reflections.

Reflecting on the debate L and I are having about the causal nexus between God and morality left me we the following thought. The most pertinent question man can possibly seek is this one:

“To whom do I owe my existence?”

And there seems to be two, and only two, possible answers: either no one or someone. And that’s all the difference in the world. And then I thought about how germane Pascal’s wager is. If you’re an agnostic (which is anyone who is unsure about God’s existence) then the most reasonable thing is to hope with all your heart and mind and soul that something like the Christian God does exist. If such a God does exist then you’re life will not end at death, and you have eternal bliss to look forward to, and even if you’re wrong, living your life in accordance to what the Christian God is genuinely like will only increase the value of your finite life. If you place your bet on the non-existence of the Christian God, all you have to look forward to is this life, and if you’re wrong you’ll be losing out on the most precious life imaginable. Construed as such, the only win-win situation is to hope that God exists and He loves you the way Christ said He does.

I wish everyone a wonderful time celebrating the birth of Jesus Christ.

What Atheists Say About Intelligent Design

1. Some atheists say that Intelligent Design is dead. If this is so, then why can't they shut up about it? This is especially ironic, as they turn right around to harp on the fact that they are in the minority, presumably to gain sympathy and pretend that they are so unique and lonely in their genius. Humans have this tendency to want to make themselves out to be victims; it's like, the thinking man's opium.

2. Some atheists say that Intelligent Design is just religiously motivated, dressed-up Creationism. This is not very precise, as Creationism, (along with it's critiques of ID), is the view that everything was brought into existence by a special act of divine creation. Intelligent Design differs from this, as it does not necessarily posit any deity. Rather, ID posits that design by an intelligent entity is a better explanation for the origin of life than untintelligent processes. The difference is significant, because the Creation Science movement never got far, while the Intelligent Design movement has been advanced, even advocated by some atheists and agnostics, with the help of other atheists. In fact, there are even some atheists using the term to describe their message, that humans were intelligently designed by other humans. The fact that many religious people have latched onto it for obvious reasons, or the claim that it has religious implications, has nothing to do with whether the theory is scientifically credible. Intelligent atheists say, 'let's hash it out, not censor it it'.

It seems to me that we all need to put history, statistics, and even implications aside and just find some common epistemological ground, some common goals, and some love, then set out to do good science and good philosophy in the areas of the origin of the universe, the origin of life, and the origin of species. I don't care what the effects or implications of believing in certain propositions are, I care about whether they are true--pragmatism be damned!

To Derek RE: our latest moral argument discussions

[To the reader: cf. all posts on the Moral Argument for the proper context of this letter.]

Based on your writings and our phone conversation, I perceive your view to be thus: you believe that contingent persons really create morals, which only regard other contingent persons. These "morals" are possible because of a permanent, abstract concept, "good", which is derived from the impersonal facts of the universe. Please correct me if I have your view wrong.

Where I think you missed my point, and where I feel the Russellian Platonist's view should be corrected to understand that if morals exist, then an eternal person of utmost authority exists, goes like this:

A Law of Ought is one person's willing, wanting, and urging for another person to obtain a possible situation. Although it may be possible for contingent persons to create Laws of Ought, their laws can only persist as long as they live and have authority to create laws. Therefore, if any necessary law exists, it means that it was created by a necessary person (ie God).

Let me try to animate my thinking a little more for you; pardon the redundancy of some broad-stroke claims.

So for example, Smoking Teenager (from my adventure) willed, wanted, and urged people in the neighborhood to not trespass. Smoking Teenager, at T1 did not want people to trespass anytime after T1, even though at T1 nobody was actively trespassing. He imagined the situation of another person trespassing and did not like it, so he willed that people not do such a thing. He also urged (in this case through a written linguistic expression--the sign) that people not trespass. This Law of Ought (that people should not trespass) did not exist before he made it. But when he made this Law, it began to exist. When Smoking Teenager dies, this Ought will cease to exist, as there will no longer be a person with authority over this property, wanting, willing, and urging people not to cause the possible situation 'trespassing' to obtain.

It is because Laws of Ought require their creators to possess abilities like imagination, emotion, intellect, will, and authority that they are obviously only able to be created by persons. These attributes are personal, and indeed are critical elements of the definition of what is personal. For example, a rock has no self-consciousness, intellect, feelings, will, or authority. But a human person like me or you may have those things.

A bean stock may have vegetative life, but it has no consciousness.

An orangutan may have consciousness and (physical) feelings (or urges or drives), but he has no intellect and no will (although he may exhibit behaviors roughly expressing what might be called 'desires' he has no 'intentionality', no rational deliberation, he cannot write a book or a meaningful sign saying 'no trespassing'). Orangutan's do not have intellectual, or rational, minds.

No, rocks, bean stocks, and orangutans are not capable of creating Laws of Ought. Only full-fledged persons are. 'Person' roughly meaning here, a united object with definite attributes, including emotion, intellect, and will.

What I meant in my former posts by 'objective', when describing such permanent Laws of Ought as morals, was not only 'real', as you seem to have taken it. What I meant was transcendent. Specifically, I mean by 'transcendent', that the law described exists outside of human (but not personal) existence. So the laws of logic are transcendent, as they exist whether or not there are humans writing truth tables. The laws of math are this way, too. Even the laws of nature, although it is debatable as to their logical necessity, transcend human existence. Transcendent objects like laws are not created by humans, they are not social constructions, they are not artificial, they are not generated by human activity, they persist throughout the birth and death of individuals. Transcendent objects may be discovered, but they may not be generated (by humans).

So step 1 of the argument I have been trying to make clear is that transcendent morals exist. I understand that there are possible situations that we should pursue obtainment of. In other words, we should do certain things. But the things that we should do, these standards for right and wrong, do not change as humans live and die. Although they only regard humans, the standards themselves do not fluctuate in and out of existence (unlike 'no trespassing' signs). Nor do they change. What is right has always been so and will continue to be so, and what is wrong has always been so and will continue to be so. Step 1 then, is that transcendent morals exist.

Step 2 is that Laws of Ought (in this case 'morals', not Monopoly rules or traffic regulations) can only be generated by persons. Like I said, this is so because they regard possibilities (requiring imagination), desires (requiring emotion), and will (requiring intellect). They also bear authority (something only a person can wield).

