Raw Theology, Blog Action Day, Misc.

I was supposed to write a blog about the environment for Blog Action Day.  I was going to write about the scientific reasons that I am currently not only a global warming skeptic, but a believer in the argument that we should not spend money and legislation trying to curb carbon emissions.  Then I was going to follow it up with a theological argument for why it is important to take good care of the environment, proceeded by a brief run-down of the basic ways this might be able to be done.

Um, yeah.

I also told myself and my cousin that I was going to post on here the other day about why I am struggling with what to do with this blog.

I am very certain of very few truth claims.  But certainty is modal, even if the truth of any given single proposition is binary.

This blog started originally as the convergence of three ideas.  I had this idea to start a home page.  And on that home page I was going to have one section dedicated to a mere systematic theology.  By "mere" I mean that it would outline issues with the boundaries I was relatively certain of.

By "systematic" I mean that I would go over each major topical category in turn.  There are several popular ways to organize a systematic theology.  Mine would be logical.  Thus I would start with the framework of a cumulative argument for the existence of God.  Then I would go over His major attributes, communicable and non-communicable.  I would go over Christology, Pneumatology, Bibliology, Ecclesiology, and on and on.  Each section and its subsections would be brief, outlining, and informational, with links to outside resources.  It would be very orthodox, but as personal and as clear as possible; just a catalogue of personal creeds.

The other idea emerged out of a conversation with _____________, my former youth group leader, current mentor of sorts, and overall good friend.  Our idea was to hold mini-conferences on difficult theological topics.  Some of these would be of the academic category "Biblical Theology", while others would be methodological, topical, political, philosophical, etc.  One of us would propose the question, and then each of us, alongside any others who wanted to join in, would propose possible answers and an apologetic for each.  We would analyze each possible answer and try to seek relevant truths.

Finally, when I first launched it, my friend and cousin Chris, hopped on board.  Chris is agnostic and was willing to dialogue about whether God exists.  Needless to say, this is something that everyone should be wondering about, and it is highly relevant to a blog like this.  I wanted interactivity, and whether God exists is a great first topic.

I wanted this blog to be "raw" in several ways.  I wanted each post to be published in an unpolished fashion.  I wanted the informal peer review process to be a part of the writing and thinking processes.  I wanted to do (a)theology in community, without each of us having to go through multiple drafts of a piece of rhetoric before showing it to each other.

I also wanted posts to be unfinished, in the sense of being incomplete.  Why not?  Why not post partial thoughts?

Finally, my dream was to create an online environment where we could all be somewhat vulnerable, and in this way be emotionally "raw".

Many of these projects and notions have been reflected in what has happened.  And I am cool with the way this blog has evolved.

We have spent the majority of the time on philosophical arguments for the existence of God.  Dualism and other philosophical positions of the medieval and modern era Christians have also found prominent spots in our discussions.

As I look back though a lot of these posts, I am sometimes a little embarrassed.  A lot of this stuff has been unpolished and incomplete, and vulnerable (like I thought I wanted).  And it makes me feel weird.  Now I remain a Christian, but I disagree with many of the things I have published on the internet under my own name.   I also hope to significantly improve my thinking and writing abilities over the next few years (well, continuing to my death, hopefully).  And this being the case, I see my writing on this blog to date as low quality compared to where I want to be.  I am painfully aware of some of my own short-comings.

I suppose it would be neat to continue trying to blog, and morphing each successive post to fit with some of my original or my new objectives.  Having archives of my intellectual journey might be valuable, if not for anyone else but myself.

Having said all this, I just don't think I want to blog on here anymore.  I know this disappoints all four of you readers out there.

I just have to think about which projects will most efficiently advance my medium and long-term goals.

The rest of the contributors to this blog are more than welcome to use it for your own designs.  I am sure we will be in touch.

Theories: Creation, Critique, and Cooperation

Upon reflection on a few conversations I've had lately, I have allowed the beginnings of a picture to materialize in my mind.  I paint it for you modestly and embrace it loosely.

It seems to me that when it comes to certain domains, such as psychology or church-planting, there are, broadly speaking, two categories of workers.  One group works with theory, and the other with application.

Those who work with theory, hypothesize, test, review, critique, and theorize.  Broadly speaking, they are scientists and philosophers.  Their position does not exempt them from a degree of involvement and application (ie research psychologists and missiologists still bear the responsibility of coming alongside other humans to help them), however their main, every-day work is in the ivory tower, proposing and criticizing theories.  Without these people, we wouldn't have many paradigms, and we would have fewer good ones.  The status quo would never be challenged, innovation would be stifled, and progress stunted.

Those who apply theories usually have to accept whole paradigms at a time.  Psychotherapists and missionaries operate according to particular modes, created for them by theorizers.  They may be smarter or stupider, more talented or less talented, then the theorizers.  But their function is completely different.  They perform therapy, they plant churches, they are on the field with their hands in the dirt.

I have been struggling with my own calling as I thought it clashed with my built-in passions.  While I am more certain of few things than my calling to Missions (To Be Defined at another time [UPDATE: I defined "Mission", and "Missions"), I am more passionate about fewer things than theorizing.  I used to think that in order to work in Missions I couldn't be a philosopher - I had to do church-planting or Bible translation or relief and development.  I was conflicted.  How could a philosopher help people?  How could a missionary philosophize?

A professor once told me that I have to die to myself in order to live for Christ.  He wanted me to give up my passion for philosophy (which he interpreted as a selfish desire for fame - which makes me laugh now).  But about the need to give oneself up, so to speak, for Christ - I agree.  I also believe that God has built me with a unique skill set and particular drive for a purpose (think about Paul's metaphor of the body of Christ).  How these two principles cohere I am not entirely certain as of yet.

God called Moses to lead a nation despite his speech impediment.  He can call me to tell stories to remote people groups in order to communicate the gospel to them despite my lack of story-telling ability.  He can call me to do relief and development work while I'm at it, despite my lack of administration skills.  He can call me to lead a revolution (although I believe in non-violent revolutions as a principle, and by the way I have no immediate intention to start or participate in any revolutions.  At least not any political revolutions; although the idea does appeal to me.)

And if He ever does, I hope that I will submit.

But until then, I am only certain of His calling to "Missions".  And I am very certain of it, if I haven't communicated that already.

So, is there room for theorists within the domain "Missions"?

I assert so.  And until I encounter reasons to do contrary, I intend on entering such a category.

It's not that I think I am a good philosopher, or will become so.  It's more like, if I don't go there, I'm not sure where I'll go.

Upon hearing such a sentence, Lindsey once comforted me by asserting that she is confident in my ability to do other work well.  I was touched and she succeeded in showing me something. However, I think the essence of my point is something more like:

If I don't get to work as a philosopher, my conscience will not be satisfied.

On Love

Love hath not to do with naught but the lover, nor hath it to do with naught but the beloved.

If the Hotel Can Have an Infinite Number of Rooms, Why Can't the Universe Have an Infinite Number of Days?

In my previous post, wherein I attempted to provide an undercutting defeater of Craig's Hilbert's Hotel argument for the impossibility of an actual infinite number of things, I allowed for the conception of a hotel, the set of whose rooms is infinite, and has a cardinality of aleph-null. And yet, I also provided a small argument at the end that I believe may better perform the same function as Hilbert's Hotel in the greater Kalam. But as I thought about what I had done, a possible reply came to mind: If the Hotel can have an infinite number of rooms, why can't the universe have an infinite number of days? I do not have a polished answer, buy I here journal my initial musings.

In the Hotel conception, I said that God built the hotel by the power of His word, and sustains it by His power. I don't actually believe that Hilbert's Hotel exists in this world, but I can conceive of it pretty good, and I think I have illustrated such a conception in a satisfactory way. At any rate, if one claims that he does not know whether he can conceive of such a hotel or not, I think I have made it more difficult to say that it is impossible to conceive of it, such that an argument for the impossibility of such a hotel, or any actual infinite number of things, is not as easy as pointing to the abnormal phenomena such a hotel might give rise to.

Nevertheless, it might appear incoherent for me to posit such a hotel and at the same time argue for the impossibility of an actual infinite number of days in the universe. After all, why can't God simply just create such a beginningless universe and sustain it by the power of His word? Such a question might be unfair for an atheistic infinite universe argument to utilize at face value, but really it is just a call for internal coherence on my part. Well, I believe that there is a fundamental difference between the Hotel and the number of days in the universe.

In the case of the hotel, the rooms are instantly built by God, such that there is no temporal transgression of an infinite spatio-temporal distance. One minute the Hotel is not, the next minute, God speaks such a structure into existence. The set A of all Hotel rooms is at T1 empty, and then the set B of all Hotel rooms is all at once at T2 infinite, and of the cardinality aleph-null.

But in the case of the days in the universe, they cannot exist all at once. Rather, this moment exists and naught else. Thus, by "days" we mean to denote a segment of temporal transgression made by temporally bound objects. There does not exist, "now", all moments in time. This view, Presentism, is something I hold but do not care to explicate and defend here. I am interested in researching it further, and perhaps writing on it someday. My Philosophy of Religion professor, Thomas Crisp, is also a presentist. I am not sure whether my argument for the beginning of the universe is altered whether or not Presentism is accepted, but I will go forward as if it is.

