy (minus friction) and continued South? What, exactly, is to assure the same "effect" in the future? The "law" that we think is governing billiard ball behavior is only a description of past experience, and causality is assumed.

A physicist will explain the mechanical issues that "caused" the transfer of energy at the time of the collision, but his world contains that same problem, on a smaller level. Why is it that atoms operate the way they do? Then - why is it that particles act the way they do? This will go on until objects get too small for us to examine at the present, and the only answer scientists can give us that they have run experiments and written descriptions of the way physical things interact with each other. They used these descriptions to predict the future, and the future did indeed resemble the past.

But we have run into our crow problem. We cannot calculate even the epistemic probability of the future without knowing about every case. Our "odds" only increase. There is never a point where we know that we have examined a majority of the cases of a physical occurrence within the universe. We can therefore never make the claim that something is "most likely". We never know how big our sample size is relative to the whole.

Bonjour's solution is to say that if we continue to find that a scientific law predicts the future, then we have reason to believe that there is something causing the outcome, and it is most likely that there exists a real reason (a determiner) that we keep on finding black crows.

But this doesn't satisfy - it begs the question. In one sense, of course something caused the cases we found. Of course something caused the crows that we found to be black. But that doesn't mean that this cause operates upon all crows.

Even if we say that it is likely that there is a reason that most or, in our case, all of the crows we found were black, we run into problems. As I illustrated above, "probable" or "likely" is a fallacious descriptive. We cannot calculate actual probability, nor does it exist as regards the truth or falsehood of a proposition (a proposition either is true or it isn't - there isn't a chance as to whether it will become true or not, as we are inquiring as to its current state). At best, Bonjour's claim can be reconstructed to specifically epistemic probability as outlined above.

It seems then, that induction has its limits and we are forced into humility when it comes to all a posteriori enterprises.

Another issue related to these musings is the reliability of physical laws and, as I will show, the a priori argument for meta-order.

One can object to my reasoning by separating my claim into two. The first would be that the extant truth of a proposition is not probabilistic. The second would be that the truth of a proposition about the future is not probabilistic.

As to my first statement, it should seem obvious (although many thinkers today inadvertently undermine with their writings). If a proposition regards the way things are - reality - then it is either true or false. Whether or not we are aware of it, reality is as it is.

The second statement is more contentious. Is a proposition that concerns the future probabilistic? I hope that by now I have made my case for why the answer is 'no'. The future is determined. Certain facets of the future are not determined yet, but they will be determined by something or someone. Pure probability is not an operating force unto itself - it is a false notion.

One might do well to say that 'if physical law (x) remains in effect throughout our next experiment, then the outcome will be the same as last time'. I like this statement. Let's explore it: can I have a priori justification for believing that if every relevant factor remains the same, an identical outcome may be produced? Certainly we trust this in science, but can we know it with justified certainty?

Even though this type of humility ('if' physical laws stay the same - allows that we do not know whether physical laws are contingent and/or consistent within this world), it still assumes a meta-order. Let's describe the application of this assumption in our case. The one who says 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome' is assuming that 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome'.

Although these are identical statements, the second emphasizes the structure or necessity whereby the conclusion is drawn. You see, although we are now allowing even for the strange possibility that physical laws may not apply, we are saying that it is obvious that if they do then we can produce the desired outcome again. We are assuming that our experiment will follow some order. It is clearly impossible for us to repeat a literally identical experiment under literally identical conditions and produce an entirely alien outcome.

To apprehend this IS to understand its truth, just as to understand what it means when we think that 2 + 2 = 4 is to understand that it is true. Perceiving these propositions a priori is to perceive their justification.

This brings me to what I find to be the single most foundational and profound assumption of science: that the universe is intelligible. This order that exists outside ourselves can be understood.

To complicate my undertaking I want to consider the solipsists cosmological argument. I heard about a lady who wrote a philosopher, 'I am a solipsist, and I just can't understand why there aren't more of us'... he found her statement hilarious.

Suppose that I am disembodied, and have no experience of anything other than myself. I have never seen, felt, heard, smelt, or tasted. I have perceived of nothing. I am only capable of thinking, and so I begin to do so...

"I exist." I begin, without knowing that Descartes says that I should begin here. "I know this because I am thinking. I have not always existed, and I did not bring myself into existence. There must be something that brought me into existence. I cannot conclude that it is a person, as there may be a rule that solipsis like me just pop out of nowhere uncaused. But such a rule is a cause. Maybe there is no rule - I just popped into existence from nothing, not of myself, nor of a rule. But then, wouldn't that be a rule? It would state something like 'for X amount of time, nothing will come about, then at time Y, a solips will come into existence'. I can go on thinking about what possible scenario possibly accounts for my existence, but I cannot imagine it as unordered by some account. Therefore I can say with certainty that I exist, and that some order exists outside myself. The very fact that my thoughts are linear, and I am able to construct rational, ordered sentences attests to this fact. I did not create the logic by which I am thinking."

Solips L knows that he came into being inside this permeating order, and he is subject to it. The order seems to be built in, permanent, or eternal. And so surely the order within which SL was conceived must be greater than him, for he fits inside its bounds. Certainly then, the order is personal, just as he is personal.

The equation of this order with a person is professed by John, in the first chapter of his account of the gospel:

1. In the beginning was the Word*, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
2. He was in the beginning with God.
3. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being.
4. In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men.
5. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.
6. There came a man sent from God, whose name was John.
7. He came as a witness, to testify about the Light, so that all might believe through him.
8. He was not the Light, but he came to testify about the Light.
9. There was the true Light which, coming into the world, enlightens every man.
10. He was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him.
11. He came to His own, and those who were His own did not receive Him.
12. But as many as received Him, to them He gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in His name,
13. who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God.
14. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.
15. John testified about Him and cried out, saying, "This was He of whom I said, `He who comes after me has a higher rank than I, for He existed before me.' "
16. For of His fullness we have all received, and grace upon grace.
17. For the Law was given through Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ.
18. No one has seen God at any time; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, He has explained Him.
19. This is the testimony of John, when the Jews sent to him priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, "Who are you?"
20. And he confessed and did not deny, but confessed, "I am not the Christ."

*This Greek word is logos, referencing the Greek's notion of order, logic, reason, that by which all things have existence and orderly relationships with each other.

Another man identified this logos, this personal order who became incarnate as the very order that holds all things together.

When reasoning with the Greeks in Acts 17:28, Paul says,

"In him [that is, Christ] we live and move and have our being, as even some of your own poets have said,'For we are indeed his offspring.'"

The first part of the sentence is possibly a quote of Epimenides of Crete, but the obvious quote is of Aratus's poem "Phainomena".

Then, in his letter to the believing community in Colossae Paul writes in chapter one:

"For by Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities--all things have been created through Him and for Him. He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together."

Thus is can be seen that even Solipse L can perceive the existence of personal order a priori.

As to physical laws, I agree with Hume, that unless we have some perpendicular reason to believe that they will persist, we can but humbly continue to trust them. Unless...

The crow case may not be our best example. Doesn't it seem silly to say that it is a physical law that all crows are black? It doesn't seem ultimate enough. The blackness of crows may be caused by the culmination of several intersecting laws and conditions. A crow is a pretty complex being.