So then it is not only that the property or relation 'good' is predicated of certain situations, it is that 'good' situations are things that we are being urged to pursue. We are wanted to do good. But not only this, an authority wills that we do good, that we obtain those possibilities that are described as 'good'. We should perform good deeds because an authority over us tells, urges, desires, wills, and wants us to. Good things most often happen to be those things which preserve life and uphold truth and nourish souls, but these things, these good things, should be pursued because of a personal requirement of us to do so. This is analogous to the 'no trespassing' sign, but it is different in that these moral laws do not change, and are above man made laws in authority. This is where I have begun to understand Dostoevsky. To perceive a moral is to apprehend that there is a person who is requiring adherence to it.

A 'moral' is not a situation. It is not a moral, 'man loves wife'. Rather, the moral would be 'the situation man loves wife should be pursued'. Even if the situation 'man loves wife' is said to be a 'good' situation, morality is not yet being described. Rather, the 'good' situation 'man loves wife' is something that we ought to cause to obtain. In other words, someone cares that we do what is right. Someone is urging us to do what is good. There is a will that supposes us to comply. There is an authority that has generated these Laws of Ought. Only persons may generate Laws of Ought (like morality).

Step 3 is easy, for if oughts can only be generated by persons, and permanent, authoritative oughts exist, then it logically follows that there is a person who does not come into existence or die, a person with authority greater than any human person. So...

(1) Oughts are generated by persons
(2) Necessary Oughts exist
(3) ∴ a necessary Person exists

This is like saying that if we perceive with our minds some moral ought like 'it is wrong to rape', we are looking at a cosmic sign saying 'no trespassing', a perception that logically leads to belief in a person who generated that ought and has the authority to enforce it. This differs from saying that,

(1) Oughts are generated by persons
(2') Oughts exist
(3') ∴ persons exists

This seems to be your argument, but the key deviance from mine is (2'). Although you verbally affirm that objective morality exists, your view does not allow for it. For if any Ought persists despite individual humans living and dying, then my conclusion is necessitated.

Now, if you happen to believe that the universe we live in is somehow in existence without a God, and it itself is impersonal, but nevertheless capable of evolving persons, then the BEST you can do if you grant (2) is to say that the universe coughed up a person, then that person generated morality. If you only grant (2), then you can deny (1), and there is no problem for you. "Morality", if it can be called such, is then relative to each individual human person who generates his own. Societies can then construct agreements, and life can go on as you seem to want it to. BUT this entails that you must concede that under your view there are no necessary morals, no transcendent, objective 'oughts'. There is no right and wrong that is above man made Laws of Ought (on the level of traffic regulations, copyright infringement, transgressions of the Geneva Convention, identity theft, taxes, etc.). The laws that human authorities make are the highest standards man should follow, and there is nothing above them or beyond them. You therefore forfeit the right to call things like the Holocaust (sorry for the example, Chris) "evil" unless you qualify it with the statement that it is evil according to your own made-up rules. In other words you are forced to say 'because I say the Holocaust was wrong, it was wrong'. You can't say that the individual Nazi's under Hitler's authority should have known better, for they were being obedient to their sovereign. Surely it makes no sense (even under this view) to say that every man should follow his own made up rules, deviating from the commandments of their sovereign. If this were so, the government would have no right to punish murders or anybody for that matter, on the account that each individual should be expected to behave as he himself deems fit. I am not here refuting your view, but you have to admit this in the tradition of your clear-thinking atheist fathers such as Nietzsche and Sartre. These men agreed with my argument, but rejected God's existence and as a consequence rejected all notions of morality (transcendent morality).

If you accept (1), you can reject (2). Perhaps morality can be generated by impersonal objects, or perhaps moral laws are like logic or math - they are just necessary components of the universe. To argue for this, however, you must either a. show that neither emotion, intellect, nor will are required to generate moral oughts, or b. show that neither emotion, intellect, nor will are personal attributes.

But if you grant (1), and (2), which you seem to be trying to do, then you must show where my logic is wrong. How is the conclusion not entailed by the premises? Where does my fallacy lie?

What exactly is the view of the RP in reply to this? Can you show me how her view is coherent, and why my critiques are not valid?

Atheist Anne Rice of "Interview with the Vampire" Finds Transformation in Life and Writing Because of Christ the Lord

Anne Rice

famous for her vampire series, a couple entries of which were made into the movies Interview with the Vampire, and Queen of the Damned, just popped out an intriguing new book, surprising both her current fans and those with any interest in Christ who also own even a minute appetite for literature.

Anne Rice describes her book as the product of her life, after having grown up Catholic and abandoning her superficial faith for atheism, becoming uncomfortably fascinated with the occult, then truly finding Christ and converting to Christianity upon the culmination of years of studying the Bible and the most respected New Testament criticism and scholarship.

In the original Author's Note, she confesses,

From [the time of my husband's death] on... I have studied the New Testament period, and I continue to study. I read constantly, night and day.

I have covered an enormous amount of skeptical criticism, violent arguments, and I have read voraciously in the primary sources of Philo and Josephus which I deeply enjoy.

Having started with the skeptical critics, those who take their cue from the earliest skeptical New Testament scholars of the Enlightenment, I expected to discover that their arguments would be frighteningly strong, and that Christianity was, at heart, a kind of fraud. I'd have to end up compartmentalizing my mind with faith in one part of it, and truth in another. And what would I write about Jesus? I had no idea. But the prospects were interesting. Surely he was a liberal, married, had children, was a homosexual, and who knew what? But I must do my research before I wrote one word.

These skeptical scholars seemed very sure of themselves. They built their books on certain assertions without even examining these assertions. How could they be wrong? The Jewish scholars presented their case with such care. Certainly Jesus was simply an observant Jew or a Hasid who got crucified. End of story.

I read and I read and I read. Sometimes I thought I was walking through the valley of the shadow of Death, as I read. But I went on, ready to risk everything. I had to know who Jesus was--that is, if anyone knew, I had to know what that person knew.

Now, I couldn't read the ancient languages, but as a scholar I can certainly follow the logic of an argument; I can check the footnotes, and the bibliographical references; I can go to the biblical text in English. I can check all the translations I have and I have every one of which I know from Wycliffe to Lamsa, including the New Annotated Oxford Bible and the old Catholic translation, and every literary translation I can find. I have offbeat translations scholars don't mention, such as that by Barnstone and Schonfield. I acquired every single translation for the light it might shed on an obscure line.

