I believe that Hume's skepticism then, is completely justified when it comes to induction in the broad sense. For example: looking at one (or one million - what does it matter?) crows and reasoning that all crows are black. Or interacting with one (or one million) females and concluding that every female is irrational. These conclusions may be reasonable, but they are not certain.
But I think we can save, or maybe strengthen, the sciences (at least in part). The difficulty is that when it comes to geometry or algebra, one can investigate these things a priori. But with the physical world, the only way we can even possibly find out about physical laws (e.g. whether matter and energy are conserved) is to examine the evidence. Although not necessarily within the category of Empiricism, science is empirical: a posteriori.
So what I would like to do is posit an a priori grounds for science. I believe I have already laid the foundation for it.
If it is true that the nature of the necessarily existing order is necessary (i.e. if it is not arbitrary that this order is the order), then, not only does science help us to learn about the order (just as a teacher helps me learn about calculus), but it helps us discover which possible world this one is.
So, we can know that there is order a priori. We can know about order a priori. We can even speculate about different potential types of physical matter or all the different possible worlds a priori. But, we cannot know which of the possible worlds is the actual world a priori. In fact, as soon as we open our eyes we have already participated in a sensory experience, rendering our enterprise an a posteriori one.
So science is about aiding our naked eyes with instruments, gathering in information about the contingent world. When we generalize the behaviors of physical objects, we are actually describing two things. First, we are describing the nature and constitution of the physical objects in question. Next, we are describing the laws by which they relate to each other (and my position as of this writing is that these laws are inherent in reality and therefore necessary). This second thing is actually compound. The way things relate to one another is determined both by the inherent order of reality AND by the constitution of the objects. It is difficult to describe the physical nature of something without analyzing how it behaves. Therefore science involves BOTH a priori and a posteriori tasks, but its foundation is laid a priori.
What about laws that have exceptions? If a law is shown to have exceptions to it, then we are not describing the ultimate enough reality. For example, if a white crow is found in Pasadena, then it is demonstrated that it never was actually a law that all crows are black. Laws describe the ultimate reality, where exceptions don't truly exist. If free agency and miracles are real, then the underlying laws are somehow setup to allow for these things. The reasons for their rarity may be accounted for by contingent factors (e.g. stars very rarely explode. In fact, we have no human record of our sun ever exploding. However we know that it will if left alone for long enough. Just because we haven't found out how it might be possible for a man to synthesize wine from water without modern tools, doesn't mean that it is impossible. To conclude so would be an argument from ignorance unless it is shown precisely why it is logically incoherent.). It cannot ever be that a true law, one accurate to the inherent order of things, gets broken. Chaos (randomness, chance, probability) is metaphysically impossible. When thinking about crows, one can see that they are contingent beings. So to incorporate them into the description of a law is problematic from the outset. This problem will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid in science, however. But we should want to get at broader and broader generalizations.
So we are justified in performing scientific tasks, because we know a priori that the order inherent in reality is necessary. Science has as its goals, firstly to help us learn about order (God), secondly to help us learn about this world (creation).
Monday, October 30, 2006
My Solution to Hume: An Addendum to My Journal on the Problem of Induction
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Posted by Louis at 12:55 PM
Labels: Epistemology, Journals, Philosophy of Science
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1 comment:
an example: it is impossible for a world to exist in which a billiard ball set, along with a room and table identical in every respect to one you might find in this world, to behave in different ways. the necessary laws, combined with whatever the physical makeup of the billard balls is, produces the outcomes.
what's interesting is that in Isaiah God cites the reliability of physical laws as a reason to trust in Him.
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