Could it be that if we were not epistemically restricted we might be able to perceive why it is so that physical laws are as they are. Just as I shown by experience how to do calculus (although it is an a priori enterprise), can it be that if I were shown why it is so that physical laws could not have been otherwise - that they are necessary? Is it possible that I am in a fragmented state and cannot perceive with pure rational insight such necessity?

Imagine such a case: a perfectly functioning (but limited) Solipse L. I am back in the situation described above, thinking about things. I begin to think that if something physical were to exist (all conceivability objections aside), then such stuff would behave in certain ways that make sense. Not only that order exists is perceived by me, but which order exists. In fact, the very nature of order can only be one way. Given exactly what it is that particles are made of, they are required to behave accordingly. Their behavior flows logically from their very nature.

For Solipse L to imagine a given nature for potential particles that might one day come into existence IS for him to imagine the nature of their interaction with each other. In this case, what it is that is underlying these "laws" is the pervading order that exists - the fabric of reality. Even a posteriori enterprises, such as science, if clear thinking is excersized and intellectual limits are not applied, could get to the bottom of the way things operate. In such cases, more than mere physical laws can be described, but the nature of the underlying order can be: mathematics, logic, and other purely relational domains. Summaries that accurately describe mathematics and other such necessary truths are indeed descriptions of God Himself.

In what way was creation voluntary then? Aside from the fact that creation at all was voluntary, God was creative in His creation. He made choices as to how creation was to look like and operate.

When we look at the physical laws, we see them as incomplete in a description of the universe. Not only do there seem to be laws in effect here, but there are also constants and quantities. Constants are types of forces which behave in certain stable ways, and persist evenly as time advances. Quantities are amounts that seem to have been arbitrary put in at the beginning of time. The amount of matter and dark matter, for example. Also the amount of energy and dark energy, the amount of radiation, the amount of entropy, and a few others. God made choices as to how much of what ingredient to put into the universe, as well as the velocity to start us off at. He also interacts with His creation in other ways after the initial creation.

What I find interesting is that the number line contains the infinite set of numbers. For a constant to be what it is, the "odds" or really "possibilities" for its value are literally infinite. Planck's constant, for example, could have been (in the broadly logical sense) any value at all. Its chances were 1/(infinity). That it is what it is, is something to marvel at.

But not only is there Planck's constant to consider, there are a host of others. The "odds" of them occurring in the relationship that they did to one another are [1/(infinity)] X [1/(infinity), et al. The "chances" that all the constants line up properly are staggering. When considering quantities as well, marvel should skyrocket.

Science has shown that if any given constant were to be changed a tiny bit, the effects would be devastating. The constants are finely tuned to accommodate human life.

Not only does metaphysical probability not exist, but the possibilities for worlds are infinite.

The Creator is great, and greatly to be praised.

As I continue to let my imagination run away with me as I journal, I think about other scattered issues. For instance, computers sometimes have random number generators. But, they have processes for selecting such numbers. The outcomes are unknown to us, as are the processes. They are only epistemically random. If we knew the rules and the initial states, then we would not call them random. Randomness does not exist.

Another thought: are all intelligible things produced by intelligence? When Lindsey says something intelligent, I can make sense of it. It is orderly. When we have a baby, it will probably speak some gibberish (until age two, when he will unify the theories of quantum physics with general relativity). I will tell him that his gibberish is unintelligent, because it is unintelligible. If our universe is intelligible (the fundamental assumption of science, remember), does it imply that it is produced by a Mind?

Even if chaos is possible, and if such theoretical chaos could produce something orderly or intelligible, it does not account for the existence of the order that such an effect exists within. There remains a need for a law giver.

I studied Turing Machine Functionalism for a short while a couple years ago. While there are so many issues to think about, I want to highlight that the Turing Machine Functionalists still have to admit that such machines must acquiesce to order that existed before the machines, and will persist after such machines expire. What accounts for that order?

I will tell you that it is permanent, necessary, personal, self-existent, and the initiator of the existence of everything other than itself.

More unorganized journals to come. Maybe on these matters, maybe on others.

My Cosmological Argument

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." (Genesis 1:1)
"[We] understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible" (Hebrews 11:3b)

1. Matter and energy exist
2. The first law of thermodynamics states that matter and energy can be exchanged, but neither can be created nor destroyed [1]
3. Therefore either
     a) Matter and energy have always existed, or
     b) Matter and energy had a beginning
4. It is impossible to transgress an infinite amount of time
5. Therefore (3a) is false
6. Therefore (3b) is true [entailed by (3), (4), and (5)] [2]
7. Therefore either
     a) Matter and energy caused themselves to come into being, or
     b) Matter and energy were caused to come into being by something that was neither matter nor energy
10. For an object to cause something, that object must exist
11. Before matter and energy existed, matter and energy did not exist
12. Therefore, matter and energy did not cause their own existence [entailed by (10) and (11)] [4]
12. Therefore (7a) is false
13. Therefore (7b) is true [entailed by (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12)]

Conclusion: Matter and energy were caused to come into being by something that was not matter or energy. Let's restate this. The online Princeton dictionary defines the verb "create" as "to bring into existence" [5]. It also defines "physical" as "dealing with matter and energy" [6].

Therefore, the conclusion of the cosmological argument is that the physical universe was created by something nonphysical. Let's use "nonphysical creator" as the beginning of our definition of "God". I will not make any claims as to other attributes that God has under the cosmological argument.

Objection 1: "Where did God come from?"

Answer: All of the empirical facts that imply that the universe cannot have always existed are based on scientific observation of matter and energy. Our argument concluded that God is neither matter nor energy. Therefore, premise (4), that matter and energy cannot have always existed, does not mean that God cannot have always existed, as He does not fit into the category "matter and energy".

Consider Einstein's theories and the space-time model [7]. Without ruling out the possibility of other dimensions, the extant scientific model of space-time combines space and time into a single manifold. As God is neither matter nor energy - He is not physical - He is not bound by time, and does not need to be described in temporal terms like matter and energy do. Thus, the question "where did God come from" or "when did God come into existence" is a categorical fallacy (cf. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_in_the_machine#Category_mistakes], although I must admit disagreement with Ryle on other counts, the principle of his objection to dualism is correct - it does not make sense to ask how long the color red is, or how much the idea of love weighs, or in this case, when God came into existence).

So imagining God's existence is not like picturing Achilles running on a racetrack without beginning or end (cf. note [2D]). God's existence is of an atemporal nature, and He cannot be thought of in spacial-temporal terms. Nowhere in my cosmological argument did I claim that everything has a beginning, but that matter and energy had a beginning.

Objection 2: "Premise (2), or the first law of thermodynamics, says that matter and energy can be exchanged, but neither can be created nor destroyed. Doesn't (12) contradict this? First you say it can't be created, then you say that it was created. Which is it?"

Answer: Wikipedia defines "physical law" as "a scientific generalization based on empirical observations of physical behavior" [8]. The first law of thermodynamics is merely descriptive of what we have observed. It is really just the discovery that we cannot create or destroy matter and energy, and a statement that we have not observed matter and energy being created or destroyed. This does not entail that they have not been created at some time in the past. This Wikipedia entry also says that physical laws are "[typically] theoretically reversible in time", which lends credibility to footnote [2Aiii].