What gradually became clear to me was that many of the skeptical arguments--arguments that insisted most of the Gospels were suspect, for instance, or written too late to be eyewitness accounts--lacked coherence. They were not elegant. Arguments about Jesus himself were full of conjecture. Some books were no more than assumptions piled upon assumptions. Absurd conclusions were reached on the basis of little or no data at all.

In sum, the whole case for the nondivine Jesus who stumbled into Jerusalem and somehow got crucified by nobody and had nothing to do with the founding of Christianity and would by horrified by it if he knew about it--that whole picture which had floated in the liberal circles I frequented as an atheist for thirty years--that case was not made. Not only was it not made, I discovered in this field some of the worst and most biased scholarship I'd ever read.

Anne Rice, Christ the Lord, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006), p. 329-330.

Rice goes on to describe the criticisms and historical scholarship she read--a large body of works on either side of the argument, to be sure. She continues to describe her very own conversion experience, and follows this all up with another note to the paperback edition.

As for the book itself, I am thoroughly enjoying it. She is a very engaging writer, capturing subtle movements of eyes and bodies and social cues, communicating the faint smells and textures of 7-year-old Jesus' experience from his own perspective as he comes to learn about how the prophecies concerning the messiah line up with his own birth and childhood. Little Jesus comedically works a few miracles by accident, weeps into Mary's bosom, perceives John's constant staring at him, holds little Salome's hand, gets excited to visit the temple, and has his little heart broken on a number of occasions. Jesus' full and complete humanity is anti-gnostically affirmed, as the fullness and completeness of his deity glimmers through this veil.

MSNBC reports on the fans of Anne's work during the isolated study that led to her conversion,

After 25 novels in 25 years, Rice, 64, hasn't published a book since 2003's "Blood Chronicle," the tenth volume of her best-selling vampire series. They may have heard she came close to death last year, when she had surgery for an intestinal blockage, and also back in 1998, when she went into a sudden diabetic coma; that same year she returned to the Roman Catholic Church, which she'd left at 18. They surely knew that Stan Rice, her husband of 41 years, died of a brain tumor in 2002. And though she'd moved out of their longtime home in New Orleans more than a year before Hurricane Katrina, she still has property there—and the deep emotional connection that led her to make the city the setting for such novels as "Interview With the Vampire." What's up with her? "For the last six months," she says, "people have been sending e-mails saying, 'What are you doing next?' And I've told them, 'You may not want what I'm doing next'." We'll know soon. In two weeks, Anne Rice, the chronicler of vampires, witches and—under the pseudonym A. N. Roquelaure—of soft-core S&M encounters, will publish "Christ the Lord: Out of Egypt," a novel about the 7-year-old Jesus, narrated by Christ himself. "I promised," she says, "that from now on I would write only for the Lord." It's the most startling public turnaround since Bob Dylan's "Slow Train Coming" announced that he'd been born again.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9785289/site/newsweek/

As for Anne, she continues to study and write, planning two sequels to Christ the Lord, writing both solidly helpful and controversial Amazon book reviews, and enjoying her newfound relationship with God.

Don't Cry Out.

My roommate Oscar Martinez is a film major at Cal State Fullerton and he made this video for one of his film classes. I think the whole thing was shot in our garage and on a little patch of grass at our condo complex, and the guy in the video is the husband of a girl I work with at Starbucks. I think it's pretty cool so I thought I would post it here to celebrate a job well done on the skimpiest budget ever! You're awesome Oscar!



And for all you animal lovers, animals were harmed in the making of this video.

a question for lots of animal rights people.

Tonight at my Starbucks the following exchange took place between myself and a coworker who prides herself on being vegetarian for reasons related to animal rights.

Amber: Hey, do you have any chicken left for me? (I had just eaten some lemon chicken from pick-up-sticks)

Me: No! Sorry, I ate every last bit of my chicken.

Amber: I’m just kidding silly! Don’t you remember I’m a vegetarian?

Me: Oh yeah. (fake laugh)

And then I got to thinking.

In my experience, by and large, those who are animal rights advocates (and not just people who happen to think animals should be treated fairly, but people who are nearly militant about the subject), also happen to support abortion rights. So would they have a problem with eating veal (or any other organism in its fetal state) if we were able to harvest them without doing harm to any other animals in the process? For the person who thinks human organisms have no rights when in the fetal stage, what would be the consistency in thinking non-human organism do?

Or better yet. Peter Singer (bioethics chair at Princeton, author of Animal Liberation) has argued that it’s completely arbitrary to define life in terms of the born/unborn distinction since the born and unborn organism, biologically speaking, is still one and the same organism. In fact he thinks the only non-arbitrary demarcation between life and no-life (when it comes to the endowment of rights) is consciousness; if an organism is conscious it is an organism which has rights. Part of such reasoning is that an unconscious biological entity can hardly be thought of a thing deserving of rights (think of flagellum and tangerines), and furthermore a biologically unconscious entity cannot be self-conscious and hence cannot even value or reckon its own existence, much less feel pain and experience the world. Such entities, Singer thinks, are not the sort of things which we think have rights. A curious implication of this idea is that the right to abortion currently tolerated to various degrees in nearly the entire western world, and almost the whole world, would also include infanticide, since, as empirical psychology has shown, infants are typically not conscious (or at least exhibit no signs of self-consciousness anyway) until the age of two or so.* In such cases Peter Singer thinks that the reasoning (correct, in his view) concerning the right to abortion combined with the only non-arbitrary criteria of life (with respect to rights) justifies the killing of human organisms before they reach the age of two (or whenever they exhibit self-consciousness). God bless empiricism.

So what if scientists were able to clone zygotes (which already exist in laboratory freezers throughout the world) of all the animals humans eat; then harvest them through the fetal stage and through the early stages of infancy; and then replace their brains with a synthetic silicon one that, unlike the brain, does not produce consciousness; and then have them wirelessly hooked up to computers which neurologically get the animals to do all the things animals usually do (but be not conscious, they would be zombie animals); and then when all is ready and plump we stop their biological life (we would kill them), and then we eat them. Assuming that this is all technologically and economically feasible, would the eating of animals be justified? It seems that on Singer’s terms such animals would be in nothing more than fantastic vegetables and vegetarians are okay with eating vegetables. It seems in such a scenario there would be clearly nothing wrong with eating meat.

___________________________
Tangent note:

* I think it’s impossible, on principle, to know whether something is conscious or not from any point of view other than the point of view of the subject whose consciousness is in question (that is, an objective point of view) which would include any and all sciences. To be conscious is never identical to exhibiting conscious behavior, and if something is conscious the only thing that could ever know it is the one who is conscious, or perhaps a mind vicarious enough for such a feat (God’s mind).

what the heavens are abstract objects?