This difference is all that is necessary to establish why it is that a hotel with an infinite number of rooms is conceivable, but a universe whose temporal past is not. For, as was shown in my argument in the previous post about the Hotel, there is no room with the number -∞ (negative infinity). Nor is there a room with the number 'infinity' on its threshold. For infinity is the state of a set, not a number unto itself. Any given number is finite, while infinite sets of finite numbers may be considered.

Similarly, if 'now' is labeled "0", and yesterday "-1", then it is seen that there cannot be a day with the label "-∞". Any given day in history will have a finite label. But why can't the set of all past days be infinite? Because of the impossibility of transgressing an infinite spatio-temporal distance. Just as the present must transgress the moments in today to get to tomorrow, so it would have had to transgress the past in order to get to today. This is what was illustrated in my thought experiment by the runners who attempted to begin their race infinitely far away. They will begin by crossing room numbers 0 through -10, and then they will transgress rooms -10 through -20, and continue running for eternity, without ever finding a starting line from which to run back to room 0. This is a textbook example of a potential infinite. At any given time, the runners will be in front of a room with a finite number, and the cardinality of the set of rooms they will have transgressed will be ever-increasing. But a potentially infinite set will never become an infinite set. In the same way that even God, if He counts one number at a time, will never reach infinity. He will be counting forever, and the set of numbers He utters will be potentially infinite. For at any given time, He will be uttering a finite number. Not even God can transgress an infinite spatio-temporal distance.

The universe cannot have existed from infinity past because it is impossible to cross an infinite distance, or an infinite amount of time. The Hotel can have an infinite number of rooms, because its construction was instantaneous. This would be like God thinking of an infinite set of numbers all at once - something He is no doubt capable of doing.

An Old Journal of My Introduction to General and Special Relativity Wherein My Skepticism and Dogmatic Newtonianism Was Dissolved

Forward:
Dear Derek, in the presence of many witnesses, in light of our brief conversation earlier, I here submit to you some of my thoughts from a Physical Science class I took in Fall of 2005. One of the assignments involved thorough interaction with a chapter of choice in Hewitt’s, Suchocki’s, and Hewitt’s, Conceptual Physical Science. I selected a chapter we hadn’t gone over in class: Chapter 35: Special and General Relativity. Please keep in mind that I have learned a lot since this writing, that this writing is a direct summary and response to a chapter of a textbook, and that this was a general ed, non-science major class.

I also highly recommend these two resources:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/
Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea

•••

Original Writing:
35.1 Summary: To record the state of something we use three dimensions, which have no robust meaning unless we also state the time that the dimensional descriptions applied to the object in question. This seems to indicate that space and time may be bound. Einstein’s theories support this; that things exist in a space-time continuum.
35.1 Comments: I have seen the PBS special “The Elegant Universe”, so I am going into this chapter with a little bit of background information about the theories of relativity, but not much. I have some speculations of my own, which begin with critiques of contemporary explanations of “space-time” observations. I would therefore like to note my initial hesitance to calling space and time, or matter and energy, the same thing; no matter how intimately they may be connected.

35.2 Summary: Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity, based on Newtonian principles, states first that “Observers can never detect their uniform motion except relative to other objects”. A restatement of this postulate is that “All laws of nature are the same in all uniformly moving reference frames”. An example is given of being able to pour coffee while flying through the air on a jet plane. This is supported by any experiment that has been carried out. If it has been carried out on earth, the fact that the earth is in motion, and the experiment was carried out as if there was not any acceleration of the location it was carried out in (indeed, there was not any relative motion of the lab relative to the earth and its atmosphere), then it becomes more and more clear that if the entire frame of reference is moving relative to an outside object, then relative motion inside the reference frame is only relative to other objects inside the reference frame – the motion of objects outside the reference frame are not factors in the motion of the objects inside.
The second postulate is that “The speed of light in free space will have the same value to all observers, regardless of the motion of the source or the motion of the observer. The speed of light is a constant.” This postulate is confirmed by our measurements of the speed of light. If both postulates accurately describe reality, then when two observers in relative motion to each other and a light source disagree about the time of a certain event, they may both be correct – the only thing to budge in the equation is time. A note is made that points in space and time are both quantized, i.e. there are fundamental units for them.
35.3 Comments: I like that the wording of the first postulate does not deny objective uniform motion or location. It does not affirm them either. If you start with relative motion, you will get relative motion. In other words, if we measure motion relatively, or call motion “change in position relative to a frame of reference” then of course we will conclude that motion is relative. Rather, the postulate simply states that it is impossible to detect uniform motion (if it is a phenomenon that actually occurs in our universe). I am however, skeptical of even this. What, logically, was Einstein’s reason for believing that humans will never discover a universally objective frame of reference, nor be able to develop the technology to measure motion in relationship to it?
I have also wondered about the famous experiment involving two clocks on two airplanes flying in opposite directions around the world. Their clocks showed a difference in displayed time at the end. But couldn’t that have been due merely to the physical strain exerted upon the inner workings of the clocks during the experiment? I would wonder then, what were the clocks measuring? Is it possible that what we call “time” is actually two different things: ‘age’ and ‘time’. ‘Age’ being the physical change or decay of an object, and ‘time’ being the objective, steady progression of events in this world. Time might be the cursor of history marking where everything is. How else would it be that the pilots of the planes could see each other after the flight? Wouldn’t they be living in two different planes of reality – different “times”? One would be a few split seconds ahead of the other! Or perhaps at the end of the day they both wound up in the same time plane, but traveled through less “time” to get there. I wonder then, what the nature of the “time” is that they traveled through; could they have seen each other during their journeys? How much of the Special Theory has to do with mere perception, and how much of it with the actual bending of time? Could it be that our methods for measurement are flawed?

35.3 Summary: The notion that time can be stretched is called “time dilation”. A very compelling illustration is given. Suppose that we could observe a light flash bounce between two mirrors inside a transparent spaceship. An observer onboard the spaceship, and an observer on the ground would both measure the speed of light as the same rate, denoted c. Yet to the observer onboard the spaceship, the flash of light is only moving up and down (which it is – relative to the environment of the spaceship). However to the observer on the ground, the flash of light will actually be moving up and down, and horizontally as well (in a zig-zag pattern). This is because the entire spaceship, including the mirrors and the light flash, are moving parallel to the ground. To the observer on the ground, the flash of light will then be covering more distance than to the observer on the spaceship. If speed is equal to distance divided by time, and the speed of light is constant, and the distance stretches, then the time must logically be stretching, or dilating, as well. This occurrence can be expressed mathematically.
The text then contends that time is actually dilating, there is nothing unusual about the functioning of a clock itself, as indeed there is nothing unusual about clocks here on earth now, though they are all whizzing through space (because the earth on which they are is whizzing through space). Next the text explains that as a result of time dilation, according to the measurements we have made, as speeds approach the speed of light, time slows down and seems to approach zero. A mass at the velocity of light, c, takes an infinite amount of time to elapse one second, and zero amount of time to travel an infinite distance. Thankfully, the Law of the universe has set c to be a type of cosmic speed limit such that it is impossible to reach or exceed c. It is important to note that time dilation, to be perfectly accurate, most be taken into account even for small masses and slow accelerations. It is also important to note that as speeds approach c, mass approaches infinity, length approach zero. However light, which moves at c, will always be measured to be moving at c, regardless of your frame of reference.
Space travel is also discussed in this chapter. At high speeds it would be theoretically possible to spend 5 years traveling at 99.999 % of c, and return to earth only to find that 1100 years have passed for it and its inhabitants.
35.3 Comments: This chapter hasn’t mentioned it yet, but c is only the speed at which light moves in a “vacuum”. Light moves significantly slower in gas, even slower in liquid, and slower still through solids (if at all). This chapter coaxes another question. If Einstein is right, then why can light go the speed of light? Isn’t light made up of photons? Why are they exempt from the c speed limit? Well, if photons have zero mass, then perhaps it is not so absurd. I would also like to note that this section does not assert that time can be turned backwards. It can be sped and slowed (relatively), but there is nothing in this section that argues for bending and twisting time like a pretzel, or going back in time. In fact on page 845 it says that time accelerated astronauts will not be able to go backward in time.

35.4 Summary: Length contraction is related to time dilation. As was mentioned, as a mass approaches the speed of light, its length approaches zero, when measured by an observer who is not traveling relative to a common frame of reference. This contraction only takes place in the direction of motion. This phenomenon is related to time dilation, as distances will flatten to zero when a mass approaches them at c. In this way, one could travel an infinite distance in zero amount of time. Furthermore, if a mass approaches the speed of light, its length does not change relative to itself. Rather, the time it has to travel through in order to reach its destination is collapsing. However from the perspective of an outside observer, lengths are contracting.

35.5 Summary: In this chapter relativistic momentum is explained. The speed of any mass has a limit: c. However, momentum may increase without limit. This is illustrated by Einstein’s new equation for calculating momentum, which accounts for the Lorentz factor. Therefore as speed approaches c, momentum approaches ∞. With any progress toward c, objects appear to increase in mass, because they display an increase in inertia. Einstein however, seemed to think later in his life that mass is the same in all frames of reference, but space-time changes with speed.
35.5 Comments: It seems to me that if you accept Einstein’s initial premises, then all of this follows logically. To be honest, I think I might just have a lot of emotional struggles with accepting all of this.