It may at first appear that I am two-faced, because I am arguing that our universe had beginning, by making inferences through reversing physical laws. But then I say that once we get back to the beginning, at least one of the laws gets broken (or created - however you want to look at it). This is vindicated because physical laws are reliable for making predications within the physical universe. So as long as we are doing science inside the confines of the physical universe, we can trust these physical laws. But the universe itself may not be subject to all the same laws that govern the matter and energy inside it. If we say that the entire universe is subject to something greater than itself, then we are supposing that there is a governing force outside of our known universe. This force cannot be made up of matter and energy, or else "universe" would encompass it. To say this is to concede the very conclusion of my cosmological argument.

It is also interesting to note here that Lord Kelvin himself, a man central to our entire understanding of thermodynamics, did not see a contradiction in these laws with the belief in a creator:

"Lord Kelvin's [William Thomson] (1824-1907) second law of thermodynamics, that the dissipation of energy is a universal feature, was directly related to his theology. Here he unified two of his deepest commitments: universal natural law is created and governed by divine power, and the world is progressively developing toward an inevitable end. He summarized his belief by quoting Psalm 102:26, "all of them shall wax old like a garment". He believed that God alone could restore the original distribution or arrangement of energy in the created universe. (Smith/Wise, p. 317, 331, 332, 497; Clark, p. 14) Related to this, Kelvin objected to evolution by blind chance. He believed that life proceeds only from life, that it is a mystery and a miracle, and was designed and guided by a Creator. However, he accepted long times for an evolution guided by a Creator. (Albritton, p. 184, 185)" [http://www.grisda.org/bclausen/papers/aid.htm] (also cf. footnote [2D] regarding the second law)

Objection 3: "Opponents also point to the semantic difficulty that the cosmological argument seems to apply temporal concepts to situations where time does not exist. For example, in physics, "cause" is a temporal concept that requires time; things which exist outside of time do not have to be caused. Since time is merely a property of our universe, the laws of time (i.e. cause) are not applicable to our universe considered as a whole. Similarly, time can begin, but not require a cause, since all human concepts of a caused beginning have something before that beginning (including the cause); this is not true of time itself. This class of counterargument assumes that causality is necessarily temporal, which itself is a point of dispute." [9]

Answer: It seems that this objection is arguing that because time is a property of objects inside our universe, then reversing it to find the beginning of our universe is illogical, because our universe considered as a whole does not have to be subject to the laws of its internal components. Or perhaps it is saying that time itself is an eternal property of this empty space that the physical universe is now residing in, and it therefore makes no sense for a cosmological argument to claim that it was all created, merely because the physical universe may have had a beginning.

My first question is, what do you consider to be our universe as a whole? Is it the collection of all the matter and energy in existence? Should we give this collection an identity of its own, or should we just let it be a reference to everything physically and spatially related to each other? Even if "universe" referenced some other abstract object ("the empty space", governed by inherent, eternal rules, in which every physical object now happens to reside, maybe), inside which matter and energy themselves once had a beginning, the challenge of the cosmological argument still stands. How did that matter and energy come to be? Moreover, what is this "universe"? What is the giver of such order?

This objection may be reconfigured to work against a cosmological argument that claims that time itself was created, however my cosmological argument does not claim that and is therefore unaltered. In comment, I see at least two possibilities on the matter. The first possibility is that Einstein is right, and time is actually the fourth dimension, in which case it actually does make some sense to say that when matter and energy were created, time was as well; either as a byproduct of the physical creation act, or as an abstract creation act in itself.

The other possibility is that time is in fact uncreated. Actually many cosmological scientists and theoretical physicists today hold that time has always existed, even if matter and energy have had a beginning. If time is uncreated, then I have a starting point for another argument for God's existence. One version of this shall be treated under a future "Argument from Universals".

The objection is correct in implying that things which exist outside of time do not have to be chronologically caused (cf. answers to objections one and four). But it is uninteresting to note that things outside of time are outside of time. To say that in physics causation is a temporal concept requiring time is also uninteresting, because physics studies physical objects, which are necessarily time-bound. The study of physical objects alone cannot make claims about whether nonphysical objects do or do not require logical causation. Moreover, to concede that causation is a physical and chronological notion allows its application to our physical universe, which is precisely what the argument does.

But this objection may be reexamined from another angle, and it could be perceived to be arguing that because "universe" encapsulates not just physical objects but time as well, this allows our universe itself to escape the need for causation (causation being allowed to be defined here as a sheerly temporal notion). Then my answer is that it will take an enormous amount of work to support the claim that some physical things (even considered as a whole and inextricably linked to presumably nonphysical things, like time) do not require causation at all, because causation is a foundational assumption of the scientific method.

Also note Wikipedia's comment on this objection, "[this] class of counterargument assumes that causality is necessarily temporal, which itself is a point of dispute" [9]. It would seem to me that for timelike substances like our universe, causality would have to be temporal, and it would have to be. But for atemporal substances like God, causality would be able to be "simultaneous", which brings me to the next objection...

Objection 4: "Where did God come from?" (part deuce)

Answer: There is a second sense in which God's existence requires explanation. The first arises out of a temporal objection: "at what time did God come into existence?", which was treated under objection one. This second kind of objection can be stated "how is it that God exists" or "what causes God's existence?". So, while the first objection deals with what is temporally prior to God, the second objection deals with what is logically prior to God. This objection is especially called for in light of my argument against the possibility of the causa sui [4].

The reality is that temporal objects cannot cause themselves to come into existence because a physical agent must first exist in order to commit an act like creation (cf. answer to objection three). Causa sui is irrational for matter and energy, and/or in a temporal environment. However, God escapes these confines, because He does not experience a succession of moments. In His case it is acceptable to say that He is the eternal cause of Himself, or self-existent. The term "eternal" in this case is only used to say that there is never a "moment" whereby God is not the source of Himself, it is not to invoke physical-temporal language and categories all over again. God is the source of existence (even His own) and can therefore be self-existent. Although it is necessary for a time-bound object to first exist before it commits an act (e.g. creation), an object who experiences no progression of moments does not need to exist prior to causation (indeed, even "prior" already begins to imply time). Interestingly enough, this is also how the second Person of the trinity can be begotten without having a beginning, but this is not a work on the Trinity and I am not making any claims about God under this argument but that He exists and is not physical.

Wikipedia agrees with me on this by stating "things which exist outside of time do not have to be caused" [9].

Objection 5: "Quantum mechanics has shown that 'subatomic particles such as electrons, positrons, and photons, can come into existence, and perish, by virtue of spontaneous energy fluctuations in a vacuum'" [9].

Answer: Quantum Mechanics is very important in theoretical physics, and helps string theory get off the ground. However, science has a lot of ground work to do in terms of reconciling it with General Relativity. Just as Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise asks the reader to comprehend how something that is finite and obviously possible (running a mile) is made up of something infinite and logically impossible to cross (infinitesimal measurements of the mile), quantum mechanics asks us to comprehend how matter and energy, which are empirically known to be unable to be created or destroyed, could be made up of subatomic particles whose existence fluctuates.