A week or so ago James Gibson let me borrow Peter van Inwagen’s essays on philosophical theology, and the first article is a critique of all (known) ontological arguments, with special attention given to Alvin Plantinga’s formulation.

I’ve yet to fully comprehend the meat of van Inwagen’s argument against all known ontological arguments, but I definitely have beef with something van Inwagen says in the preliminary stages of his argument. I’ll quote the beginning of the section III at length:

Let us now turn to ontological arguments. We said that there were ontic
arguments that could be regarded as arguments for the existence of a
Deity. But this is vague, since it is not clear in the case of every set
of properties whether it could be instantiated only by a Deity. For
example, could something that is not a Deity instantiate the set {N, being the
maker of the world}(1)? It seems (epistemically) possible that, if
there were a necessary being who was the maker of the world, this being
might also be rather limited in power and knowledge, indifferent to the
sufferings of its creatures, and perhaps even made the world out of some
inchoate stuff that existed independently of its will. Should we be
willing to apply the term ‘Deity’ to such a being? Perhaps some would and
some wouldn’t, and this indicates the concept of a Deity (and hence our concept
of an ontological argument) is vague.
Let us therefore replace this vague idea of an ontological argument with a more precise one. It is clear that, whatever ‘Deity’ might reasonably be supposed to
mean, and Deity must be a nonabstract object. (I shall call nonabstract
objects concrete without regard for the etymology or philosophical history of
this word.)
I am not sure how to go about analyzing the notion of an abstract object, but I
think it is an important and intelligible notion. There are things that we
can see, hear, be cut or burned by, love, hate, worship, make, mend, trust in,
fear, and covet. These are the sorts of thing I mean by “concrete
object.” And there are things we could not possibly stand in anyone of
these relations to, for example, properties, propositions, sentence-types, sets,
and systems of natural deduction- and these I call “abstract objects.”
Let us suppose that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is
clear enough to go on… (pg. 28)

My point of contention is this ostensive distinction between abstract and concrete objects doesn’t at all make clear the salient differences between the two. What exactly is the criterion for a certain object to be either abstract of concrete?

I’ve never actually done any studying on the distinction between abstract and concrete objects; they’ve only come up as peripheral points in the metaphysics literature I’ve been exposed to. To my knowledge I don’t think there is even a book whose primary content is the exposition of the distinction. In the little research I’ve done Frege’s On the Foundation of Mathematics and David Lewis’ The Way of Negation seems to be the primary places to which our current assay has been inherited. At this point I’m going to give my current and extremely tentative view of the nature of the distinction and what objects I think fall into which category.

In my experience thus far I’ve come to think of the word ‘abstract’ as having two different senses: the first is adjectival and referring to a type or class of object and the second sense verbal and epistemological.

When ‘abstract’ is used in the former sense it’s about an entity which has no spatial or temporal location. An entity that I almost always read about being in such a category is numbers. The number 1 for instance is an object which has no spatial location and no duration within the universe. It’s also been argued that properties such as “redness” and “being snub-nosed” are things are also abstract entities; but if the criterion for being abstract is that an entity must necessarily not be extended in space and have a specifiable duration then I don’t know what to make of the idea of that properties are abstract. Surely it’s the case the whiteness and being snub-nosed has been extended in space and time, for my door is white and Socrates was said to be snub-nosed, and those things are (and were) extended in space and time.

I suppose this is where the verbal and epistemological sense of ‘abstract’ usually comes into the discussion. Philosophers have maintained that properties are extended in space and time, but the mind has the capacity to abstract from its experience certain properties like whiteness and snub-nosedness from the spatial/temporal things which have such qualities and to think of such properties “in abstraction,” that is, as things in themselves and apart from the object which ‘actually’ have them.

Indeed, some philosophers have maintained that all abstract entities are reducible to the set of things which humans have abstracted from the things which actually have them, and numbers too, are no different. This view says numbers are only true of the world when there is a number of objects, and when the mind observes these objects they abstract from the number of things to think of just number themselves, and only at this point do numbers take on a mode of existence that lacks spatial and temporal dimensions.

For such philosophers then, there presumably is only one genuine sense of ‘abstract,’ and this sense is the epistemological sense which describes the ability of the human mind to artificially remove a property of a thing spatially and temporally extended and to be thought of without being such. Such a construal is often what allows philosophers to make sense of mathematics while still being materialists.


Along with the non-spatiality criterion, Frege thought that the second requisite to be an abstract object was to be causally inefficacious. But I think this account flies in the face of some serious tradition. Plato would deny such a construal. Abstract objects, though neither spatial or temporal entities are surely causally efficacious. What accounts for the possibility of predication in sensible objects (like the white pages in my book) is that such instances stand in certain causal relations to abstract entities, like the form whiteness. If Plato’s account is correct, then abstract entities are not only causally efficacious but causes par excellence.

From what I can tell so far the only unanimous criteria for an entity to abstract is the non-spatial/temporal criteria.

So what of concrete objects? The most obvious contrast that concrete objects have to abstract ones is that concrete objects are spatially and temporally located. May we say then to be concrete is exist temporally and spatially? I think this is uncontroversial, and so it has my tentative alliance.

Well maybe not. If dualism is true or if humans have genuine conscious states that escapes physical description (and reduction), then there is the possibility of existing without being spatially located, for consciousness has no spatial location (if so, where?). But maybe this is too quick. Even if it is the case that consciousness itself is not located anywhere spatially speaking, the perspective had by a conscious state it seems must necessarily be a conscious state of some spatial location or another. I can’t imagine myself being conscious without having a point of view, a vantage point of some space in the universe. Does necessarily having a spatial perspective allow consciousness to join the class of concrete objects? I have no idea.

But let’s pretend the consciousness cannot be admitted to class of concrete objects, does this mean that consciousness is an abstract thing? No. To be abstract an entity cannot be temporally situated, and it seems to be the case that all conscious states are temporally situated.

So this seems to imply that conscious entities are neither abstract nor concrete, and I have no idea how to make sense of this.

Notice, however, that just because something is not concrete it does not mean that it doesn’t exist. Abstract entities, whatever they are, must exist in at least some fashion, or else we wouldn’t be able to intelligibly discuss them.