35.6 Summary: Einstein asserts that matter and energy may be exchanged according to the expression E=mc2; E being energy, m being mass, and c being the familiar uninhibited speed of light. When fuel is used to produce energy, the system will afterward be found to be less some mass, in accordance with Einstein’s equation!

35.7 Summary: A desire to describe nature using standard forms and perspectives motivated Einstein to pursue a description of the phenomena he was examining, which came to be know as his theory of General Relativity. By thinking about a spaceship accelerating at g, the principle of equivalence became manifest, that “local observations made in an accelerated frame of reference cannot be distinguished from observations made in a Newtonian gravitational field”. A few thought experiments quickly establish this theory as reasonable, but Einstein elaborates on it by saying that, (in a free environment) because the trajectory of a beam of light relative to an accelerated mass is identical to the trajectory of an additional object relative to the same accelerated mass, space-time itself curves. He contends that matter and energy are two aspects of the same thing.
Euclidean geometry produces accurate results when dealing with objects on a flat surface. However, Einstein’s observations and calculations argued for a four dimensional warping of space-time. This is seen when the shortest distances between three planets form a triangle whose angles add up to greater than 180 degrees. The lines making up the legs of triangles such as this are called geodesics. The lines are technically not straight, but they are short. If this curving of space-time is positive throughout the universe, then the universe is warped like a sphere. If it is negative, then it is shaped more like a Pringles potato chip. This curvature of space-time causes what we perceive as gravity, and is proportional to mass. This principle is seen when we calculate the effect of large masses as they change position. It would seem that, rather than a sudden ceasing of gravitational force on other masses, a large mass that changes position creates gravity waves, similar to the waves made on the surface of a waterbed when a bowling ball is rolled across it.
Einstein’s calculations, when applied to planets in Our Solar System predicted precessing orbits. When Newtonian physics were used to predict the orbits of the planets it pretty much worked out – except for the missing 43 seconds of arc that Mercury displayed. Einstein’s equations had produced the right predictions.
Another confirmation of Einstein’s theory occurred in 1919 when a solar eclipse revealed that his predictions about the exact arc beams from distant stars display when passing near the Sun where dead on.
A third test confirms General Relativity, and it becomes clear that in General Relativity, the gravitational “red shift” is relative to location rather than speed (because c is a constant). It is also important to note that time is never sped or slowed for an object relative to itself (obviously). This is to say that though an object may pass through time more slowly than another relative to it, its lifespan is never extended from its own perspective.
35.7 Comments: I heard once that Einstein responded with a complete lack of surprise when his predictions about starlight arc were shown to be accurate. He said something about being certain from his equations alone; observation is secondary.

Concluding Thoughts:
This chapter has brought many questions and ideas to mind. For example, if God has no mass, then (if Einstein is right), He is not subject to time. Perhaps He can interact with this universe in the ontological now, all the while being atemporal and eternal. Maybe that photons have no mass somehow plays into a facet of God’s foreknowledge or omniscience.
This in turn raises thoughts concerning humans and the resurrection. If human souls have no mass, maybe it is so that, upon death (separation of body and soul), a soul zooms to resurrection day, upon which it meets its body and enters into temporality again. I understand this to be a much bigger scriptural and scientific topic to be researched than is feasible here, but it is interesting to be introduced to such musings.
I cannot keep from thinking about the implications of God stretching out the heavens. Could this skew our observations of the age of the universe? What if our solar system was accelerated altogether such that the age of our solar system is different than the age of another? I have heard some compelling arguments for a very young earth, and some for a very young solar system. But I have also heard about evidence that seems to support an older universe. Could it be that when God stretched out the heavens, galactic clocks spun at different rates relative to each other?

Consider:
Job 9:8 “[God] stretches out the heavens”
Ps. 104:2 “stretching out heaven like a tent curtain”1
Isa. 40:22 “He ... stretches out the heavens like a curtain and spreads them out like a tent”1
Isa. 42:5 “... God the Lord, who created the heavens and stretched them out”
Isa. 44:24 “I, the Lord, am the maker of all things, stretching out the heavens by Myself”
Isa. 45:12 “It is I who made the earth and created man upon it. I stretched out the heavens with My hands”
Isa. 48:13 “Surely My hand founded the earth and My right hand spread out the heavens.”
Isa. 51:13 “the Lord your Maker, Who stretched out the heavens and laid the foundations of the earth”
Jer. 10:12 “He has stretched out the heavens”
Jer. 51:15 “He stretched out the heavens”
Zech. 12:1 “the Lord who stretches out the heavens”

Please also see:
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/SpeedOfLight/measure_c.html
http://www.creationscience.com/onlinebook/FAQ111.html#wp1885480
http://www.cosmicfingerprints.com/

Lastly, I would like to leave the reader with the following thought. When God destroys nature, and recreates it (Rev. 21:2), will he do so with a new set of universal constants, quantities, and forces? Did the fall of Adam knock a lot of forces and constants off track? Humans have the opportunity to seek the answers, but let us give glory to God, above all.

What is Religion? And Dawkins isn't too bad a fellow - he does have some good stuff to say.

[Although it is often difficult for me to escape what may seem to be condescending or at least certain rhetoric, much of this blog has been a journey for me, and I hope at least some of my honest inquisitiveness is visible through the veil. For all actual condescension and wrongfully dogmatic or inflammatory language I apologize, whether I did it intentionally.]

Is religion the designation for a group of topics, one's opinions about which constitute his religion? This can't be it, because choosing to believe that there is a God makes a person religious. But according to this definition of religion, taking the opposite position, that there is no God, is also a religious belief. I doubt most atheists want to call themselves religious.

Is religion a set of traditions? If this is so, then going to Starbucks every day would be a religious activity. Celebrating birthdays doesn't seem to qualify as religious either. Let's try again.

Is religion a set of propositions that render a man religious upon affirmation? This might be closer. If anyone affirms that there is a God, gods, or anything supernatural, then he is called religious. If this is so, then religious beliefs shouldn't be disqualified merely on the basis of their category. Rather, they should be investigated to determine whether they are reasonable. In this case, the proposition "God exists" is something that a free thinker, scientist, or philosopher may inquire as to the truth of. Such an inquirer may come to agree with the proposition in question, rendering him religious. Or, he may come to disagree with the proposition, rendering him, in this case, irreligious. Either stance, if arrived at rationally, may turn out to be a scientific or philosophically defensible position.

Is religion an epistemology that derives belief from authority, tradition, intuition, and/or feeling? This also comes close to the popular use of the term. Most classified "religions" such as Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and yes, even Christianity, hold epistemological frameworks that elevate tradition (pick your holy book), authority (pick your religious leader), intuition (pick your bosom-burning), and/or feeling (can you feel the Spirit?). If this is what religion is, then I want no part in it.

My personal goal is to seek to believe in what is true, meaning what is accurate to reality. In my humble and limited experience I have come to esteem science and logic as avenues to arrive at truth. I am a sort of free thinker, an arm-chair scientist, a lay anthropologist, and a budding young philosopher.

On an only semi-related, but very important note...

I have recently sworn off all conspiracy theories. These include common Christian presumptions about the hatred and deceitfulness of atheists and other non-Christians. I have actually been finding Dawkins to be quite a reasonable man. His scientific discourses are interesting, clear, and informative. I think that his qualms with religion are valid, and in fact I share them. He is right to rebut screwy epistemology, promote science and free inquiry, as well as common sense.

I think that people of all religions, including Christianity, have more to learn from him than teach him. I have always been uncomfortable with the notion of "blind faith". I grow increasingly frustrated with with what I call "folk Christianity", and with the Religious Right.

I have even been reforming much of my own world view and behavior as of late. I feel like I have a large humility pill I need to swallow. I feel that I have been guilty of a lot of ad-hoc thinking, red herrings, and ad hominems. I have been guilty of sweeping aside arguments merely because of their source (genetic fallacy). But I am young, and this transition in my development marks only an important period of growth, and the beginning of a new stage of thinking.

Perhaps instead of fighting Dawkins, Christianity should embrace what he has to say and teach. Perhaps we need a wake up call. This is not to say that we can't engage Dawkins logically, however.

After all, we were the ones who use to build the universities, kick off the science experiments, and promote literacy. We use to drink, smoke cigars and pipes, experiment with music, talk philosophy, engage the culture, make friends with prostitutes, and love the homeless. Yes, there are many who do this today, and yes, we've certainly had our dark and hateful times in the past as well. We have a lot to learn, and a long way to go in many areas.

Why don't modern Evangelicals clearly see the destructiveness in accusation and judgment as much as they see the destructiveness in individual sins and disbeliefs themselves? Why are we so scared to encourage doubt? Why are we glad to see our children and friends believe in the right things for the wrong reasons, or using the right beliefs to motivate wrong behaviors?

The average "Christian" today couldn't give a rational defense for his beliefs. This grieves me.