This objection is a type of argument from ignorance. It should be restated as "we don't know what creates and destroys subatomic particles, therefore your claim that things cannot come into existence without cause is irrational". Or even "we don't know what creates and destroys subatomic particles, therefore it is not God and God does not exist". This is worse than the theist who says "we don't know what caused the Big Bang, therefore it was God". Science might one day discover what is causing the fluctuation of existence of subatomic particles, and that day would scientifically destroy this objection.

This objection is also question begging. Even if someone demonstrates precisely why we know that subatomic particles genuinely randomly come into existence without cause, my cosmological argument is not undermined. My cosmological argument handles matter and energy in their whole states, not separated into subatomic particles. To say that subatomic particles can come into existence spontaneously begs the question of how the matter itself came into existence in the first place. Before there can be material to examine the pieces of, that material must exist (and its existence demands explanation).

Lastly and fatally, the objection itself acknowledges the fact that subatomic particles "come into existence, and perish, by virtue of spontaneous energy fluctuations". In this case subatomic particles themselves are not actually even being created in the brute sense, they are being formed out of energy [cf. premise (2)]. Forming matter out of energy is not actually interesting in the slightest, because we can take measurements of the net gain or loss of matter and energy in the system, and find that it comes out to a big zero. Matter and energy are always conserved. The fact that some energy gets rolled into little balls called subatomic particles is uninteresting and irrelevant.

If one wants to say that the case with our universe was similar, that energy was floating around and then BAM! or should I say BANG!, our universe popped out, then it begs the question yet again. My argument says that matter AND energy had to have had a beginning. So I childishly say to you "yeah, but where'd the lighter fluid come from?", I mean "where did the energy come from?". There had to have been a beginning, and it had to have been caused by an external agent.

Objection 6: "(2) rests on a physical law that may not have been in operation before the Planck Epoch"

Answer: I am regularly amazed at the volume of science and reason that atheists throw out the door before they accept that it is rational to believe in God. Isn't it convenient that because we don't know very much about what our universe was like moments after its explosion, some are willing to use that period of time as a trash can to throw out every law of science and logic so that they are exempted from submission to God? Sounds like an emotional problem with theism, not an intellectual one. This is a catch-all, such that even if irrefutable proof of God's existence was furnished, an atheist could say that Modus Tollens itself didn't operate before that damn Planck Epoch. When you can demonstrate to me that we have exhaustive knowledge of the nature and substance of our universe as it existed throughout the Planck Epoch, and that it necessarily entails that God does not exist, then I will start taking this objection seriously.

By the way, Max Planck himself announced, during his Nobel Prize acceptance speech:

"All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particles of an atom to vibration and holds this minute solar system of the atom together... We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind."

Objection 7: "Indeed the supposed singularity from which our universe is said to have originated in the classic Big Bang picture is actually a physical paradox - an indication that current theory is not an adequate description [of]." [9]

Answer: Again, that fact that current theory is not an adequate description of what is supposed to have been the first term of our universe says nothing about whether it was created by God or not. Would you like to borrow my book of logical paradoxes that have been solved since their conception? Can I buy you a book full of empirical facts that did not make sense at their discovery, but that we have since come to understand? Maybe the fact that modern theory has posited something that it cannot account for empirically should make modern theorists turn to at least consider potential nonphysical factors involved when our universe was but a singularity.

Objection 8: "The Big Bang is said to be the start of both space and time, so the question "What was there before our universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time." [9]

Answer: This objection does assume that time had a beginning, which needs more work to be established. However I do consider the temporality of time possible (pardon the pun). What I like about this objection is that it acknowledges that it makes no sense to apply terms like "before" to situations without time, lending support for my answer to objection one.

To consider this objection the threat has to be understood. It seems to be proposing that a cause of our universe was not necessary if nothing - not even time - existed just prior to the existence of the singularity. For, during that situation, time itself did not exist and therefore the popping into existence of time and matter and energy requires no explanation.

A problem with this objection is that it begs the question yet again. Although a situation without time (or matter and energy) seems to require no explanation, we are inquiring about a situation with all of those things. The coming into existence of the singularity (plus time) still needs explanation. Just because you suppose that right before its existence there existed nothing, doesn't exempt the singularity itself from requiring explanation. In other words, rather than explaining the cause of our universe, the objection is saying that the state prior to the existence of our universe does not require explanation.

I can't help but note here that objections like these also lend support to (6), that our universe had a beginning.

Objection 9: "Isn't this all one big argument from ignorance?"

Answer: What keeps my cosmological argument from being one from ignorance is that I am not concluding that God exists because it has not been disproved, because we don't know what caused our universe, or because it seems to me that He did so. Rather, I am giving all logical possibilities a fair trial. I am not merely regarding the lack of evidence for possibilities in alternate to theism, but I put forth specific reasons to disbelieve them. Even further evidence specifically in favor of theism, which will also help to further define "God", will be presented in the future.

-------------------------------
NOTES
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics#First_law

[2] Regarding (4), and its entailed premises, (5) & (6), I expect some opposition. An objection may be made by one who claims to be able to conceive of, or have evidence for, an infinite regression of matter and energy into the past. To strengthen (4) and therefore (5) & (6), I would like to offer four considerations.

     A) Consider the following implication:
          i. The second law of thermodynamics states that our universe is in an increasing state of entropy [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_thermodynamics#Second_law]
          ii. This entails that the total entropy of our universe is increasing over time
          iii. This implies that there was a time of minimum entropy, or a time of maximum order
          iv. This implies that matter and energy had a beginning point, from which entropy began

My syllogism above is also assented to by self-proclaimed agnostic Robert Jastrow:

"And concurrently there was a great deal of discussion about the fact that the second law of thermodynamics, applied to the Cosmos, indicates that our universe is running down like a clock. If it is running down, there must have been a time when it was fully wound up. Arthur Eddington, the most distinguished astronomer of his day, wrote: 'If our views are right, somewhere between the beginning of time and the present day we must place the winding up of our universe.' When that occurred, and Who or what wound up our universe, were questions that bemused theologians, physicists and astronomers, particularly in the 1920’s and 1930’s" [Jastrow, Robert (1978), God and the Astronomers. New York: W.W. Norton. pp. 48-49]

     B) Here I am going to talk about a couple things that are a little over my head, but hopefully reliance on more credible sources will suffice. At any rate, I am only offering this as one of four considerations.

Consider the fact that Big Bang cosmology itself is based on principles that imply that there was a singularity which constituted the beginning of our universe and the earliest time. Weingard, on page 199 of his 1979 "Some Philosophical Aspects of Black Holes" in Synthese elaborates on this. He explains that the singularity is a geodesic, which can only be finitely extendible into the past. It seems then that we have reason to believe that the singularity was timelike (bibligraphic information for this publication can be found here [http://www.metapress.com/], and cf. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timelike] for information about what it means to be "timelike"). Steven Hawking seems to believe that this implies finiteness in his 1980 "Theoretical Advances in General Relativity", in Some Strangeness in the Proportion. It seems that if Einstein was right about General Relativity, then our universe has a finite past.