So let’s go back to van Inwagen’s construal. He seems to think that if God exists, then he’s a concrete object. But what of the fact that to be concrete one must be spatially and temporally located, and if God did exist, and assuming it’s possible he can have a temporal mode of existence, he most certainly would not be spatially located anywhere. So it’s not all clear how van Inwagen thinks that if God does exist he must be a concrete object. Assuming I’m right here, that van Inwagen has misconstrued the mode of God’s existence, I don’t know what kind of implications this might have on his argument.

Any thoughts?






____________________________________

Notes
1. N = the property of necessarily existing.


Works Cited___________________________

SEP on abstract objects.
SEP on God and other necessary beings.


Further Reading________________________

Edward Zalta's webpage.
Edward Zalta's online papers on extremely sexy topics.

Just a Brief Thought on Anselm's "Blasphemy"

I was browsing the blog and re-read Chris' clever post on Aselm's blasphemy. I can't help but wonder if he read Anselm's own rebuttal to Guanilo, and just forgot to include it when responding to the relevant historical text on the matter. I am also curious as to whether Derek's modal ontological argument, or his rehashing of Descartes' ontological argument have been at all considered since their posting. At any rate I had a brief thought on the part where Chris offered his own theological perspective. He argues,

1. God exists and man by necessity of being in every way inferior to him is proved to not exist. Or...

2. Both Man and God exist. Man being in every way inferior to God proves that existence is not a perfection. Therefore the argument is void. Or...

3. Man exists and is therefore in that regard equal to God.

All three assume that existence is binary: either on or off. Either an object exists or it does not. But this is not the whole picture. Certainly there are modes of existence. For example, man's existence is contingent, meaning his creation and sustainance is dependent on things outside himself (for us theists, man's existence is considered dependent on God, but even the atheist must admit that humans are dependent on things like food and water). But God (if He exists) exists necessarily, and a se. He is the source of existence, and sustains even His own. So while the attribute of existence is communcated to man, it is so in a limited sense. This is like sight, which man has, but God has without limits (He is omniscient). This is also like power (or free will), which we reference in God with the term 'omnipotence', while man is only 'potent', and has within himself only a limited ability to determine.

So while man shares in divine attributes, they are only communicated in a limited way, hence 'image of God', not 'exact duplicate of God'. So your lines of reasoning need to be reworked in light of this modality. I have taken the liberty of doing this work for you:

1. God exists and man by necessity of being in every way inferior to [Him] is proved to [exist contingently]. Or...

2. Both Man and God exist. Man being in every way inferior to God proves that [God exists necessarily]. Therefore the argument [still works]. [And]...

3. [That 'man] exists and is therefore in that regard equal to God[' is a void argument].

Arguments (1) and (2) no longer debunk the ontological argument, and (3) no longer renders Anslem a blasphemer (phew!).

Intelligent Design in Peer-Reviewed Publications Despite the Fits of Dogmatic Darwinists

Despite outright denial and dogmatic censoring of legitimate scientific qualms with Darwinism, works supporting the theory of Intelligent Design have in fact been published in many respected, peer-reviewed publications. As to the supposed concessions on this point Behe made in court, examine the manuscript for yourself, or read Dembski's quotes. How did the judge make up his mind? By cutting and pasting an error-filled document from the ACLU, a practice frowned upon by courts. What was that trial about, anyway? Only whether teachers should read the following memo encouraging students to think critically:

The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of which evolution is a part.

Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence is
discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is no
evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations.

Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin's
view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually involves.

With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and their families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses upon preparing students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.

There is no factual error in the memo, it takes a couple seconds to read, and it promotes clear, rational thinking. Although I think it makes little difference whether students hear such a memo or not, I find it hilarious that hysterical characters in the tradition of Richard Dawkins become irately zealous to maintain their lame critiques of Intelligent Design. The irony, I suppose, is that the ruling may have actually opened more doors for the ID movement.

That Laws of Ought Can Only Come from Persons: A Case Study (The Platonic Theist's Appendix)

In jr. high my best friend Luke Langton and I would rollerblade everywhere, all the time. We loved going to Lucky's to buy ice cream. We cruised through the neighborhood like really fast like whoa. This one time we came across a chain-linked fence, separating two touching residential streets. The fence looked like it was on private property - someone's driveway. But if we could have just hopped the fence, it would have saved us a lot of time. But on the fence was a sign saying "No Trespassing". Luke told me that he did it all the time, so we started the climb (note: yes, with our skates on. we're studs). It was a tall fence, and when we were nearing the top and putting our legs over, a looming high school kid came out with baggy jeans, no shirt, a shaved head, and holding a smoking cigarette. We tried to play it cool.

What are you doing?

He asked.

Just taking a short cut,

we replied.

Well, I don't think you should...

He said. We chickened out.

Okay.

We went back the way we came and took off skating. A little anti-climactic, I know. But shut up, work with me.

•••

It seems to me that there are two broad kingdoms of laws. There are Laws of Description, such as mathematical axioms like 'expressions that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another', logical syllogisms such as Modus Ponens, and even Physical Laws like those describing thermodynamics.

Then there are Laws of Ought. These include international, federal, state, and local man made laws, as well as cultural norms, school laws, and your very own 'household rules' for things like how to play Monopoly or Settlers of Catan (which, by the way, we will be playing on Friday, by popular demand). But Laws of Ought also include Moral Laws (if there are any).

So the real life case study provided by the youthful adventures of yours truly can help me demonstrate what I am talking about. The Law of Ought written on the sign, 'No Trespassing' was not a description of the fact that no trespassing ever occurs at that location. In fact, if no trespassing ever occurred at that location, that fact or (if you playfully allow that this case can be expressed so strongly) that law, would exist as a brute fact, lying around the universe. It would be merely a true proposition.

But that was unfortunately not the case, and I cannot triumphantly say that I broke a law of the universe - a Law of Description. Rather, I broke a Law of Ought. The sign was the expression of a personal urging. It bore the authority of it's author, and it regarded a possibility (that of trespassing: a situation it was supposing us not to obtain).

Laws of Ought can thus be easily understood as things that can only be generated by persons. For, Laws of Ought require things that only a person is capable of accomplishing. For example, a Law of Ought regards a possibility. To regard a possibility one must have imagination. Imagination is a function of the intellect. A Law of Ought also bears the will of its author (e.g. the author of the Law of Ought in the case study did not think we should trespass). Finally, a Law of Ought also expresses the emotions of its author (e.g. the author of the Law of Ought in the case study did not want us to trespass, a fact expressed by his coy remarks). Emotion, intellect, and will are personal attributes, and all three are necessary for the author of a Law of Ought to have. The Law of Ought in this case study however, was only man made.