At the end of the day, I remain a Christian. By this I mean that I believe that the Bible is true, I believe there is a God who exists as three persons, and I believe that Jesus is fully and completely God, as well as fully and completely human. I believe that He died for my sins, and that my trusting in Him is an important part of accepting the gift of eternal life. I believe that He can offer this to me, because despite the wages of sin being death, Jesus died as a penal substitution for me. Communing with Him is exactly that, and will persist after bodily death. I will one day reunite with my body in some capacity, and all of creation will be redeemed, from the stars to the rocks to the plants to the animals. Those who reject Christ (whatever form that takes, and whoever they are - I am not placing judgment) will be dealt with justly and permanently.

But why I continue to believe in these things follows an ironically more traditional line of thought than many modern Evangelicals. I do not choose to believe in these things, and allow these beliefs to motivate certain behaviors, merely because my parents taught them to me. Nor do I believe in them because millions of people do. I don't accept the Bible on blind faith, then follow everything it says without question. I don't believe that doubts and questions should be suppressed.

Now I have to admit, I grew up in a Christian family, who went to church weekly. I am white. I am an American citizen. I "accepted the Lord", so to speak, when I was two years old. What this means for my position as an objective observer, I fear. Forgive my vulnerability.

Nevertheless, as of today, I maintain that there exists a sufficient body of empirical and logical evidence to render my beliefs at the very least reasonable. Furthermore, I have experiential warrant for the continuity of my faith. Any attempt at persuading others on certain matters should be done so based on evidence of varying kinds; I don't pretend I have all the answers, but I don't ask anyone to accept my world view without good reason.

I may have grown up thinking like a Christian, but any beliefs that have persisted have done so because of what I judge to be good reason. I ask nobody to take my word for it, but encourage everybody to investigate these matters on their own.

The Genuis of Max Alan Clark

By sheer intuition I Googled one of my best friends, Max Clark. Given his status, think of my shock when I uncovered a rather consistently kept-up but obviously somewhat secret blog of his from of old. I read a couple posts, and was not surprised by how insightful they were. But then I got hit by the most impressive fact. What packed the punch was that he hadn't touched it since he was like 15. I like that he gives credit where credit is due, not trying to steal the glory for good jokes and important insights. One thing he brought to a post was a quote from a younger boy he had met,

saying
"it works in theory, but not in reality"
is wrong.

you just have a bad theory.

I agree, Max.

Archbishop of Canterbury Rejects Creationism, and By The Way I am a Darwinist Too

In my previous post, the full article from which I quoted contained a disturbing comment:

Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, made a useful and unequivocal intervention rejecting creationism...

Why the intelligent design lobby thanks God for Richard Dawkins | Columnists | Guardian Unlimited

At first I thought about how sad it is that although there has been ecclesiastical continuity in Augustine's Chair, the men holding positions like the Archbishop of Canterbury have gone quite liberal in order to make Christianity palatable to the mainstream. Personally, I believe in contextualization of Christian truths and ethics. But I do not believe that true propositions ever change. If God created everything, then He did. If He didn't, then He didn't. Let's find out what's true, and believe it! Communicating that truth within different cultural and temporal contexts, and demonstrating its relevance to daily living is something that we have to be constantly reinventing. If we really believe that Christianity is true and valuable, why change it?

That said, I do want to make clear that I believe that there are in fact some details that are up for debate within Christianity. Putting aside the non-negotiables (meaning, propositions that may be debated, but if they are not believed in by person A, then A cannot be called a "Christian" in the traditional sense of the word), we find propositions that are hotly debated among Christians. These include things like whether there will be a rapture, whether Christ will return to set up a Kingdom for the duration of a literal 1,000 years, whether creation was accomplished within six literal 24-hours periods, whether Christ descended into hell while His body was in the grave, whether God's predestination is unconditional, etc.

Anyway, I decided that a half-sentence from a secondary source on a completely different topic wouldn't be enough. I resolved to seek other sources on the matter. So I Googled "archbishop of Canterbury rejects creationism", and found all kinds of articles citing this alleged concession that the man in Anselm's tradition made. Here's the mention of it in the top hit:

Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Rowan Williams has rightly called [creationism] “a category mistake” within Christian thinking.

Government department rejects creationist infiltration of science teaching

But there are more. Lots more. Knowing what I do now, I am tempted to be upset that everyone is taking what he said out of context and blowing it out of proportion. But to be honest, I now almost find it cute. When I was young and I caught my brilliant older sister absent-mindedly placing a carton of ice cream in the fridge, I berated her for years. I still bring it up. Why? Because it was the only mistake I had ever seen her make. Finally she called me on it and said that she understood that I want to make myself feel good by reliving the one moment of silly thinking she had ever had, but it was now getting a little annoying for her.

The Archbishop's comment wasn't even as bad as absent-mindedly misplacing an ice cream carton. He was selecting his language carefully to make a point. Was he advocating a stance contra Genesis? Let's take a look at the actual transcript of the interview he had with Guardian:

"AR" is Alan Rusbridger, and "ABC" is Rowan Williams, the current Archbishop of Canterbury.

AR: Are you comfortable with teaching creationism?

ABC: Ahh, not very. Not very. I think creationism is, in a sense, a kind of category mistake, as if the Bible were a theory like other theories. Whatever the biblical account of creation is, it's not a theory alongside theories. It's not as if the writer of Genesis or whatever sat down and said well, how am I going to explain all this.... I know ' In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. And for most of the history of Christianity, and I think this is fair enough, most of the history of... Christianity there's been an awareness that a belief that everything depends on the creative act of God, is quite compatible with a degree of uncertainty or latitude about how precisely that unfolds in creative time. You find someone like St. Augustine, absolutely clear God created everything, he takes Genesis fairly literally. But he then says well, what is it that provides the potentiality of change in the world? Well, hence, we have to think, he says, of - as when developing structures in the world, the seeds of potential in the world that drive processes of change. And some Christians responding to Darwin in the 19th Century said well, that sounds a bit like what St. Augustine said of the seeds of processes. So if creationism is presented as a stark alternative theory alongside other theories, I think there's - there's just been a jar of categories, it's not what it's about. And it - it reinforces the sense that...

AR: So it shouldn't be taught?

ABC: I don't think it should, actually. No, no. And that's different from saying - different from discussing, teaching about what creation means. For that matter, it's not even the same as saying that Darwinism is - is the only thing that ought to be taught. My worry is creationism can end up reducing the doctrine of creation rather than enhancing it.

Archbishop of Canterbury | Sermons and Speeches

Wow, what a different story! We see the Archbishop saying things like creationism is not a mere "theory among other theories", that "a belief that everything depends on the creative act of God, is quite compatible with a degree of uncertainty or latitude about how precisely that unfolds in creative time", and finally, "creationism can end up reducing the doctrine of creation rather than enhancing it".

I think it is firstly very clear that the Archbishop affirms the Genesis account of Divine creation, certainly placing him well within the Intelligent Design camp, and maybe even within the Creationist camp. It is not clear whether he personally believes in literal 24-hour periods, or whether God used a system roughly resembling Darwinian natural selection to produce species or kinds. He does seem to be concerned with upholding the "doctrine of creation", and he does grant the scientific validity of Darwinism. Although he literally says "creationism is, in a sense, a kind of category mistake", he goes on to elaborate on what he means by this, which is that "[it's] not as if the writer of Genesis or whatever sat down and said well, how am I going to explain all this". Well, if the writer of Genesis didn't make the story up, Who did? Let's take a hint from 2,000 years of Christian teaching (not to mention thousands of years of Jewish teaching, for that matter) and presume that the very Archbishop of Canterbury himself might actually be crazy enough to believe in something like the Divine inspiration of the Bible! Now we are getting a much different picture of the concessions he made to the Darwinists!

Personally, I have observed that it is no longer really debated whether Darwinian natural selection is a real process that occurs in nature. In fact, it is a very important part of the Creationist's model for rapid speciation. There are also other forces that affect speciation. But most Creationists deny that it is sufficient to increase genetic information or produce different kinds. This is where they part ways with traditional Darwinists, because they then say that the separate kinds were originally created by God.

I happen to be a Christian, a Creationist, an Intelligent Design theorist - whatever. I think that the ID movement is a better way to frame scientific theistic arguments in a secular society, and I deny that the arguments require Christian premises. Nor is the movement synonymous with Creationism. But am I a Darwinist? Kind of. I don't think that humans evolved from primates, I don't think that speciation increases genetic information, and I reject current atheistic accounts for the origin of the universe. But none of that separates me in any critical way from Darwin himself! Call me what you will.

Why I am a Global Climate Skeptic

October 17, 2006

Washington DC - One of the most decorated French geophysicists has converted from a believer in manmade catastrophic global warming to a climate skeptic. This latest defector from the global warming camp caps a year in which numerous scientific studies have bolstered the claims of climate skeptics. Scientific studies that debunk the dire predictions of human-caused global warming have continued to accumulate and many believe the new science is shattering the media-promoted scientific “consensus” on climate alarmism.