Permit another quotation of Jastrow on the matter:

"Only as a result of the most recent discoveries can we say with a fair degree of confidence that the world has not existed forever;... The lingering decline predicted by astronomers for the end of the world differs from the explosive conditions they have calculated for its birth, but the impact is the same; modern science denies an eternal existence to our universe, either in the past or in the future." [Jastrow, Robert (1977), Until the Sun Dies. New York: W.W. Norton. pp. 19, 30]

     C) Consider a source specifically hostile to my goal, to advance the argument that God exists, who says the following in a paper attempting to argue for an uncaused universe:

"Models of an oscillating universe usually predict that with each new cycle there is an increase in the size of the radius of our universe, amount of radiation present, and entropy. Radiation from previous cycles accumulates in each new cycle, and the accompanying increase in pressure causes the new cycle to be longer than the last one; our universe expands to a greater radius and takes a longer time to complete the cycle. This disallows an infinite regress into the past, for a regress will eventually arrive at a cycle that is infinitely short and a radius that is infinitely small; this cycle, or the beginning of some cycle with values approaching the values of this cycle, will count as the beginning of the oscillating universe.

The inference to a finite past can also be made from a measure of the amount of radiation present in our universe; if there were an infinite number of previous cycles, an infinite amount of radiation would be present in the current cycle, but the amount measured is finite. Joseph Silk calculates that the amount of radiation observed in the present expansion allows there to be "about 100 previous expansion and collapse cycles of our universe" (Silk 1980, p. 311).

The conclusion that the past is finite also follows from facts about entropy; if an infinite number of previous cycles have elapsed, each with increasing entropy, then the present cycle would be in a state of maximum entropy—but in fact it is in a state of relatively low entropy.

John Wheeler sweeps away these objections to an infinitely oscillating universe by supposing that at the end of each contracting phase all the constants and laws of that cycle disappear and our universe is "reprocessed probabilistically" (Misner, Thorne and Wheeler 1973, p. 1214) so as to acquire new constants and laws in the next cycle. No information about a previous cycle is passed on to the next cycle. Accordingly, no inference to a finite past can be made on the basis of present observations and the laws and constants that hold in the current cycle.

Now there is no reason to think that such a universe is logically impossible, but that is not germane to our present concern, which is to establish probabilist grounds for a belief in the finitude or infinitude of our universe's past. It is logically possible that at the point of onset of each new cycle all laws and constants are transformed, but since these occurrences cannot be predicted according to any known physical law, there is no reason to think that these transformations occur.

Indeed, there is a theoretical reason to prefer the finite oscillatory models to Wheeler's model (supposing that we must choose among oscillating models). The finite models, through being constructed in accordance with the known physical laws and constants, obey a principle related to the principle of induction; the related principle is that physical laws and constants originally inductively established for one domain of physical events should be applied to other domains of physical events if there is no observational evidence that events in these other domains differ in the relevant respects from those in the original domain. In the present context, the domains are cycles; since there is no observational evidence that events in past cycles differ relevantly from those in our cycle, we are not justified in supposing that the laws and constants inductively established in our cycle do not apply to the events in previous cycles. " [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/uncaused.html]

I suppose that if one, such as John Wheeler, wants to step outside the bounds of science, he can choose to believe that, previous to our universe, there existed a universe that operated under completely alien constants and laws. There are two problems with this. The first is that the entire oscillatory model is itself a patterned structure that would have to endure through each oscillation, which undermines Wheeler's objection. The second problem is that science has to stay within the bounds of what can be tested, such that a hypothesis can be supported and predictions about the future can be made. If one wants to be scientific about his search for information about the origin of our universe, he must handle the facts that we have available to us. I will not condemn one who wishes to abandon science during his quest to find out about our universe, but I cannot be expected to assent to a proposition without warrant.

After writing this paragraph, I came across an acclaimed astrophysicist who shares my critiques of infinite oscillatory models and M-theory:

"First of all, quantum fluctuations are a key ingredient of inflation theories that attempt to address how our universe, and a myriad of others, came into being. The problem is that quantum fluctuations presuppose the existence of quantum laws. If there truly were no quantum laws or any other laws whatsoever, nothing could happen. No laws, no action. The origin of universes as a result of quantum laws, inflation fields, or other arcane properties of string theory depends upon the preexistence of those laws or fields. And so even the skeptical scientist cannot avoid taking that on faith.

The second problem is that none of the other universes can ever be observed, not even in principle, since trying to measure across universes with different fundamental laws would be like using a microphone to observe the moon or using a telescope to record a rock band. So yet a second article of faith is required of the modern scientist: the existence of an infinite number of unseen universes." [Haisch, Bernard. The God Theory: Universes, Zero-point Fields, And What's Behind It All. Preface.]

There are other means to acquire knowledge than modern science, which actually brings me to my fourth consideration...

     D) Although I have presented three pieces of empirical evidence that support my premise that matter and energy had a beginning, I would also like to offer some logical support. Even if an infinite oscillatory model is produced that makes sense of the scientific facts that usually support a finite universe, it ultimately begs the philosophical question of (6). If there was a universe before ours it incites the query, 'where did that universe come from?', and these questions would go on for eternity.

That an infinity cannot be transgressed is demonstrated by Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. The traditional text of the paradox, along with an explanation can be found at [http://www.mathacademy.com/pr/prime/articles/zeno_tort/]. The reason the paradox is so tricky is because it brings out in us the intuition that infinity cannot be transgressed. It then artificially divides up a finite distance into infinite parts. We know that a finite distance can be transgressed, and so our mind has to sort through the language to find the trick. If one claims that paradoxes such as Zeno's prove that infinity can be transgressed, I would again accuse such a one of begging the question. Achilles is still only transgressing a finite distance, even though it is described with infinite language. When Zeno can make Achilles finish an infinitely long race, then he'll have something.

Indulge me for one more moment whilst I explore this possibility. Imagine such a racetrack. You are sitting on the sideline and a line on the racetrack in front of you is painted red. The racetrack extends without limit in either direction. Achilles is running toward the red line, but has not yet gotten to it. In fact, he as an infinite amount of distance to cross before he reaches it. Will he ever reach it? In the original race against the tortoise, the racetrack was finite, but measured with infinitely small measurements. In this new race track, the distance he has to traverse is infinite, and no matter how fast Achilles is, he always has more ground to cover. In the first race the limit could be calculated, but in this new race the limit is (infinity). In other words, Achilles will never reach the limit.

The red line on the racetrack represents today. Achilles represents the cursor of history. Today will never come to pass, if the matter and energy in our universe have an infinite number of days to pass before they get to today. The first race is a paradox because we know that Achilles can overtake the tortoise based on the empirical fact that people complete races all the time, but the argument says that he can't. The second race is not a paradox because we don't start with the knowledge that the infinite can be transgressed - this is what we are trying to find out. The results are in, and the conclusion is that it cannot. The second race then, is a contradiction.

One more point must be made in regards to Achilles on the new, infinite racetrack. It might be possible to imagine Achilles as being about one mile behind the red line and running toward it. In this case he will definitely cross the line, and continue running forever. However, this is still question begging, because Achilles must have had to travel across the entire preceding length of the racetrack. He cannot start the race mid-way. If he does, his staring point is his starting point, and a beginning is conceded.