When a human perceives a moral (which is a Law of Ought that happens to be transcendental), he thinks, sees, and/or feels that a situation, for example, should not obtain (e.g. innocent life should not be taken). This refers to a hypothetical situation, requiring both he and the author of the moral to have imagination (differentiating it from a Law of Description). It regards what should or should not occur, requiring will. And, it wields and inspires emotion (a feeling of what is right or wrong). This is why morals are Laws of Ought, and therefore can only have been generated by a person. To grant that morals (objectively defined) exist, should strongly point you to the fact that they were generated by an eternal person, with utmost authority, righteous desires, and the power and intention to enforce them.

Why I am a Global Climate Skeptic

October 17, 2006

Washington DC - One of the most decorated French geophysicists has converted from a believer in manmade catastrophic global warming to a climate skeptic. This latest defector from the global warming camp caps a year in which numerous scientific studies have bolstered the claims of climate skeptics. Scientific studies that debunk the dire predictions of human-caused global warming have continued to accumulate and many believe the new science is shattering the media-promoted scientific “consensus” on climate alarmism.

Claude Allegre, a former government official and an active member of France’s Socialist Party, wrote an editorial on September 21, 2006 in the French newspaper L'Express titled “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (For English Translation, click here: http://epw.senate.gov/fact.cfm?party=rep&id=264835 ) detailing his newfound skepticism about man made global warming. See: http://www.lexpress.fr/idees/tribunes/dossier/allegre/dossier.asp?ida=451670 Allegre wrote that the “cause of climate change remains unknown” and pointed out that Kilimanjaro is not losing snow due to global warming, but to local land use and precipitation changes. Allegre also pointed out that studies show that Antarctic snowfall rate has been stable over the past 30 years and the continent is actually gaining ice...

Allegre has authored more than 100 scientific articles, written 11 books and received numerous scientific awards including the Goldschmidt Medal from the Geochemical Society of the United States.

Allegre's conversion to a climate skeptic comes at a time when global warming alarmists have insisted that there is a “consensus” about man made global warming. Proponents of global warming have ratcheted up the level of rhetoric on climate skeptics recently. An environmental magazine in September called for Nuremberg-style trials for global warming skeptics and CBS News “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley compared skeptics to “Holocaust deniers.” See: http://www.epw.senate.gov/fact.cfm?party=rep&id=264568 & http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/03/22/publiceye/entry1431768.shtml In addition, former Vice President Al Gore has repeatedly referred to skeptics as "global warming deniers."

This increase in rhetorical flourish comes at a time when new climate science research continues to unravel the global warming alarmists’ computer model predictions of future climatic doom and vindicate skeptics.

60 Scientists Debunk Global Warming Fears

Earlier this year, a group of prominent scientists came forward to question the so-called “consensus” that the Earth faces a “climate emergency.” On April 6, 2006, 60 scientists wrote a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister asserting that the science is deteriorating from underneath global warming alarmists.

“Observational evidence does not support today's computer climate models, so there is little reason to trust model predictions of the future…Significant [scientific] advances have been made since the [Kyoto] protocol was created, many of which are taking us away from a concern about increasing greenhouse gases. If, back in the mid-1990s, we knew what we know today about climate, Kyoto would almost certainly not exist, because we would have concluded it was not necessary,” the 60 scientists wrote. See: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=3711460e-bd5a-475d-a6be-4db87559d605

U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Aside from the U. S. Senate reporting on the advancements in science which have recently been debunking global warming alarmists, India remains unconvinced of the threat:

Almost as soon as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming came into effect on February 15, Kashmir suffered the highest snowfall in three decades with over 150 killed, and Mumbai recorded the lowest temperature in 40 years. Had temperatures been the highest for decades, newspapers would have declared this was proof of global warming. But whenever temperatures drop, the press keeps quiet...

The models have not been tested for reliability over 100 years, or even 20 years. Different models yield variations in warming of 400%, which means they are statistically meaningless.

India Times

I sometimes get confused as to the facts about whether our planet is warming or cooling, over how long a timeline, and whether it is good or bad. Then occasionally I stumble accross a helpful science-whiz like this nice chap, who goes and clears everything up: global warming can sometimes cause... global cooling!

Scientists announced in the July 21, 1999, edition of the journal Nature findings that suggest that global warming can sometimes lead to cold weather or even a worldwide freeze...

Dinosauria Online

Now, I am just a tender young man without any real scientific training, much less access to resources, tools, time, and grant money to go out and research this business for myself. I am forced to pick which authorities to listen to. Given the limited amount of research I have done so far (research meaning, I have read others' research), I have felt no choice but to become a global climate skeptic. Here's the basic run down of what I don't want:

• I don't want to look outside my window and see filthy air anymore
• I don't want our machines to spew forth man made chemicals in abundance before we are sure what it is going to do to the environment
• I don't want to stop researching global climate
• I don't want unnecessary, unfounded, and expensive regulations on businesses
• I don't want the U.S. to be an international renegade by refusing to sign what everyone else is
• I don't want politicians to be false about their causes just to gain campaign funds and votes

From "The Sound of Circular Reasoning Exploding"

Recent experiments cause a central tenet of NDE to miss the prediction. Large swaths of junk DNA (non-coding, no known fuction) were found to be highly conserved between mice and men. A central tenet of NDE is that unexpressed (unused) genomic information is subject to relatively rapid corruption from chance mutations. If it’s unused it won’t do any harm if it mutates into oblivion. If it’s unused long enough it gets peppered with mutations into random oblivion. If mice and men had a common ancestor many millions of years ago and they still have highly conserved DNA in common, the story follows that all the conserved DNA must have an important survival value.

A good experiment to figure out what unknown purpose the non-coding conserved pieces are doing would be to cut them out of the mouse genome and see what kind of damage it does to the mouse. So it was done. Big pieces of junk DNA with a thousand highly conserved regions common between mice and men was chopped out of the mouse. In amazement the mouse was as healthy as a horse (so to speak). The amazed researchers were in such a state because they were confident NDE predicted some kind of survival critical function and none was found.

Uncommon Descent: The Intelligent Design Weblog of William Dembski, Denyse O'Leary and Friends

Why is it that predictions made by Darwinian Evolutionists continue to be falsfified?

