(well, my rehashing of it anyway)
I have a concept of a perfect square. A perfect square is a geometric figure of four sides, made up of four equally perfect straight lines that form four perfect 90-degree angles. My concept of a perfect square is something I’ve actually never seen before; no perfect squares have ever been presented to me through my perceptual experiences. Every time I see a hunk of matter stacked squarely it’s had imperfections: either two of its sides were longer than the other two, or the lines weren’t truly straight, or the angles were slightly off the 90-degree mark.
Despite the fact that I haven’t seen a perfect square it nevertheless seems to be the case that my conception of such a square is innate. This is because in order for me to know I haven’t yet perceived a perfect square it must be the case that I already know what a perfect square is; if I didn’t already know (what a perfect square is) how could I possibly know I haven’t seen one yet?
If I have a concept of perfect square it must have come from something perfect; for how could something perfect come from something imperfect? Well is it possible that I invented such a thing as a perfect square? Surely not, for despite what I would like others to believe about me, I’m far from perfect, and since something perfect cannot come from something imperfect, it follows that I am not the source of my own conception of a perfect square. In order for me to have a concept of a perfect square then, it had to come from something perfect, a perfect being, so to speak. And there is only two possibilities for a perfect being.
The first possibility is a perfect square that exists in the universe (independent of my mind) that causes me to somehow have a concept of itself. But this is impossible, since despite being perfect in all respects to being a perfect square, perfect squares don’t contain within themselves the causal power to produce a replicate of itself in my mind; surely such an attribute is irrelevant to nature of a perfect square.
Well, what’s the other possibility? The only other possibility is a perfect being that is both the source of perfect things and also had the ability to cause concepts to exist in other things, and the only thing that seems to satisfy such a description is a being identical to God. Therefore God exists.
“And let us make man in Our image.”
-an ancient Hebrew text.
Friday, November 10, 2006
a Cartesian ontological argument.
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3 comments:
the second most suspect assumption is that your idea about the perfect square is perfect. the most suspect premise is that something perfect cannot come from something imperfect.
could it be that you are having an imperfect idea about a perfect thing? thus, something perfect would not be coming from something imperfect, but an imperfect idea would be coming from something imperfect. then you might argue over whether the Darwinian has to account for the content of the idea in the first place - is it possible to imagine something that does not exist? i suppose this is where you might rely on something found in your former rendition of the ontological argument; one can imagine composites (like unicorns, whose images involve things that do exist: horns and horses), but not new things (I can't imagine anything whose parts don't truly exist already). i think your two arguments together are a little stronger than the two read separately. but now you have to prove why it is that we can know something is true in virtue of analyzing its definition. it might also be a worthwhile project to demonstrate why a perfect square is not a composite of things already in existence. the same goes for God: could it be that we are imagining Him based only on attributes we already have? we distinguish between communicable and incommunicable attributes - but even Grudem says that it is only a matter of degree of communicability. you even mention that God made man in His image - is it possible that we are imagining God in our image? so we have sight - we imagine Him as having unlimited sight. we have existence - we imagine Him as having unlimited existence, etc.
the evolutionist (although evolution is not mutually exclusive with theism or even Christianity, most atheists are Darwinian, and your argument does contend with Darwinism) will reject the idea that something perfect cannot come from something imperfect - or at least that more complex things (perhaps things capable of positing perfect things) cannot come from less complex things. this is what the whole debate is about, and your argument doesn't show why it is so that the perfect cannot come from the imperfect, it just relies on our intuition. you might be able to distinguish between 'more complex' and 'perfect', arguing that the Darwinian can't account for the perfect. he might respond by blurring the lines, saying that he doesn't know what you mean by 'perfect', or saying that steps of complexity over an infinite amount of time will result in perfection. if an argument goes that direction, i would imagine that it would be easy to clarify the term 'perfect' (and indeed you did so with regard to the idea of the square), which would autmomatically distinguish 'perfect' from 'more comlex'. the the Darwinian would be taxed with coughing up an account of how more complexity will result in perfection.
in the end, i agree with you and with your argument. i think its a good one, but not a silver bullet.
derek, I posted someone's objection under your other ontological argument - you should check it out.
