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[ ] of the Gaps

When asked, "what was the sufficient cause of the universe?", two individuals respond.

Mr. Materialist Scientist answers, "We don't know the answer yet, but we have philosophical reasons to believe that it was a material cause that modern physical science will be able to discover. We have some theories that model how it may have happened."

Mr. Dualist Theist answers, "We don't know the details yet, but we have philosophical reasons to believe that it was an immaterial cause. We have some theories that model how it may have happened."

haha

Communism killed 100 million people and all I got was this silly t-shirt.

Blog Action Day

On October 15th, Raw (A)Theology will be participating in Blog Action Day. The only requirement is that we post entries whose subject is the environment. So think about what effort you want to make, start writing and refining, and let your entry loose on October 15th.

another dualism discussion.

see comments 6-8 to see me trying to defend dualism @ show me the agument.

the argument from propsitions. Redux.

Consider Goldbach’s conjecture:

(G) Every even number greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes.

No one, mathematician or otherwise, has either confirmed or refuted this conjecture. I suppose this hasn’t happened yet for two related reasons. No human mind has yet been able to cognize a set whose cardinality is ∞, and if they could cognize such a set, the task of confirming the conjecture would be an endless process- there just is no final member of a set with a cardinality of ∞.

But what’s crazy is that Goldbach’s conjecture, regardless of our failure to find it out, is either true of false; which means as of right now the proposition expressed in (G) is either true or false. Okay, so maybe that doesn’t seem crazy yet. But give me a sec.

Consider that propositions are things only minds can be acquainted with. Why so? Because minds are the only things that can think and therefore they are the only things that can be acquainted with propositions. What’s worse is that propositions seem to depend on minds for their existence. Why so? Because propositions are inexorability linked with intentionality; that is, propositions only have meaning in virtue of what they refer to. And minds are the only things that can refer; which is to say, minds are the only things that have intentions. Why so? Because no conglomerate of atoms ever refers to anything, silly. (just for a fun thought experiment think of the merelogical sum of any atoms you prefer (I’m currently thinking of Michelangelo’s David, and, well, my brain), after you have whatever atom conglomerate in your mind, ask yourself what thing those atoms refer to.)

So if propositions depend on minds and any unambiguous proposition whatever has a certain truth value out of de dicto necessity, then it follows there is a mind that is acquainted with the proposition expressed in (G). But if there is a mind that is both acquainted with the proposition expressed in (G) as well as its truth value, this mind must be of an infinite caliber, and this mind is what all men mean by the term ‘God’.

Lewis as the philosophically insane.

I’ve been reading van Iwagen lately and I now realize why he is so revered. A topic which has come up several times in his articles is the role propositions play in ones ontology. He critiques Lewis’ possible world assay almost entirely on the fact that his Lewis’ reductionism does violence to what we thought we mean when we express modal propositions. Consider the following:

(1) It’s possible that that JFK died of natural causes.

On Lewis’ account, the proposition expressed in (1) really means this:

(1)’ There is a world spatiotemporally unrelated to ours where JFK died of natural causes.

The ramifications of such a reduction are manifest, for it implies there really is world, full of atoms and space and even has JFK as one of its members that really exists (in the sense that it’s a concrete world), but we are spatiotemporally not related to that world. Other queer entailments include the following: The word ‘actual’ functions as an indexical: When we express the proposition ‘It’s actually the case that JFK was assassinated’ the word ‘actually’ is referring to the world we are spatiotemporally related to. When the people in W2 say ‘it’s actually the case JFK died of natural causes’, by ‘actually’ they are pointing out the world (W2) where they are spatiotemporally related. Does this mean that proposition ‘JFK died of natural causes’ (as well as its contrary) is both true and false? No, because the referent of that proposition is ambiguous- for it does not designate a specific world. HA!
The craziest implication of Lewis’ view, I think, is that there is not just one unique JFK, but possibly millions. Consider the following propositions:

(2) JFK never married.
(3) JFK lived until 1989.
(4) JFK was a Soviet spy.