Claude Allegre, a former government official and an active member of France’s Socialist Party, wrote an editorial on September 21, 2006 in the French newspaper L'Express titled “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (For English Translation, click here: http://epw.senate.gov/fact.cfm?party=rep&id=264835 ) detailing his newfound skepticism about man made global warming. See: http://www.lexpress.fr/idees/tribunes/dossier/allegre/dossier.asp?ida=451670 Allegre wrote that the “cause of climate change remains unknown” and pointed out that Kilimanjaro is not losing snow due to global warming, but to local land use and precipitation changes. Allegre also pointed out that studies show that Antarctic snowfall rate has been stable over the past 30 years and the continent is actually gaining ice...

Allegre has authored more than 100 scientific articles, written 11 books and received numerous scientific awards including the Goldschmidt Medal from the Geochemical Society of the United States.

Allegre's conversion to a climate skeptic comes at a time when global warming alarmists have insisted that there is a “consensus” about man made global warming. Proponents of global warming have ratcheted up the level of rhetoric on climate skeptics recently. An environmental magazine in September called for Nuremberg-style trials for global warming skeptics and CBS News “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley compared skeptics to “Holocaust deniers.” See: http://www.epw.senate.gov/fact.cfm?party=rep&id=264568 & http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/03/22/publiceye/entry1431768.shtml In addition, former Vice President Al Gore has repeatedly referred to skeptics as "global warming deniers."

This increase in rhetorical flourish comes at a time when new climate science research continues to unravel the global warming alarmists’ computer model predictions of future climatic doom and vindicate skeptics.

60 Scientists Debunk Global Warming Fears

Earlier this year, a group of prominent scientists came forward to question the so-called “consensus” that the Earth faces a “climate emergency.” On April 6, 2006, 60 scientists wrote a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister asserting that the science is deteriorating from underneath global warming alarmists.

“Observational evidence does not support today's computer climate models, so there is little reason to trust model predictions of the future…Significant [scientific] advances have been made since the [Kyoto] protocol was created, many of which are taking us away from a concern about increasing greenhouse gases. If, back in the mid-1990s, we knew what we know today about climate, Kyoto would almost certainly not exist, because we would have concluded it was not necessary,” the 60 scientists wrote. See: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=3711460e-bd5a-475d-a6be-4db87559d605

U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Aside from the U. S. Senate reporting on the advancements in science which have recently been debunking global warming alarmists, India remains unconvinced of the threat:

Almost as soon as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming came into effect on February 15, Kashmir suffered the highest snowfall in three decades with over 150 killed, and Mumbai recorded the lowest temperature in 40 years. Had temperatures been the highest for decades, newspapers would have declared this was proof of global warming. But whenever temperatures drop, the press keeps quiet...

The models have not been tested for reliability over 100 years, or even 20 years. Different models yield variations in warming of 400%, which means they are statistically meaningless.

India Times

I sometimes get confused as to the facts about whether our planet is warming or cooling, over how long a timeline, and whether it is good or bad. Then occasionally I stumble accross a helpful science-whiz like this nice chap, who goes and clears everything up: global warming can sometimes cause... global cooling!

Scientists announced in the July 21, 1999, edition of the journal Nature findings that suggest that global warming can sometimes lead to cold weather or even a worldwide freeze...

Dinosauria Online

Now, I am just a tender young man without any real scientific training, much less access to resources, tools, time, and grant money to go out and research this business for myself. I am forced to pick which authorities to listen to. Given the limited amount of research I have done so far (research meaning, I have read others' research), I have felt no choice but to become a global climate skeptic. Here's the basic run down of what I don't want:

• I don't want to look outside my window and see filthy air anymore
• I don't want our machines to spew forth man made chemicals in abundance before we are sure what it is going to do to the environment
• I don't want to stop researching global climate
• I don't want unnecessary, unfounded, and expensive regulations on businesses
• I don't want the U.S. to be an international renegade by refusing to sign what everyone else is
• I don't want politicians to be false about their causes just to gain campaign funds and votes

Nietzsche & Jesus

On page's 6-7 of his translation and edition with commentary on "On the Genealogy of Morals" and "Ecce Homo" (New York: 1989) Walter Kaufman says about Nietzsche's readers:

[They are] tempted to add that the kind of obscurantism he abominated involves irremediable ambiguities which lead to endless discussion, while his terms, whether German or foreign, are unequivocal. That is true up to a point--but not quite. Nietzsche had an almost pathological weakness for one particular kind of ambiguity: he loved words and phrases that mean one thing out of context and almost the opposite in the context he gives them. He loved language as poets do and relished these "revaluations." All of them involve a double meaning, one exoteric and one esoteric, one--to put it crudely--wrong, and the other right. The former is bound to lead astray hasty readers, browsers, and that rapidly growing curse of our time--the non-readers who do not realize that galloping consumption is a disease.

The body of knowledge keeps increasing at incredible speed, but the literature of nonknowledge grows even faster. Books multiply like mushrooms, or rather like toadstools--mildew would be still more precise--and even those who read books come perforce to depend more and more on knowledge about books, writers, and, if possible--for this is the intellectual, or rather the nonintellectual, equivalent of a bargain--movements. As long as one knows about existentialism, one can talk about a large number of authors without having actually read their books.

I want to take the time to consider arguments charitably, even perhaps daring to research some citations and recommendations made by their authors. I can't help but compare Nietzsche's passion for a distinct kind of obfuscation with Jesus' as recorded in Matthew 13:10-16:

And the disciples came and said to Him, "Why do You speak to them in parables?" Jesus answered them, "To you it has been granted to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not been granted. For whoever has, to him more shall be given, and he will have an abundance; but whoever does not have, even what he has shall be taken away from him. Therefore I speak to them in parables; because while seeing they do not see, and while hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand. In their case the prophecy of Isaiah is being fulfilled, which says,

YOU WILL KEEP ON HEARING, BUT WILL NOT UNDERSTAND;
YOU WILL KEEP ON SEEING, BUT WILL NOT PERCEIVE;
FOR THE HEART OF THIS PEOPLE HAS BECOME DULL,
WITH THEIR EARS THEY SCARCELY HEAR,
AND THEY HAVE CLOSED THEIR EYES,
OTHERWISE THEY WOULD SEE WITH THEIR EYES,
HEAR WITH THEIR EARS,
AND UNDERSTAND WITH THEIR HEART AND RETURN,
AND I WOULD HEAL THEM.

But blessed are your eyes, because they see; and your ears, because they hear."

don't be stupid (revised)

When Evangelicals, Mormons or Jehovah's Witnesses pay you visits with messages from God, you (rightfully) ask them how they know that their messages are from God. When an Atheist makes a truth claim (such as 'there is no god'), you (rightfully) ask for the reasons why Mr. Atheist believes such a thing. We all have not only the right but the responsibility to put dogma to the test.

I came across a web page recently that I found helpful. It has a list of what are now considered bad arguments for creationism. I hope that it will help me stay current on the conversation that the creation scientists are having with the evolutionists.

In addition to scientists, apologists such as Josh McDowell, N. T. Wright, William Lane Craig, and F. F. Bruce have put together some phenomenal, scholarly works on the resurrection of Jesus. These guys are inspirational. What I want to strive to avoid in my lifetime is becoming complacent in my walk relationship with God, or my relationships with others. It seems that having a ready answer for my beliefs would be important for the latter. May God's grace help us all meet the challenges of this era.

I saw this Oprah episode where a bunch of "experts" were discussing "spirituality". This cheesy middle-aged fundegelical Christian woman in a floral dress with puffy sleeves stands up and talks about Christianity (a good start). But she tanked almost immediately when she distinguished Christianity only by saying that it is the only religion based on love. Needless to say, the Pluralists in the room ripped her to shreds. The Christian ethic is not the essence of Christianity, nor is Christianity the only religion that teaches its followers to love each other. This makes me a little bit sad, because it reflects the fact that so many churches ignore doctrine for the sake of teaching ethics, while both are important.

You know something? Bless her heart. It sort of reminds me of when I was a child and though I had a relationship with God, I couldn't always intellectually defend His existence or give justification for my beliefs. To be honest, I really don't think I can get very far today, either. But surely I don't have arbitrarily selected beliefs..? There is something else that assures me of my Lord.

I have a somewhat unrelated thought. And to put it in a really weird way it goes like this: I am not really committed to Christianity. I am committed to the truth. I am ready to abandon any belief I have for something that I am persuaded is true if the two propositions contradict. As of right now, I happen to hold some beliefs (e.g. God exists, Jesus is God, Jesus was raised from the dead, etc.) that fit me into the category "Christian" - but thats just a label. Am I religious?

In clarification let me bellow a resounding 'yes!' to the question 'are you committed to Christ?'. I don't know if I am articulating this whole thing very well, but maybe some explanation of where it is coming from will give you some insight into my mind.

I have been reading about religion a little bit lately. Most of the critiques seem pretty valid. Most religions place their beliefs in an untouchable box that is safe from criticism. Either it is wrong to question the religion, or they choose beliefs that are not falsifiable. In general, most religious beliefs and practices seem really fishy to me. Even traditionally "Christian" things smell funny and even horrify to me at times.