Louis protests:
“the second most suspect assumption is that your idea about the perfect square is perfect. the most suspect premise is that something perfect cannot come from something imperfect. could it be that you are having an imperfect idea about a perfect thing? thus, something perfect would not be coming from something imperfect, but an imperfect idea would be coming from something imperfect.”
I don’t see how my concept of a perfect square fails the perfection tests; in what respects do you think my concept is not perfectly square? And how the hell do you have access to my Cartesian theatre?
“then you might argue over whether the Darwinian has to account for the content of the idea in the first place - is it possible to imagine something that does not exist?”
On my view it’s possible to imagine contingent composite objects that don’t exist in the actual world. This is possible because the parts of a composite non existent object do exist in the contingent world, and you’re able to think of things that don’t exist because they’re composite parts do exist…
“i think your two arguments together are a little stronger than the two read separately.”
I actually think the Cartesian argument is less suspect than the modal ontological one, simply because the Cartesian one doesn’t actually define God into existence but rather brings God into the equation as an explanatory hypothesis that answers the questions.
“but now you have to prove why it is that we can know something is true in virtue of analyzing its definition.”
No one denies whether you can know a concept in virtue of its definition, the only time philosophers start to get fussy is when ‘existence’ becomes part of the definition. In my definition of a perfect square I nowhere included ‘existence’ as a predicate, such a move is unnecessary because anyone who would agree that for I to have a concept of a square they must also concede that at least one square exists as a concept of my mine, for there is no other way I could have a concept of a square if my concept didn’t exist.
“it might also be a worthwhile project to demonstrate why a perfect square is not a composite of things already in existence.”
I’ve never seen a perfect 90 degree angle, never seen a perfect line, never seen an object with four equal sides.
“the same goes for God: could it be that we are imagining Him based only on attributes we already have? we distinguish between communicable and incommunicable attributes - but even Grudem says that it is only a matter of degree of communicability. you even mention that God made man in His image - is it possible that we are imagining God in our image? so we have sight - we imagine Him as having unlimited sight. we have existence - we imagine Him as having unlimited existence, etc.”
Hmmm… your statement are easily turned into more Cartesian arguments: unless we already know the distinction between limited and unlimited we wouldn’t have the mental machinery to think beyond what we’ve experienced. Everyone knows men have experienced perception, love, intelligence, etc. But how are we able to imagine beyond the powers we’ve experienced (some perception, some love, some intelligence, etc.) to maximal sets of all of the above if we don’t already know what such things would look like? We’ve never seen unlimited any of these things, yet we have the conceptual framework to know what it would look like, so where did we get those ideas? Not from our experience, because (as we all agree) the experiences we have had were not of the power we are now imagining them to be, so we’re did our intellectual abilities of abstraction and maximization come from? If we’re on board with the premise that no quality of an effect is absent from itss cause (e.g. nothing perfect can come from something imperfect), then we’re back to the God hypothesis.
”the evolutionist (although evolution is not mutually exclusive with theism or even Christianity, most atheists are Darwinian, and your argument does contend with Darwinism) will reject the idea that something perfect cannot come from something imperfect - or at least that more complex things (perhaps things capable of positing perfect things) cannot come from less complex things. this is what the whole debate is about, and your argument doesn't show why it is so that the perfect cannot come from the imperfect, it just relies on our intuition. you might be able to distinguish between 'more complex' and 'perfect', arguing that the Darwinian can't account for the perfect. he might respond by blurring the lines, saying that he doesn't know what you mean by 'perfect', or saying that steps of complexity over an infinite amount of time will result in perfection. if an argument goes that direction, i would imagine that it would be easy to clarify the term 'perfect' (and indeed you did so with regard to the idea of the square), which would autmomatically distinguish 'perfect' from 'more comlex'. the the Darwinian would be taxed with coughing up an account of how more complexity will result in perfection.”
Well said.
”in the end, i agree with you and with your argument. i think its a good one, but not a silver bullet.”
My arse it’s not a silver bullet!
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