Wednesday, June 27, 2007

the argument from universals.

An argument for platonic realism regarding universals (that abstract entities exist and can do so without dependence on their instances) takes the following form:

(1) There is a possible world where there are no particular things colored red.

(2) Despite the fact of (1), the following propositions are true, and necessarily so; that ‘necessarily, red is a color (there is no possible world where red is not a color)’, and ‘necessarily, red resembles orange more than it does blue, (there is no possible world where red doesn’t resemble orange more than it does blue’, and also that ‘necessarily, no single indivisible entity can be both red and green at the same time (there is no possible world where a single thing can be both red and green).

(3) Since the propositions expressed in (2) are necessary truths, they are also true in the possible world expressed in premise (1). But (1) stipulated that that there is a world where no particular thing is colored red. So the question is, if propositions are true or false in virtue of the content they express, how can it be the case in the possible world where there are no instances of red that propositions expressed in premise (2) are true? The way it out is to assert (4).

(4) In a possible world where nothing in particular is colored red the necessary propositions expressed in (2) are true because they refer to the form of red, which is an uninstantiated universal. Therefore,

(5) Platonism in true.

The only way out of this consequence, it seems, is the denial of the last part of (3); namely, that propositions can only be true or false in virtue of the content they express and refer too. To say it another way, one must deny that propositions need not have intention to be true or false. But this seems crazy, and I cannot even begin to conceive of what this might look like, so pending further enlightenment by some sneaky Aristotelians, I must declare (5).

Well, assuming everything I’ve articulated adds up, consider the following proposition:

(6) Necessarily, to be a person is to have rational faculties (either dormant or otherwise).

If (6) is true, then so is

(7) There is a possible world where there are no instances of persons, but since (6) is necessarily true, it’s also true in such a world. But if (6) is true (and necessarily so),

(8) (6) is (necessarily) true in virtue of the fact that it expresses, namely, that a person necessarily has rational faculties (dormant or otherwise). If this is a fact, then there is at least one person, and He must necessarily exist, since (6) could only be true in virtue of this fact. And if there is a person that exists necessarily, then he can be nothing other than what men call God.


... No, I presume I may say that we
more certainly know that there is a
God than that there is anything else without
us. When I say we know I mean there
is such knowledge within our reach which
we cannot miss, if we will but apply our
minds to that, as we do to several other
inquiries.


John Locke,
Chapter X of Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Saturday, June 23, 2007

What if the Universe is Infinite?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the universe really has existed forever, without beginning. Although I have objections to this, I will concede it momentarily.

Imagine the universe exists without a beginning. Does this entail atheism? Of course not. There may have been a God who created an eternal universe. Does the existence of this possibility entail theism? No, of course not.

But if the universe exists eternally, certain cosmological arguments are undercut. For example, those that require that the universe had a beginning. My cosmological argument is one such, and would be undercut should it be shown that the universe is in fact infinite.

But cosmological (and ontological) arguments that only require the universe to be contingent are not undercut. Those atheists who posit an infinite universe still beg the question of why there exists a universe at all, rather than no universe. Such a universe would still require something logically prior to it.

Can't the universe exist by necessity? I posit 'no', as I commit no logical fallacy when I imagine a "world" in which nothing exists - no matter, no energy, no time, no space. Anselmian theists maintain that God is logically necessary, unlike the universe. Thus, He may be logically prior to the universe.

Tuesday, June 05, 2007

On Love

Love hath not to do with naught but the lover, nor hath it to do with naught but the beloved.