But despite this, I am firmly convinced of a set of propositions that the family of Christian faith has traditionally held to be true. I feel like, from one perspective, Christianity has been falsely labeled as a religion. The Bible encourages us to question and test what we are taught (check out the Epistles). We have Biblical precedents for even questioning God Himself (check out Psalms, Jeremiah, Lamentations, et al.). Sure, the Catholic church got the whole Papal authority thing wrong, which led to some disastrous beliefs and practices, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I have heard a lot of speakers distinguish Christianity from religion, or from other religions in a number of other key ways, too. Christianity isn't concerned so much with orthopraxy as it is with orthodoxy. We don't even pretend we can earn salvation on our own merits or make our way to God, He had to purchase our souls Himself, and it is He who comes to us by His grace. Christianity is concerned with what the Living God is like. Which God do we worship? Well, the one that exists. Our God is distinctly ontologically independent, a se, and transcendent. Yet He is immanent. He has chosen too reveal Himself through generally revelatory ways (nature) and specifically revelatory ways (the incarnation and the Bible). He is personal, and engages each of us in a one-on-one relationship. The list of distinctions goes on - check out Colossians (and Josh McDowell's "The Evidence for Christianity" is really good. I am sort of working my way through it right now).

To be balanced I feel like I should mention that from another angle, I think Christianity is a religion, and a good one at that. We have indeed built up some good habits and helpful traditions. Jesus Himself told us that we should repeat the Last Supper, as often as we do, in remembrance of Him. We have a hall of witnesses that have gone before us (Hebrews 11-12). It sort of wearies me when my local church talks so harshly against religion. I agree with their points (cf. Erwin McManus' "The Barbarian Way", or our most recent sermon - its a free podcast on iTunes, just look up "Mosaic"). But, I think we should be more focus on hypocrisy, legalism, and false doctrines within religion.

So what is this all to say?

That people have a responsibility to test propositions,
That it is helpful for us to have a ready defense of what we believe,
That it is neither by evidence nor by arbitrary faith that we relate to Christ,
That Christianity is very distinct from what is conventionally called "religion",
And that religion, broadly defined, isn't always bad.

Please please please forgive my previous version of this post. I do in fact struggle with both being and sounding condescending, and I am very sorry. Nor did I ever mean to say that I have obtained an untouchable platform from which I can easily defend Christianity. Nor did I ever mean to deny that it is important to, or that I am, committed to Christ. I just meant to say that I am committed to finding out what is true, and aligning my life with it as best I can. Right now I believe that Christianity, properly understood, is a description of some very important true propositions.

C. S. L

Hey guys, sorry I haven't written in a while. My best friend David told me the other day that my posts are too long. 'If only you would write smaller posts more often', he said, 'it would be easier for me to keep up'. I told him that I wasn't witting for anyone else but myself. Well now I am second guessing that statement. Someday I would like to write for an audience (meaning, I intend to write some books before I die). I hesitate to say that because, as we all know, hype kills good things.

To some degree it is emotionally healthy to write for no one but myself. How free it feels to stretch out in the warm, creative waters of my blog, allowing the jacuzzi-like bubbles (called hits by people I will never meet face-to-face) to validate my vulnerability. But is it possible to retain the important things about such a posture, and still make small adjustments to my writing style over time so as to be persuasive or appealing to a wider audience? I do not know the answer.

C. S. Lewis is overrated. Let's be real. The guy didn't say too many original things, he just baptized things like Platonism in Christianity. He repackaged older saints in metaphorical plastic wrap. He updated the same ole arguments to counter the same ole poppycock that people had been saying for centuries. But people connect with C. S. Lewis. Hey, even I enjoy reading his stuff. Part of his appeal is that he is a little vulnerable; he allows some playful intellectual experimentation to show through in his writing. It makes reading him kind of romantic - something to do with tea on a crisp morning in a park.

Aquinas provided just the opposite experience for me. I recently read his Shorter Summa, being the summary of his summary of all theology. That sucker is packed. Every sentence is a clear, concise, definite statement about the way God is. I had to read like one or two pages a day, allowing the lump ample time for swallowing and dissolution in my stomach. Parts of it were pretty dry because he adds little or no personality. I will be honest, his section on the trinity is the best I have ever read, hands down confessional.

Well I hereby declare this blog an experiment. Experimentation should be a healthy component of one's theology, anyway. Really, this is what is has been from the beginning. Isn't it apropos that sort of our first topic's theme has centered on whether God exists? Surely that is some sort of foundation for theology... I guess it feels good just to write. For you, for myself, and in declaration. If I never get another reader - if I lose the couple of readers I have - thats fine. Let me find my voice through these posts and work out some more of my beliefs.

Don't worry you will see Chris and me continue our conversation about God's existence. I want to give atheists a voice here at Raw Theology. Besides, we happen to be related, and he is a pretty cool guy all around. Others continue to be welcome to add their thoughts, insights, and questions, too. This post is just a declaration of freedom. In writing this, I am busting the shackles I put on myself regarding writing on this blog. I refuse to be confined to any topic or any style. I refuse to write only for myself or only for others. I refuse to write regularly or irregularly. Here I am, take me or leave me, as I am. May I stand or fall solely on the grounds of my honesty.

My Solution to Hume: An Addendum to My Journal on the Problem of Induction

I believe that Hume's skepticism then, is completely justified when it comes to induction in the broad sense. For example: looking at one (or one million - what does it matter?) crows and reasoning that all crows are black. Or interacting with one (or one million) females and concluding that every female is irrational. These conclusions may be reasonable, but they are not certain.

But I think we can save, or maybe strengthen, the sciences (at least in part). The difficulty is that when it comes to geometry or algebra, one can investigate these things a priori. But with the physical world, the only way we can even possibly find out about physical laws (e.g. whether matter and energy are conserved) is to examine the evidence. Although not necessarily within the category of Empiricism, science is empirical: a posteriori.

So what I would like to do is posit an a priori grounds for science. I believe I have already laid the foundation for it.

If it is true that the nature of the necessarily existing order is necessary (i.e. if it is not arbitrary that this order is the order), then, not only does science help us to learn about the order (just as a teacher helps me learn about calculus), but it helps us discover which possible world this one is.

So, we can know that there is order a priori. We can know about order a priori. We can even speculate about different potential types of physical matter or all the different possible worlds a priori. But, we cannot know which of the possible worlds is the actual world a priori. In fact, as soon as we open our eyes we have already participated in a sensory experience, rendering our enterprise an a posteriori one.

So science is about aiding our naked eyes with instruments, gathering in information about the contingent world. When we generalize the behaviors of physical objects, we are actually describing two things. First, we are describing the nature and constitution of the physical objects in question. Next, we are describing the laws by which they relate to each other (and my position as of this writing is that these laws are inherent in reality and therefore necessary). This second thing is actually compound. The way things relate to one another is determined both by the inherent order of reality AND by the constitution of the objects. It is difficult to describe the physical nature of something without analyzing how it behaves. Therefore science involves BOTH a priori and a posteriori tasks, but its foundation is laid a priori.

What about laws that have exceptions? If a law is shown to have exceptions to it, then we are not describing the ultimate enough reality. For example, if a white crow is found in Pasadena, then it is demonstrated that it never was actually a law that all crows are black. Laws describe the ultimate reality, where exceptions don't truly exist. If free agency and miracles are real, then the underlying laws are somehow setup to allow for these things. The reasons for their rarity may be accounted for by contingent factors (e.g. stars very rarely explode. In fact, we have no human record of our sun ever exploding. However we know that it will if left alone for long enough. Just because we haven't found out how it might be possible for a man to synthesize wine from water without modern tools, doesn't mean that it is impossible. To conclude so would be an argument from ignorance unless it is shown precisely why it is logically incoherent.). It cannot ever be that a true law, one accurate to the inherent order of things, gets broken. Chaos (randomness, chance, probability) is metaphysically impossible. When thinking about crows, one can see that they are contingent beings. So to incorporate them into the description of a law is problematic from the outset. This problem will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid in science, however. But we should want to get at broader and broader generalizations.

So we are justified in performing scientific tasks, because we know a priori that the order inherent in reality is necessary. Science has as its goals, firstly to help us learn about order (God), secondly to help us learn about this world (creation).

Scattered Thoughts on Crow Blackness Likelihood, Solipsism, and Order

I have been musing about crows, blackness, and probability since I met with Derek von Barandy and James Gibson about Hume and Bonjour last Thursday night. Let me share a snippet of my thoughts with you, as writing it down helps me to work it out in my mind.

This is not meant as an argument, but my own unorganized ponderings.

There are ten birds in a cage, five of which are white. The likelihood of me selecting a white bird with my eyes closed is 5/10. In a bird cage whose total number of birds is unknown to me, I cannot calculate the likelihood of white bird selection.

Such is the case in our world, whose total number of crows is unknown to me. If I examine 1 crow and find it to be black, my probability of selecting a black crow in the future becomes 1/X. If I examine 2 black crows, I increase my odds, but I can never reach a point at which it is true to say that my odds make it more likely that I will select another black crow for examination. For it is an epistemic possibility for me that there exist but 2 black crows in a world whose crow population remains unknown.