It is seen then, that the thought experiment does not even allow for Achilles to be placed on the track at all, because the racetrack has no starting line. The scenario of Achilles running on an infinite racetrack is itself incoherent, for he has no place to start. Similarly, the concept of a universe whose physical past extends infinitely is inconceivable.

[4] Nowhere has science ever observed a physical object create itself where there was previously nothing, not even raw materials (such as energy). Causa sui hypotheses would be hard pressed to make testable predictions about the future, for it could be anywhere, at any time, that any object imaginable could suddenly bring itself into existence and pop out of nowhere and nothingness. If a causa sui is possible, then gods of all types can randomly bring themselves into existence. If they haven't yet, no worries - they may soon enough. This concept also violates the first law of thermodynamics, for both matter and energy would have to be created during a causa sui - but not just created: created by nothing from nothing. Then the created something would in turn have to somehow retroactively have been the creator of itself. But don't take my word for it.

Nietzsche himself, in section 21 of "Beyond Good and Evil", states that the "causa sui [to be the cause of oneself] is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far; it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic... to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness." In context he is discussing freedom of the will, in which case I should be honest here and note that I happen to hold to a libertarian model of human freedom, which disagrees with Nietzsche's ultimate point. However, the principle that he plainly rejects is that something can be the very cause of it's own existence. The fact that he is hostile to the advancement of the argument that God exists positions him in a good place to affirm one of my premises. An online translation of "Beyond Good and Evil" can be found at [http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/beyondgoodandevil_tofc.htm]. Section 21 is found in "Part One: On the Prejudices of Philosophers".

But consider a skeptic on the matter:

"The problem emerges in science when scientists leave the realm of science and enter that of philosophy and metaphysics, too often grandiose names for mere personal opinion, untrammeled by empirical evidence or logical analysis, and wearing the mask of deep wisdom. And so they conjure us an entire Cosmos, or myriads of cosmoses, suddenly, inexplicably, causelessly leaping into being out of—out of Nothing Whatsoever, for no reason at all, and thereafter expanding faster than light into more Nothing Whatsoever.... They then intone equations and other ritual mathematical formulae and look upon it and pronounce it good. I do not think that what these cosmologists, these quantum theorists, these universe-makers, are doing is science. I can’t help feeling that universes are notoriously disinclined to spring into being, ready-made, out of nothing" [Estling, Ralph (1994), “The Scalp-Tinglin’, Mind-Blowin’, Eye-Poppin’, Heart-Wrenchin’, Stomach-Churnin’, Foot-Stumpin’, Great Big Doodley Science Show!!!” Skeptical Inquirer, 18[4]:428-430, Summer. 18[4]:430 (an online version of this can be found at {http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2843/is_n4_v18/ai_16139350})]

And allow the citation of a theologian:

What an atheist or agnostic "...deems possible for the world to do—come into being without a cause—is something no judicious philosopher would grant that even God could do. It is as formally and rationally impossible for God to come into being without a cause as it is for the world to do so.... For something to bring itself into being it must have the power of being within itself. It must at least have enough causal power to cause its own being. If it derives its being from some other source, then it clearly would not be either self-existent or self-created. It would be, plainly and simply, an effect. Of course, the problem is complicated by the other necessity we’ve labored so painstakingly to establish: It would have to have the causal power of being before it was. It would have to have the power of being before it had any being with which to exercise that power" [Sproul, R.C. (1994), Not A Chance. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. pp. 179,180]

Even British astrophysicist Steven Hawking confesses of this theory:

“The new inflationary model [aka "Steady State Theory", or "The Cosmological Casua Sui"] is now dead as a scientific theory, although a lot of people do not seem to have heard of its demise and are still writing papers on it as if it were viable” [Hawking, Stephen W. (1988), A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam. p. 132]

[5] [http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=create]

[6] [http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=physical]

[7] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime]

[8] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_law]

[9] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_argument#Counterarguments_and_objections]

Tags: Kalam cosmological argument, cosmological argument, existence of God

I had this dream…

Last night I had this dream where I was at this huge party my parents hosted at their house in Payson (Az), only their house was much larger than it actually is. Anyway it was a dinner party and after I got my food I preceded to sit at the table to which I was assigned. When I found my seat there was this gentleman making an argument about how God’s existence is irrelevant to being good person and so it doesn’t really matter if someone believes in God or not. I let him finish making his point before I chimed in.

“Assume for sake of argument,” I began, “that someone can be completely good with or without God’s existence. Assume further that God does exist and even though someone doesn’t believe He does exist he can do all the right actions and have all the right intentions in any circumstance whatever. Even if this is possible, it nevertheless is the case (if Theism is true) that God is the causal nexus of all existence other than Himself, in which case God is the cause of everything we see and everything we are, and He is the cause which holds all things together. But if God is how we just described we would have a duty to recognize that God is the cause of all things, and since God is a person we would have to turn our recognition of this fact into praise. The situation is analogous to, but in an even more severe than, the praise we owe an inventor for his invention. If we use the things to which the inventor invented without giving him credit we would be committing an ungrateful disservice. An inventor doesn’t even create anything new, she just rearranges in new ways things that where there all a long, things she never herself made. But in the case of God He not only arranged all things but caused all things too, in which case the disservice we would be doing to him by not recognizing these facts would be even more unvirtuous. So in the case where someone is good and doesn’t believe in God, if it turns out God does exist, not only is it the case that such a person is not being good in a certain respect (not giving credit where credit is due), in all other respects where she is a good person her disbelief in God severely trivializes such a status, since all her good deeds are derived and made possible by God’s existence. “

The same point can be made for an atheist too. Until an atheist knows with Cartesian certainty that she is correct, it will always be the case that she quite possibly owes God the recognition she has never given Him; in fact, the more she values her life and the things which comprise it the greater the possible debt becomes.

It’s also the same for the theist. Even if someone is a theist, it doesn’t mean that she doesn’t take for granted more than she realizes. All men, theists or not, must continually search the depths of their souls to the heights of the cosmos to recognize to what or whom, to anything or anyone, they owe their existence.

Freedom Time.

These are the lyrics to a song by Lauryn Hill called "Freedom Time". I'm basically obsessed with it right now, and think you should be too. I've made just about everyone who's anyone in my life listen to it in the recent past, so if i haven't made you listen to it yet, here you go. If it helps, you can rap the lyrics to yourself and imagine how cool they would be when sung by lauryn baby herself. cool.