The information discussed in Dembski's blog was published at here, at NewScientist.com.

"There is no such thing as human superiority"
-Dwight D. Eisenhower

Ashley's Testimony

In one of my classes the students are organized into cohorts, which have to meet weekly to discuss course content. After meeting with my cohort every week throughout the semester I began to get to know them. During the course of a particular conversation, one of my new friends, Ashley Schroeder, shared a little bit about an experience she called a miracle. I asked her if she would be willing to send me a quick email, answering two things. I wanted to know what she considered a "miracle", and I also wanted a brief description of the one she thought she experienced. This is the email I got back:

Sorry life is crazy! Here is some of it... if you want more info then I
will give it to you. I think a miracle is an act that only God could do
for which there is no other explanation.

It is hard for me to see how anyone could deny Christ because of all He
has done for me. I have suffered from severe asthma since I was little.
During high school I rarely went three or four days with out one if not
two attacks. It was hard and left me weak and sick. Coming to Biola was
a rough transition. My first semester here I got sent to the hospital ER
with a really bad attack, worse than any before. I was released after 6
hours, exhausted and weak. I was still struggling with multiple attacks a
week. Then I had one so bad I was in the hospital for four days at the
beginning of my spring semester. The Tuesday after this attack I was at
my bible study, and I started having another attack, the group began to
pray over me, and it stopped. I have never had an attack since. It is
truly a miracle of God and an awesome one at that.


Ashley Schroeder~

Sigma lobby gang 4ever! :)

Ashley is a senior, so it has been three years since her last asthma attack. Is her belief that the stopping of her asthma attacks is a miracle worked by God able to be demonstrated conclusively? Is it reasonable? Is she rational for adding this to her pile of reasons to believe, next to other experiences (perhaps less miraculous), a cosmological argument, 30 units of theological study, and years of reading the bible? If her reasons to believe outweigh the arguments and testimonies of nonchristians that she has heard, is her faith understandable? Should we ask Ashley to withold belief until she has read every book and spoken to every scientist about whether or not God exists?

the Platonic Theist answers her Russellian friend

Prologue:
Let's be clear about our the question at large. Atheists and theists may both live moral lives if they chose to. Atheists and theists may both believe in the existence of morality (regardless of whether such belief is warranted). Atheists and theists may both postulate systems of morality (regardless of whether such systems point their owner to other beliefs). What I am trying to establish is that the existence of transcendental moral facts points to the existence of God. If you think that morality is relative, that's fine - I am not attacking your view. I would however, argue that morality, popularly defined, is objective. So I say that you should revise your language; but I am not trying to debunk your view at this particular juncture.

Introduction:
The best atheistic worldview that yet affirms the existence of objective moral facts is one held by a realistic, yet fictitious Russellian Platonist. Derek's character is described thus:

she thinks there are certain moral facts lingering around the universe and can cause certain things be or not be the case when certain things are done or not done. So a Russellian Platonist believes the predicate good is true of the universe. But unlike in mathematics and logic when having a conversation about the predicate good she cannot help think that such conversation about goodness is usually a conversation about humanity

http://rawtheology.blogspot.com/2006/12/russellian-platonist-wants-to-know.html

Such a character is indeed manufactured for the purpose of doing good philosophy. We should be concerned about making the best and most ultimate arguments and conclusions. So, even though Derek himself believes in both objective morality and the Christian God, he happens to believe that it is in fact possible to be both an atheist, and coherently affirm the existence of objective moral facts. Just for fun, I rummaged around and was able to scrounge up a primary source that thinks along Derek's lines:

Atheists who are in fact materialists would find it very difficult to accommodate transcendental moral facts to their worldview, but atheists who are not materialists need not find any difficulty in doing so. A non-materialist atheist can, for instance, follow Plato in supposing that transcendental moral facts exist in their own right as brute facts. Hence, the argument that atheism precludes transcendental moral facts by virtue of excluding the transcendent altogether, is unsound.

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/moral.html

Argument 1:
I will set aside the possible argument from the fact that Plato's "Good" is widely considered to be thought personal by him, rendering him a theist of sorts. Rather, for the sake of argument, I will allow that it is possible to be an Atheist/Russellian Platonist about numbers. When it comes to morality however, things get more difficult for such an atheist.

As numbers are nonphysical and unchanging in value and relation, our fried would say that they are transcendent, organizing, eternal principles of the universe. Such a view is only one step short of theism. For theism only requires the set of all such things to be personal.

But the difference between mathematical axioms and moral facts is that morality is personal. How can something impersonal ask you to do something? Can an impersonal set of universal brute facts say that you should do something? Or is logic itself capable of judging one circumstance as "bad" and one as "good"? Mathematics and logic concern dry tautologies. There is nothing about 2+2=5 that is morally wrong; it is just plain false - it cannot be. But the life of an innocent man being taken is a scenario that can be. And yet it isn't supposed to be. But Who is supposing such a situation to not be? The very nature of an ought is that it comes from a person. It is impossible that a mindless set of brute facts produce such moral oughts. The moment you leave mathematical Platonism, and perceive there to be such things as moral facts, is the moment you render yourself a theist. For the theist is just a Platonist who says that brute facts such as math and logic are descriptions of the nature of God, and moral facts are descriptions of the character of God. For, moral facts concern agents alone, and can be generated by character and command only - not some sterile, impersonal, universal just-about-almost-a-god-but-missing-personhood. Ought implies authority - a personal attribute.

Argument 2:
No matter how hard you try, unless you postulate God, you will always have a meta problem when it comes to morality. For example: suppose our Russellian Platonist affirms the existence of objective mathematical facts, and objective moral facts, yet denies the existence of any eternal person. Our friend still cannot tell me why it is wrong to transgress this moral law. Even if it is indeed "wrong" to do action W (according to the universe), so what if every human on earth performs W? Who cares?

Argument 3:
Finally, Who will hold you accountable to such moral oughts? Suppose I am able to perform a crime such that nobody will ever arrest me. Now, suppose I am so convinced of my own righteousness that I never feel bad about it. Also suppose that said crime benefits me materially or relationally for the duration of my life. Under the Russellian Platonists view, there is nobody to hold me accountable for my transgression! So this "morality" spoken of isn't really anything at all. The Russelliaon Platonist can give such a criminal no reasons for being moral, or even an argument for why such a criminal "ought" to have done otherwise.