After selecting 2 black crows I can truthfully say that, on account of my experience, it is more likely that another black crow is found (in this case "more" is a term relating to my first trial). This is so because last time my odds were 1/X, and this time my odds are 2/X (we are assuming X is a finite number - there are only so many crows that exist at the time of the exam).

Thus, although I am able to increase my epistemic odds by examination, I am unable to know my actual odds.

Advancing from black crow selection to crow population description raises the problem I want to illumine. Suppose I want to support the claim "all crows are black". To do this I can examine one million crows, lending support to my hypothesis and perhaps rendering it a theory. The "odds" of blindly selecting a black crow after such an experiment are 1,000,000/X.

Terms like "probability" as applied to the truthfulness of my theory are problematic. I cannot say that my theory is "probably true", as I cannot express it as probabilities are expressed. What I can say is that now that my hypothesis is a theory it is relatively more probable to be true that it was when it was a mere hypothesis. I am not telling the truth if I say that my theory is "probably true".

Actual probability calculated for such a claim defeats the relevancy of such calculation. This is so for all exhaustive claims about reality. To start with, I cannot find terms to fit the probability schema. What is to be the numerator? What is to be the denominator? If this world is the numerator (i.e., if it is true that all crows are black in this world), then my numerator is 1. If I somehow know the number of possible worlds (assuming that it is a finite number), then I suppose I can use it for my denominator. I would also have to know the number of possible worlds whose entire crow population is black (never mind the difficulty in examining every crow in every possible world).

But in discovering what I can truthfully place in the numerator position I have found the relevant information. I will have had to find out already whether all crows are black in this world. In discovering this truth I have eliminated the need for me to calculate how probable it is that all crows are black (in this world).

Perhaps it would be helpful on another front to learn how narrow the parameters are that our world lies within. If the denominator of our "probability", or number of trials (i.e. number of possible worlds), is large relative to the numerator, or number of possible worlds that only have black crows, then we can count it remarkable that our world is one in which all crows are black. For example, if we can somehow learn that 12 out of 1,000,000 possible worlds have naught but black crows, then we should marvel at the fact that our world lies within the parameter of 'having only black crows'.

If we are careful, we can see that actual probabilities do not exist. If it is true that all crows are black, then the probability is 1. There is no crap shoot.

But what about the probability of this world being the one that occurred? Isn't that an actual probability? Here is where care must be taken. We must not mistake probability with possibility. Let's examine what it means for something to be possible.

There are four categories that a thing can fall into:

1. Necessary
2. Contingent
3. Possible
4. Impossible

Necessary things are those that cannot be otherwise than they are. They exist in every possible world.

Contingent things are those that can be otherwise than they are. They exist in this world, but not in every possible world.

Possible things are those that can be. They exist in at least one possible world, and they do not exist in at least one possible world.

Impossible things are those that cannot be. They do not exist in any possible world.

Although it may be true that all crows are white in some possible world, it may not be so that any crows are white in this world. What I mean is that the truth of my theory, that all crows are black (in this world), does not depend on whether the contrary is possible in another world. In fact, the truth of my theory depends on whether it is true in this world.

In discovering whether it is true in this world, I do not eliminate the possibility of its falsehood in another world. But whether it is true in this world is not probabilistic. This world is this world, and our tomorrow is not arbitrarily selected from among possibilities. Rather, tomorrow is created by the state of affairs that exist today, combined with personal determination.

Let me show you what I mean. If all crows are black in this world, and it is because of something in crow genetics that doesn't change as time advances, then it will be so tomorrow that all the crows in this world will be black. Crows will mate, the earth will rotate on its axis and advance its revolution 1/365.25th, and we will examine all new crows spawned and find them all to be black.

I say that personal determination is the other force that creates tomorrow because, as a certain set of meteorological circumstances yields a rainstorm, I can choose to operate upon the immediate sky above Los Angeles and alter the outcome of today. I could do this by creating a large fan, blowing the warm front out of the course of the cold front. While physical states of affairs are deterministic of their following physical states of affairs, personal agency can alter states of affairs. Such agency is not arbitrary, but it is not itself determined. Rather, it is determining. The nature of its ability to determine rests upon the power and authority whereby it determines, as well as its options in determining. Thus all things have as their first cause (a) choice(s) made by (a) person(s). My physics/metaphysics is not the key, however.

What is the key is that what produces tomorrow does so determiningly and according to a framework, not probabilistically and/or without boundaries. Thus, in cases that are produced within systems of pure physical causation, the outcome may be predicted. For example, once a pair of dice are thrown, if a physicist is given the opportunity to measure the velocity and spin of the dice, as well as their distance to the ground and the shape and exact physical nature of any obstacles, he is capable of predicting the outcome. The outcome is not probable, it is certain.

In systems that contain personal forces, outcomes are not produced probabilistically either. A person's choices are not made for them arbitrarily or randomly. The person is responsible for determining the choice. Moreover, he must do so with the burden of forces and compulsions influencing his will. The decision must also be one of available decisions to make, and it must be according to the laws in operation.

If you do not accept my physics/metaphysics, then it is even easier for you to see the non-arbitrary, or non-probabilistic nature of outcomes. For it may be that even personal decisions are nothing more than the tantamount of complex and layered physical phenomena.

In the case of the dice roll, outcomes are not probable, they are certain and fixed. Outcomes are, however, possible. If our epistemic situation is limited (i.e., we are not aware of the initial states and governing laws of the dice), then we call given outcomes probable according to what we know is possible. There are six sides to a die, and only one will be facing upwards at the end of the roll. We call this a probability, but it is only one epistemically. The trajectory of the dice will be determined by the person, and the rest is up to physical states of affairs that are reliable (the size of the dice and the force of gravity, etc.).

In the case of my theory that all crows (in this world) are black, it either is so or it isn't. My theory is possibly true, but it cannot accurately be said to be probably true, unless by this we only mean that we have warrant to believe in it and our warrant increases with every black crow that is found.

We therefore cannot ever elevate a theory contingent upon experience to the status of certain truth. To be rational, we must therefore choose to believe what we find to be the most epistemically probable truth (when it comes to some beliefs, warrant may consist of both empirical and logical evidence). This is what I call faith: belief in a proposition for which evidence exists, but irrefutable proof one way or the other is not observed. It is an active belief, but should not be held without reason.

When considering whether to believe in something, one ought to consider first the evidence in favor of it, and then consequences of accepting such a belief. This is what Jesus speaks of at the end of chapter 14 of Luke's gospel when He says, "Whoever does not carry his own cross and come after Me cannot be My disciple. For which one of you, when he wants to build a tower, does not first sit down and calculate the cost to see if he has enough to complete it?"

An issue entangled in this pondering is the reliability of science. Hume argued that for inductive enterprises (such as physics), in contrast to a priori enterprises (such as mathematics - within which domain we are able to fully examine just a single case of 2 + 2 equally 4 and make justified conclusions about all instances of 2 + 2), there cannot be found rational justification. In other words, why do we assume causation, and expect that the future will resemble the past? Couldn't it just be coincidence that the cue ball was accelerating South at 3 miles per hour, and when it reached the eight ball it lost its energy, and then the eight ball (unconnectedly) assumed the same amount of energy (minus friction) and continued South? What, exactly, is to assure the same "effect" in the future? The "law" that we think is governing billiard ball behavior is only a description of past experience, and causality is assumed.

A physicist will explain the mechanical issues that "caused" the transfer of energy at the time of the collision, but his world contains that same problem, on a smaller level. Why is it that atoms operate the way they do? Then - why is it that particles act the way they do? This will go on until objects get too small for us to examine at the present, and the only answer scientists can give us that they have run experiments and written descriptions of the way physical things interact with each other. They used these descriptions to predict the future, and the future did indeed resemble the past.

But we have run into our crow problem. We cannot calculate even the epistemic probability of the future without knowing about every case. Our "odds" only increase. There is never a point where we know that we have examined a majority of the cases of a physical occurrence within the universe. We can therefore never make the claim that something is "most likely". We never know how big our sample size is relative to the whole.

Bonjour's solution is to say that if we continue to find that a scientific law predicts the future, then we have reason to believe that there is something causing the outcome, and it is most likely that there exists a real reason (a determiner) that we keep on finding black crows.

But this doesn't satisfy - it begs the question. In one sense, of course something caused the cases we found. Of course something caused the crows that we found to be black. But that doesn't mean that this cause operates upon all crows.

Even if we say that it is likely that there is a reason that most or, in our case, all of the crows we found were black, we run into problems. As I illustrated above, "probable" or "likely" is a fallacious descriptive. We cannot calculate actual probability, nor does it exist as regards the truth or falsehood of a proposition (a proposition either is true or it isn't - there isn't a chance as to whether it will become true or not, as we are inquiring as to its current state). At best, Bonjour's claim can be reconstructed to specifically epistemic probability as outlined above.

It seems then, that induction has its limits and we are forced into humility when it comes to all a posteriori enterprises.

Another issue related to these musings is the reliability of physical laws and, as I will show, the a priori argument for meta-order.

One can object to my reasoning by separating my claim into two. The first would be that the extant truth of a proposition is not probabilistic. The second would be that the truth of a proposition about the future is not probabilistic.