Yo, there's a war in the mind, over territory
For the dominion
Who will dominate the opinion
Skisms and isms, keepin' us in forms of religion
Conformin' our vision
To the world churches decision
Trapped in a section
Submitted to committee election
Moral infection
Epedemic lies and deception
Insurrection
Of the highest possible order
Destortin' our tape recorders
From here and like under water
Beyond the borders
Fond of sin and disorder
Bound by the strategy
It's systematic deprivaty
Heavy as gravity
Head first in the cavity
Without a bottom
A fate worse than Sodom
What's got 'em
Drunk of the spirits
Truth comes, we can't hear it
When you've been, programmed to fear it
I had a vision
I was fallin' in indescision
Apollin', callin' religion
Some program on television
How can dominant wisdom
Be recognized in the system
Of Anti-Christ, the majority rules
Intelligent fools
PhD's in illusion
Masters of mass confusion
Bachelors in past illusion
Now who you choosin'
The head or the tail
The bloodshed of male
Or confidance in the veil
Conferences of Yale
Discussin' doctrines of Baal
Causin' people to fail
Keepin' the third in jail
His word has nailed
Everything to the tree
Severing all of me from all that I used to be
Formless and void
Totally paranoid
Enjoy darkness as the Lord
Keepin' me from the sword
Blocked from mercy
Bitter than cerasee
Hungry and thirsty
For good meat we would eat
And still, dined at the table of deceit
How incomplete
From confrontation to retreat
We prolong the true enemies defeat
Destitute a necessity
Causin' desperation to get the best of me
Punishment 'til there was nothing left of me
Realizin' the unescapable death of me
No options in the valley of decision
The only doctrine, supernatural circumcision
Inwardly only water can purge the heart
From words, the fiery darts
Thrown by the workers of the arts
Iniquity, shapen in
There's no escapin' when
You're whole philosophy is paper thin
In vanity
The wide road is insanity
Could it be all of humanity?
Picture that
Scripture that
The origin of man's heart is black
How can we show up for
An invisible war
Preoccupied with a shadow, makin' love with a whore
Achin' in sores
Babylon, the great mystery
Mother of human history
System of social sorcery
Our present condition
Needs serious recognition
Where there's no repentance there can be no remission
And that sentence, more serious than Vietnam
The atom bomb, and Saddam, and Minister Farakkhan
What's goin' on, what's the priority to you
by what authority do we do
the majority hasn't a clue
We majored in curses
Search the chapters, check the verses
Recapture the land
Remove the mark from off of our hands
So we can stand
In agreement with his command
Everything else is damned
Let them with ears understand
Everything else is damned, let them with ears understand

[Singing Chorus]
It's freedom, said it's freedom time now
It's freedom, said it's freedom time now
It's freedom, I'ma be who I am
It's freedom time, said it's freedom time
Everybody knows that they've lied
Everybody knows that they've perpetrated inside
Everybody knows that they’re guilty, yes
Resting on their conscience eating their insides
Get free, be who you're suppost to be
Freedom, said it's freedom time now
Freedom, said it's freedom time
Freedom, freedom time now

a defense of the ontological argument.

My version of the ontological argument:

(1) The concept of God is identical to the concept of the greatest conceivable being possible.
(2) The concept of the greatest conceivable being (henceforth GCB) contains the concept of necessarily existing.
Argument for (2): (along Anselmian lines)
(2a) If GCB failed to exist necessarily then it would be lacking a necessary prerequisite to be such a being, for surly a GCB who does not exist necessarily is not as great as a GCB who actually does, in which case the GCB that does not exist necessarily would not in fact be the GCB, therefore:
(2).
(3) To be GCB is to necessarily exist (entailed by (1) and (2)).
(4) To necessarily exist means nothing more that GCB must exist in all possible worlds.
(5) This world is a possible world.
(6) God exists (entailed be (4) and (5)).

I must concede that this argument is different than Anselm’s in an important respect, for it introduces the modal notion of ‘necessary’ as the type of existence had by the GCB in question. But we still haven’t left the notion of the GCB, so it’s not entirely distinct from Anselm’s either. And in introducing the notion of necessary (existence) we’re able to narrow the arguments scope, which in turn might reveal what St. Anselm was trying to get at as well as point out why Gaunilo's Island and Chris’ Teleportation Device- counterarguments (by why of analogy) have no effect.

Gaunilo’s Island argument (and Chris’ too) serve to counter St. Anselm by using the same argument in order to render a ridiculous conclusion. But the modal version above can easily block such a move, which we can begin to see by replacing the concept of God with the concept of ‘Teleportation Device’ in premise (1).

(1’) The concept of (the Teleportation Device) is identical to the concept of the greatest conceivable being possible.

Which is clearly false; the concept of a teleportation device could never be identified with the greatest conceivable being, for at least two reasons:

-(1’)a The greatest possible being is too big of a thing to be reduced to a teleportation device, despite what a wonderful thing it could be (if it existed), because the GCB must also be able to be conscious, have the capacity to love, create universes, etc.

-(1’)b a teleportation device is clearly a contingent thing (it’s existence is in no way necessary), which is evidenced by the fact that it doesn’t happen to exist, and therefore can never be a necessary being.

But perhaps I’m cheating. By way of the first premise I attempted to weed out Chris’ analogy, and to be fair I need to change some things. In order to carry out Chris’ (and Gaunilo’s) response appropriately, the argument should be reconstructed like so:


(1’’) The concept of the greatest conceivable Teleportation Device (henceforth GCTD) contains the concept of necessarily existing.
Argument for (1’’): (along Gauniloian lines)
(1’’)a If GCTD failed to exist necessarily then it would be lacking a necessary prerequisite to be such a being, for surly a GCTD that does not exist necessarily is not as great as a GCTD that actually does, in which case the GCTD that does not exist necessarily would not in fact be the GCTD, therefore:
(1’’).
(3’) To be GCTD is to necessarily exist (entailed by (1)).
(4’) To necessarily exist means nothing more that GCTD must exist in all possible worlds.
(5’) This world is a possible world.
(6’) GTCD exists (entailed be (4) and (5)).

At first glance this argument seems to fly just as well as the original, but perhaps we should take a closer look. It’s obvious the subject of this argument (the GCTB argument) has changed from the GCB one, but that’s to be expected since that’s how you argue analogically. But the thing to notice is that because the subject of the argument has changed, so has the sense in which the modal term ‘necessity’ is read. Compare, for instance,

(3) To be GCB is to necessarily exist.
and,
(3’) To be GCTD is to necessarily exist.

Despite the identity in syntax between these premises, the way in which these two premises predicate ‘necessarily exist’ to their subjects is different. We can’t read (3’) in the same way we read (3) because the way in which we ascribe the necessity to the greatest conceivable teleportation device is dissimilar to how we ascribe necessary existence the greatest conceivable being, and the way to show this to is to go back to argument that entailed this premise, which would be (2)a (for GCB) and (1’’)a (for GCTD).

(2) said that for the GCB to be such it must necessarily exist, because it wouldn’t be (as) great if it didn’t exist. (1’’)a said that GCTD must necessarily exist for the same reason (that it wouldn’t be as great if it didn’t exist). But the reasons why we say that both need to necessarily exist is different: in the case of GCB the reason why it must exist necessarily is because it’s apparent to our reason that such a being would posses such a property necessarily; that is, we perceive the necessary existence of the GCB to be an intrinsic property of that thing. But when we said that the GCTD must exist necessarily to be such, the reason why we would say that is because it would be greater to us that it actually existed, for if it didn’t, we couldn’t use it, and hence it wouldn’t be so great. But this means that when it comes to TDs, the greatness they would have by existing or wouldn’t have by not existing is external to the thing itself. And this simply isn’t the case when you think of the greatest conceivable being, for in conceiving such a thing we realize that to be such a thing, we think that it must not be great merely because it would make a difference to us, but also because it seems that such thing must exist necessarily to be such a thing in the first place.