(2)-(4) are all true in some really existing world and the singular term ‘JFK’ in each proposition picks out the JFK in that world where the proposition is true. What’s worse, every possible proposition that includes the singular term ‘JFK’ picks out a really existing JFK. Ergo, there is an uncountable (if not an infinite) number of JFKs currently in existence.

Are you kidding? What’s the fruit of a reductive analysis if it comes at such a cost? And back to van Inwagen’s point (and Plantinga, and Kripke, et al.), the proposition expressed in the sentence ‘It’s possible JFK died of natural causes’ I am predicating a modal term on a proposition, and to say what I really mean by this is the nonmodal proposition ‘there is world spatiotemporally unrelated to us where JFK died of natural causes’ is to change subjects.

I cant figure out how to delete this post!

Theories: Creation, Critique, and Cooperation

Upon reflection on a few conversations I've had lately, I have allowed the beginnings of a picture to materialize in my mind.  I paint it for you modestly and embrace it loosely.

It seems to me that when it comes to certain domains, such as psychology or church-planting, there are, broadly speaking, two categories of workers.  One group works with theory, and the other with application.

Those who work with theory, hypothesize, test, review, critique, and theorize.  Broadly speaking, they are scientists and philosophers.  Their position does not exempt them from a degree of involvement and application (ie research psychologists and missiologists still bear the responsibility of coming alongside other humans to help them), however their main, every-day work is in the ivory tower, proposing and criticizing theories.  Without these people, we wouldn't have many paradigms, and we would have fewer good ones.  The status quo would never be challenged, innovation would be stifled, and progress stunted.

Those who apply theories usually have to accept whole paradigms at a time.  Psychotherapists and missionaries operate according to particular modes, created for them by theorizers.  They may be smarter or stupider, more talented or less talented, then the theorizers.  But their function is completely different.  They perform therapy, they plant churches, they are on the field with their hands in the dirt.

I have been struggling with my own calling as I thought it clashed with my built-in passions.  While I am more certain of few things than my calling to Missions (To Be Defined at another time [UPDATE: I defined "Mission", and "Missions"), I am more passionate about fewer things than theorizing.  I used to think that in order to work in Missions I couldn't be a philosopher - I had to do church-planting or Bible translation or relief and development.  I was conflicted.  How could a philosopher help people?  How could a missionary philosophize?

A professor once told me that I have to die to myself in order to live for Christ.  He wanted me to give up my passion for philosophy (which he interpreted as a selfish desire for fame - which makes me laugh now).  But about the need to give oneself up, so to speak, for Christ - I agree.  I also believe that God has built me with a unique skill set and particular drive for a purpose (think about Paul's metaphor of the body of Christ).  How these two principles cohere I am not entirely certain as of yet.

God called Moses to lead a nation despite his speech impediment.  He can call me to tell stories to remote people groups in order to communicate the gospel to them despite my lack of story-telling ability.  He can call me to do relief and development work while I'm at it, despite my lack of administration skills.  He can call me to lead a revolution (although I believe in non-violent revolutions as a principle, and by the way I have no immediate intention to start or participate in any revolutions.  At least not any political revolutions; although the idea does appeal to me.)

And if He ever does, I hope that I will submit.

But until then, I am only certain of His calling to "Missions".  And I am very certain of it, if I haven't communicated that already.

So, is there room for theorists within the domain "Missions"?

I assert so.  And until I encounter reasons to do contrary, I intend on entering such a category.

It's not that I think I am a good philosopher, or will become so.  It's more like, if I don't go there, I'm not sure where I'll go.

Upon hearing such a sentence, Lindsey once comforted me by asserting that she is confident in my ability to do other work well.  I was touched and she succeeded in showing me something. However, I think the essence of my point is something more like:

If I don't get to work as a philosopher, my conscience will not be satisfied.