As to my first statement, it should seem obvious (although many thinkers today inadvertently undermine with their writings). If a proposition regards the way things are - reality - then it is either true or false. Whether or not we are aware of it, reality is as it is.

The second statement is more contentious. Is a proposition that concerns the future probabilistic? I hope that by now I have made my case for why the answer is 'no'. The future is determined. Certain facets of the future are not determined yet, but they will be determined by something or someone. Pure probability is not an operating force unto itself - it is a false notion.

One might do well to say that 'if physical law (x) remains in effect throughout our next experiment, then the outcome will be the same as last time'. I like this statement. Let's explore it: can I have a priori justification for believing that if every relevant factor remains the same, an identical outcome may be produced? Certainly we trust this in science, but can we know it with justified certainty?

Even though this type of humility ('if' physical laws stay the same - allows that we do not know whether physical laws are contingent and/or consistent within this world), it still assumes a meta-order. Let's describe the application of this assumption in our case. The one who says 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome' is assuming that 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome'.

Although these are identical statements, the second emphasizes the structure or necessity whereby the conclusion is drawn. You see, although we are now allowing even for the strange possibility that physical laws may not apply, we are saying that it is obvious that if they do then we can produce the desired outcome again. We are assuming that our experiment will follow some order. It is clearly impossible for us to repeat a literally identical experiment under literally identical conditions and produce an entirely alien outcome.

To apprehend this IS to understand its truth, just as to understand what it means when we think that 2 + 2 = 4 is to understand that it is true. Perceiving these propositions a priori is to perceive their justification.

This brings me to what I find to be the single most foundational and profound assumption of science: that the universe is intelligible. This order that exists outside ourselves can be understood.

To complicate my undertaking I want to consider the solipsists cosmological argument. I heard about a lady who wrote a philosopher, 'I am a solipsist, and I just can't understand why there aren't more of us'... he found her statement hilarious.

Suppose that I am disembodied, and have no experience of anything other than myself. I have never seen, felt, heard, smelt, or tasted. I have perceived of nothing. I am only capable of thinking, and so I begin to do so...

"I exist." I begin, without knowing that Descartes says that I should begin here. "I know this because I am thinking. I have not always existed, and I did not bring myself into existence. There must be something that brought me into existence. I cannot conclude that it is a person, as there may be a rule that solipsis like me just pop out of nowhere uncaused. But such a rule is a cause. Maybe there is no rule - I just popped into existence from nothing, not of myself, nor of a rule. But then, wouldn't that be a rule? It would state something like 'for X amount of time, nothing will come about, then at time Y, a solips will come into existence'. I can go on thinking about what possible scenario possibly accounts for my existence, but I cannot imagine it as unordered by some account. Therefore I can say with certainty that I exist, and that some order exists outside myself. The very fact that my thoughts are linear, and I am able to construct rational, ordered sentences attests to this fact. I did not create the logic by which I am thinking."

Solips L knows that he came into being inside this permeating order, and he is subject to it. The order seems to be built in, permanent, or eternal. And so surely the order within which SL was conceived must be greater than him, for he fits inside its bounds. Certainly then, the order is personal, just as he is personal.

The equation of this order with a person is professed by John, in the first chapter of his account of the gospel:

1. In the beginning was the Word*, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
2. He was in the beginning with God.
3. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being.
4. In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men.
5. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.
6. There came a man sent from God, whose name was John.
7. He came as a witness, to testify about the Light, so that all might believe through him.
8. He was not the Light, but he came to testify about the Light.
9. There was the true Light which, coming into the world, enlightens every man.
10. He was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him.
11. He came to His own, and those who were His own did not receive Him.
12. But as many as received Him, to them He gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in His name,
13. who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God.
14. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.
15. John testified about Him and cried out, saying, "This was He of whom I said, `He who comes after me has a higher rank than I, for He existed before me.' "
16. For of His fullness we have all received, and grace upon grace.
17. For the Law was given through Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ.
18. No one has seen God at any time; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, He has explained Him.
19. This is the testimony of John, when the Jews sent to him priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, "Who are you?"
20. And he confessed and did not deny, but confessed, "I am not the Christ."

*This Greek word is logos, referencing the Greek's notion of order, logic, reason, that by which all things have existence and orderly relationships with each other.

Another man identified this logos, this personal order who became incarnate as the very order that holds all things together.

When reasoning with the Greeks in Acts 17:28, Paul says,

"In him [that is, Christ] we live and move and have our being, as even some of your own poets have said,'For we are indeed his offspring.'"

The first part of the sentence is possibly a quote of Epimenides of Crete, but the obvious quote is of Aratus's poem "Phainomena".

Then, in his letter to the believing community in Colossae Paul writes in chapter one:

"For by Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities--all things have been created through Him and for Him. He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together."

Thus is can be seen that even Solipse L can perceive the existence of personal order a priori.

As to physical laws, I agree with Hume, that unless we have some perpendicular reason to believe that they will persist, we can but humbly continue to trust them. Unless...

The crow case may not be our best example. Doesn't it seem silly to say that it is a physical law that all crows are black? It doesn't seem ultimate enough. The blackness of crows may be caused by the culmination of several intersecting laws and conditions. A crow is a pretty complex being.

Could it be that if we were not epistemically restricted we might be able to perceive why it is so that physical laws are as they are. Just as I shown by experience how to do calculus (although it is an a priori enterprise), can it be that if I were shown why it is so that physical laws could not have been otherwise - that they are necessary? Is it possible that I am in a fragmented state and cannot perceive with pure rational insight such necessity?

Imagine such a case: a perfectly functioning (but limited) Solipse L. I am back in the situation described above, thinking about things. I begin to think that if something physical were to exist (all conceivability objections aside), then such stuff would behave in certain ways that make sense. Not only that order exists is perceived by me, but which order exists. In fact, the very nature of order can only be one way. Given exactly what it is that particles are made of, they are required to behave accordingly. Their behavior flows logically from their very nature.

For Solipse L to imagine a given nature for potential particles that might one day come into existence IS for him to imagine the nature of their interaction with each other. In this case, what it is that is underlying these "laws" is the pervading order that exists - the fabric of reality. Even a posteriori enterprises, such as science, if clear thinking is excersized and intellectual limits are not applied, could get to the bottom of the way things operate. In such cases, more than mere physical laws can be described, but the nature of the underlying order can be: mathematics, logic, and other purely relational domains. Summaries that accurately describe mathematics and other such necessary truths are indeed descriptions of God Himself.

In what way was creation voluntary then? Aside from the fact that creation at all was voluntary, God was creative in His creation. He made choices as to how creation was to look like and operate.

When we look at the physical laws, we see them as incomplete in a description of the universe. Not only do there seem to be laws in effect here, but there are also constants and quantities. Constants are types of forces which behave in certain stable ways, and persist evenly as time advances. Quantities are amounts that seem to have been arbitrary put in at the beginning of time. The amount of matter and dark matter, for example. Also the amount of energy and dark energy, the amount of radiation, the amount of entropy, and a few others. God made choices as to how much of what ingredient to put into the universe, as well as the velocity to start us off at. He also interacts with His creation in other ways after the initial creation.

What I find interesting is that the number line contains the infinite set of numbers. For a constant to be what it is, the "odds" or really "possibilities" for its value are literally infinite. Planck's constant, for example, could have been (in the broadly logical sense) any value at all. Its chances were 1/(infinity). That it is what it is, is something to marvel at.

But not only is there Planck's constant to consider, there are a host of others. The "odds" of them occurring in the relationship that they did to one another are [1/(infinity)] X [1/(infinity), et al. The "chances" that all the constants line up properly are staggering. When considering quantities as well, marvel should skyrocket.

Science has shown that if any given constant were to be changed a tiny bit, the effects would be devastating. The constants are finely tuned to accommodate human life.

Not only does metaphysical probability not exist, but the possibilities for worlds are infinite.

The Creator is great, and greatly to be praised.

As I continue to let my imagination run away with me as I journal, I think about other scattered issues. For instance, computers sometimes have random number generators. But, they have processes for selecting such numbers. The outcomes are unknown to us, as are the processes. They are only epistemically random. If we knew the rules and the initial states, then we would not call them random. Randomness does not exist.

Another thought: are all intelligible things produced by intelligence? When Lindsey says something intelligent, I can make sense of it. It is orderly. When we have a baby, it will probably speak some gibberish (until age two, when he will unify the theories of quantum physics with general relativity). I will tell him that his gibberish is unintelligent, because it is unintelligible. If our universe is intelligible (the fundamental assumption of science, remember), does it imply that it is produced by a Mind?

Even if chaos is possible, and if such theoretical chaos could produce something orderly or intelligible, it does not account for the existence of the order that such an effect exists within. There remains a need for a law giver.

I studied Turing Machine Functionalism for a short while a couple years ago. While there are so many issues to think about, I want to highlight that the Turing Machine Functionalists still have to admit that such machines must acquiesce to order that existed before the machines, and will persist after such machines expire. What accounts for that order?

I will tell you that it is permanent, necessary, personal, self-existent, and the initiator of the existence of everything other than itself.

More unorganized journals to come. Maybe on these matters, maybe on others.