Conclusion:
Morality is something by persons and for persons. To affirm that there is a transcendent morality is to entail that there is an eternal person of unsurpassed authority, whose character and command dictate right and wrong, and who has the power and intention to hold lower persons accountable for such oughts.

Epilogue:
Such a God, being thus just, could not allow crimes to go unpunished. But how sublime it is that God Himself became incarnate as a man, to live a righteous life, only to die as a substitute for you and me! In this way the moral lawgiver Himself walked in our nature and fulfilled the law so that He could pay our debt to Himself! Thanks be to God that all we have to do to accept such a gift is to confess with our mouths that Jesus is Lord, and believe in our hearts that God raised Him from the dead!

the Russellian Platonist wants to know!

Preliminary remarks

Following G.E. Moore in his Principia Ethica I think we cannot analyze the fundamental moral predicate ‘good’ and its abstraction ‘goodness’ into any necessary and sufficient parts. This is to say that goodness or the good is something simple and therefore not reducible to anything else. So what of ethical theories? Is not the attempt of any and all ethical theories (deontology, utilitarianism, etc.) a matter of discovering what makes things like actions and intentions ‘good’? Well that depends. If these theories attempt to reduce the predicate ‘good’ to anything other than itself, whether it be actions or intentions or what have you, then all ethical theories are a failure, simply because simple things can never be reduced to anything else. But if ethical theories are not about reduction, but rather showing the principles that explain why the predicate obtains in some instances and absent in others, then ethics (construed as such an endeavor) is certainly a worthy enterprise.

Maybe an illustration might help. The fact that goodness is a simple quality and unanalyzable explains the disagreement between ethical theorists. When such theorists engage in a debate about their theories one will say that such and such things are what bring about goodness, and the other will disagree and say other such and suchs bring about an instance of the predicate good. The only thing that makes sense of this phenomenon is that the subject matter the debate is taking place over is one and same thing; if they’re not arguing over the same subject, then it’s simply impossible that their arguing at all. As it turns out all ethical theories presuppose the subject to which a certain theory is attempting to give an account; all ethical theories unanimously agree that there is such a thing as goodness, or else none of them are attempting to explain the very same thing. When a deontologist says it’s action that are good or bad, or a utilitarian says it’s the outcome of an action that is good, both are acting as complete non skeptics about whether or not good exists, they just disagree which things the predicate is true of. Hopefully this makes sense…

So on my Moorean view goodness is a simple mind independent quality of some things and not others. Some things cause an instance of goodness, some things are indifferent to goodness, and other things cause the goodness to abstain when it would have otherwise obtained (these things are typically called ‘evil’).

the Russellian Platonist

A Russellian Platonist is one who believes that the world is comprised of whatever it happens to be comprised of, nothing more, nothing less. (I call it this view ‘Russellian’ because the early Bertrand Russell ((before he was corrupted by a man named Wittgenstein)) held something close to the view I’m about to explicate). A Russellian Platonist believes there such things as predicates. She thinks that two specially/temporally separated objects can contain the very same thing; she thinks both the shade of white on one page of her book is the same shade of white on the next, even when she cuts the book in half, separating the book into two distinct objects. She thinks for materialism to be true all things must be spatially or temporally located and no single object can be in two places at once. Since she believes that the white on the first half of the torn book is the very same white found on the pages of the other torn half she thinks a certain thing can be in two places at once (namely the white on the separate pages), she thinks that such an observation confounds the prospects of materialist doctrine (that no object can be in two places at once) and so she’s no materialist.

She also thinks that there has been some profoundly interesting things discovered in modern neurology, but despite all of the discovers she’s never seen the pain she feels when someone pricks her with a pin; she’s seen the CAT scans, understands the biochemical reactions going on in her brain, she’s knows what part of her brain they happen in, but yet she’s never seen what she feels, nothing looks like her pain. She thinks that maybe the issue of pain is complicated because after all it’s intimately associated with physical factors like pinpricks and banging funny bones. But there’s less mushy cases like when she feels depressed about a friend dying or happy about her other friend’s birthday. She knows the neurological factors in those cases, but still she’s never ever seen her experiences of depression and happiness in her text books. She even ran a google image search of the words ‘happiness' and ‘depression’, and when she does she sees things associated with such experiences, but she never sees her actual inner experience; she never sees the things she feels.

A Russellian Platonist also believes that numbers are located no where, that two plus two equaling four would still be true even if the physical world never existed, so she believes that there are certain necessary propositions that are timeless and hardly physical. She also believes there a priori propositions, synthetic or otherwise, are true about the world but not located anywhere, and further more she knows she knows them, and she knows she didn’t learn them strictly through sense experiences, so she knows her mind is of the sort that can experience things that escape physical description and know things that don’t depend on the (physical) world’s existence to be true.

In summary a Russellian Platonist is a dualist about the world. She believes that the universe is a mix of physical and non physical things, both fundamental to her experiences in one way or another and both are equally real.

She also happens to think that when she does good things, like help the poor or sacrifice her time against her initial will for a longtime friend she is doing what she ought, and that such a state of affairs betrays any physical description she has heard, so she thinks there are certain moral facts lingering around the universe and can cause certain things be or not be the case when certain things are done or not done. So a Russellian Platonist believes the predicate good is true of the universe. But unlike in mathematics and logic when having a conversation about the predicate good she cannot help think that such conversation about goodness is usually a conversation about humanity, and not say flying bats or baseballs- unless of course the bats and baseballs in questions were flung at a human by another human with ill intention to cause undue harm. So like her experience of pain and happiness, the predicate good is what happens to a mind, and if it goes beyond that it’s because the predicate good was instantiated by something beyond itself, like celebrating her friend’s birthday.

But a Russellian Platonist is no theist. She’s been unmoved by the best of theistic arguments and she has yet to have sensus divinitas encounter with the Divine. She overheard L S discussing a curious question concerning the necessary nexus between God and the predicate good, and she became extremely interested to hear about how the predicate good shares a special nexus to the Divine which no other class of objects in existence has. She knows that if God did happen to exist that all things would depend on Him, but she’s curious to know what specifically the connection between God and good have that would not also be true of any other object.

So L, please explain to the Russellian Platonist why she must believe God to exist for her to believe the things she does about goodness. I know you gave an argument towards the end of your latest post on this subject, but I’d appreciate it if you could tailor it down a bit more to appeal to our Russellian Platonist’s liking.

Sanders & Lenin: Coincidence? I think not.

The New God Theory