In jr. high my best friend Luke Langton and I would rollerblade everywhere, all the time. We loved going to Lucky's to buy ice cream. We cruised through the neighborhood like really fast like whoa. This one time we came across a chain-linked fence, separating two touching residential streets. The fence looked like it was on private property - someone's driveway. But if we could have just hopped the fence, it would have saved us a lot of time. But on the fence was a sign saying "No Trespassing". Luke told me that he did it all the time, so we started the climb (note: yes, with our skates on. we're studs). It was a tall fence, and when we were nearing the top and putting our legs over, a looming high school kid came out with baggy jeans, no shirt, a shaved head, and holding a smoking cigarette. We tried to play it cool.
He asked.
What are you doing?
Just taking a short cut,we replied.
Well, I don't think you should...He said. We chickened out.
Okay.We went back the way we came and took off skating. A little anti-climactic, I know. But shut up, work with me.
•••
It seems to me that there are two broad kingdoms of laws. There are Laws of Description, such as mathematical axioms like 'expressions that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another', logical syllogisms such as Modus Ponens, and even Physical Laws like those describing thermodynamics.Then there are Laws of Ought. These include international, federal, state, and local man made laws, as well as cultural norms, school laws, and your very own 'household rules' for things like how to play Monopoly or Settlers of Catan (which, by the way, we will be playing on Friday, by popular demand). But Laws of Ought also include Moral Laws (if there are any).
So the real life case study provided by the youthful adventures of yours truly can help me demonstrate what I am talking about. The Law of Ought written on the sign, 'No Trespassing' was not a description of the fact that no trespassing ever occurs at that location. In fact, if no trespassing ever occurred at that location, that fact or (if you playfully allow that this case can be expressed so strongly) that law, would exist as a brute fact, lying around the universe. It would be merely a true proposition.
But that was unfortunately not the case, and I cannot triumphantly say that I broke a law of the universe - a Law of Description. Rather, I broke a Law of Ought. The sign was the expression of a personal urging. It bore the authority of it's author, and it regarded a possibility (that of trespassing: a situation it was supposing us not to obtain).
Laws of Ought can thus be easily understood as things that can only be generated by persons. For, Laws of Ought require things that only a person is capable of accomplishing. For example, a Law of Ought regards a possibility. To regard a possibility one must have imagination. Imagination is a function of the intellect. A Law of Ought also bears the will of its author (e.g. the author of the Law of Ought in the case study did not think we should trespass). Finally, a Law of Ought also expresses the emotions of its author (e.g. the author of the Law of Ought in the case study did not want us to trespass, a fact expressed by his coy remarks). Emotion, intellect, and will are personal attributes, and all three are necessary for the author of a Law of Ought to have. The Law of Ought in this case study however, was only man made.
When a human perceives a moral (which is a Law of Ought that happens to be transcendental), he thinks, sees, and/or feels that a situation, for example, should not obtain (e.g. innocent life should not be taken). This refers to a hypothetical situation, requiring both he and the author of the moral to have imagination (differentiating it from a Law of Description). It regards what should or should not occur, requiring will. And, it wields and inspires emotion (a feeling of what is right or wrong). This is why morals are Laws of Ought, and therefore can only have been generated by a person. To grant that morals (objectively defined) exist, should strongly point you to the fact that they were generated by an eternal person, with utmost authority, righteous desires, and the power and intention to enforce them.
1 comment:
Everything you mentioned seems to be compossible with many possible Russellian Platonisms, except for the following:
“This is why morals are Laws of Ought, and therefore can only have been generated by a person. To grant that morals (objectively defined) exist, should strongly point you to the fact that they were generated by an eternal person, with utmost authority, righteous desires, and the power and intention to enforce them.”
I’m not sure, even on your construal, what you mean by ‘objectively exist’. Under my understanding of moral realism, ‘oughts’ are objective in the following sense: human beings really do exist, and human beings can enter into certain relations with other human beings and themselves. Certain relations are detrimental to their well being (some things inhibit the predicate ‘good’ to be instantiated when it otherwise would have) and some other relations are conducive to their well being (some things bring about the predication of the property good in persons), and there are types of relations among humans that neither inhibit nor predicate the property good in humans. So far this construal is considered objective because the above mentioned relations are real relations that exist in the world, and the predicate good is a real thing inside the world. Do you mean something more than this when you say that morals ‘objectively exist’?
On the Russellian Platonic account, it is true that moral oughts are real and that they are generated by persons. In the case of Luke and Louis’ transgression: The Russillian Platonists thinks that the moral ought was generated by facts concerning personhood and property. Following John Locke, persons have certain unalienable rights, of which include the ‘right to property.’ In the case of Luke and Louis the objective fact of transgression was brought about by them trespassing on property that was not their own, and the consequence was that someone’s property was abused (however slight). For the Russellian Platonists moral oughts supervene on objective features of persons and their possible relations, and so long as there is persons and the property good in the universe, this situation is completely cogent without invoking the causation of God. If you disagree, what am I missing?
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