Simply put, necessary existence is an essential intrinsic quality a GCB must have to be such a thing, but on the other hand the greatness of a TD might only imply existence when it would be great for us, in which case in terms of thinking about the greatest conceivable TD, it’s greatness would be a matter of an external property of the thing in question.

Some clarifying objections:

Kant’s rejection of the ontological argument, ironically, helps to point out what I’m trying to get at. Basically Kant’s problem is that existence isn’t a predicate (or if it is, it’s never an essential property of a thing). For instance, suppose two people are arguing over whether unicorns existed. Assuming the debate is a semiformal one, the members of the debate decide to define their terms. The one arguing against the existence of unicorns says, “so let me get this straight; when you say that there are such things as ‘unicorns’, you mean an animal that more or less resembles a horse and it has a horn on its forehead?’ The one arguing pro says, “Why yes, the qualities which a unicorn has are as you described, but you mustn’t forget that unicorns exist, that is, they have the essential quality of existing.’ “I thought we’re arguing over whether unicorns exist or not, so you mustn’t assume they exist until you’ve proved it to us!”, responds the opponent. “No no no,” says the man arguing for the existence of unicorns, “The unicorns I’m talking about do exist; they have such a quality! So you’re not thinking of the same thing I am.” “Well,” says the opponent, “if you can’t separate the idea of a unicorn from it’s existence, then it seem you’ve already won the debate, in which case it seems there is nothing to debate about.” “Hmmm, I guess we’re at an impasse.”

Kant says that if existence is a property, it must be assumed to be irrelevant to the object of a thing or else you would never be able to prove to someone who doesn’t already believe in the existence of a certain thing in the first place. This is so, says Kant, because whether a thing exists or not it makes no difference because existence is never an essential attribute of an object; hence why we’re able to debate whether certain things exist.

I think perhaps Kant is right, that one can rightfully separate the existence of certain objects without changing or altering the object in question. This is obviously the case when it comes to things like Islands and teleportation devices. The difference between the greatest possible island that does exist and greatest island that does not is nothing. They’re identical intrinsically speaking since they have all qualities in common. The only way existence would become relevant to perfect islands is when we equivocate between the senses of greatness. Only in the observer-relative sense of ‘greatness’ does existence become relevant. This is to say, again, that a perfect island can be intrinsically great without needing to exist.

But is Kant’s observation true of all objects, whatever? What if we introduce the notion of a type existence such as ‘necessary existence’? Think of GC islands or teleportation devices: examining them with our mind’s eye we see that if they necessarily existed or not it would make no difference; even worse both objects (all created things, actually) could never possess such a property, even if they did exist, because all such objects are contingent things. It’s necessarily false that a contingent thing posseses the property of necessary existence.

But what of the very idea of greatest conceivable being, the very idea of God? If we look to see with our mind’s eye at such a being, wouldn’t we see that to be such a being it couldn’t help to exist necessarily? Isn’t it the case that unlike all other objects, if we tried to remove existence from God’s essence we would cease to be contemplating the same thing? Isn’t the difference between a being who necessarily existed and one who needn’t not to exist to be such being an infinite difference? Doesn’t it seem to be the case that the notion of the GCB includes within itself necessary existence, such that if we took it away it wouldn’t be what it is?



11
Identity of essence and existence in God.

God’s essence cannot be other than His existence.
In any being whose essence is distinct from its
existence, what it is must be distinct form that
whereby it is. For in virtue of its essence we say
what it is. This is why a definition that signifies
an essence manifests what a thing is. In God,
however, there is no distinction between what He
is and whereby He is… therefore God’s essence is
nothing else than His existence.

St. Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas’s Shorter Summa, 11



*** By the way, the ontological argument has had an impressive list of defenders: Descartes and Leibniz have defended their own versions, and just in the last century you have philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, Charles Hartshorne, and Norman Malcolm (a student of Wittgenstein, no less, who has a similar argument to the one I presented ((Charles Hartshorne from what I’ve heard argues along the same lines too, but I haven’t read him)).

Creationism Grounds a Reasonable Environmentalism

[When] it comes to broadening the reach of the environmental movement to red state America, the real savior turns out to be the Rev. Richard Cizik of the National Assn. of Evangelicals, America's most influential Christian lobbying group, representing 45,000 churches and roughly 30 million believers across the country. According to two new documentaries, it is evangelicals like Cizik who may do more to make global warming a front-and-center issue than hundreds of white-wine fundraisers in Bel-Air and Manhattan's Upper West Side.

calendarlive.com: THE BIG PICTURE / PATRICK GOLDSTEIN - Believers preach gospel of green

Genesis 1: 27-28 says "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them. And God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens nad over every living thing that moves on the earth."

I know of a lady who has dominion over her backyard. She walks out there and says "hello ladies" to her flowers, and smiles. I hear her garden is beautiful. She lovingly waters and feeds her plants, and makes sure to keep the weeds out. She spends lots of time with her backyard. Sometimes she has to cut the rose bushes way back and it almost seems cruel to completely cut off branches and the bushes look barren afterwards, but sure enough they grow back even more full and beautiful.

God pronounced His creation "good" several times. Then He gave us stewardship over it, telling us to have dominion over it, just as He has dominion over us. What a priviledge and responsibility to be faithful caretakers of the earth!

He also made man in His image, and called us "very good", as opposed to just "good". We are set apart from the rest of creation. There is a thick ontological line between man and beast, and between beast and plant, and between plant and earth. Let's not confuse ourselves with nature, but let's take really good care of it.

Slightly on the Theology of Kissing

My wife Lindsey told me the other day that she read some research that supported the idea that non-sexual kissing is good for your physical health. Isn't it interesting that something that is good for a relationship also just so happens to be good for your physical health, but has nothing to do with procreation?

Jack Johnson, Theologian of Man

POSTERS LYRICS

Looking at himself but wishing he was someone else
Because the posters on the wall they don't look like him at all

So he ties it up, he tucks it in, he pulls it back, and gives a grin
Laughing at himself because he knows he ain't loved at all

He gets his courage from the can,
It makes him feel like a man
Because he's loving all the ladies
But the ladies don't love him at all

Cause when he's not drunk
He's only stuck on himself
And then he has the nerve
To say he needs a decent girl

Looking at herself but wishing she was someone else
Because the body of the doll it don't look like hers at all

So she straps it on, she sucks it in, she throws it up, and gives a grin
Laughing at herself because she knows she ain't that at all

All caught up in the trends
Well the truth began to bend
And the next thing you KNOW, man
There just ain't no truth left at all

Cause when the pretty girl walks
She walks so proud
And when the pretty girl laughs
Oh man, she laughs so loud

And if it ain't this then its that
As a matter of fact
She hasn't had a day to relax
Since she has lost her ability to think clearly

Well I'm an energetic hypothetic version of another person
Check out my outsides there ain't nothing in here

Well I'm a superficial, systematic, music television addict
Check out my outsides there ain't nothing in
Here comes another one, just like the other one
Looking at himself but wishing he was someone else
Because the posters on the wall they don't look like a him
And so he ties it up he tucks it in, he pulls it back and gives a grin
Laughing at himself because he knows he ain't loved at all
He knows he ain't loved at all