the argument from universals.

An argument for platonic realism regarding universals (that abstract entities exist and can do so without dependence on their instances) takes the following form:

(1) There is a possible world where there are no particular things colored red.

(2) Despite the fact of (1), the following propositions are true, and necessarily so; that ‘necessarily, red is a color (there is no possible world where red is not a color)’, and ‘necessarily, red resembles orange more than it does blue, (there is no possible world where red doesn’t resemble orange more than it does blue’, and also that ‘necessarily, no single indivisible entity can be both red and green at the same time (there is no possible world where a single thing can be both red and green).

(3) Since the propositions expressed in (2) are necessary truths, they are also true in the possible world expressed in premise (1). But (1) stipulated that that there is a world where no particular thing is colored red. So the question is, if propositions are true or false in virtue of the content they express, how can it be the case in the possible world where there are no instances of red that propositions expressed in premise (2) are true? The way it out is to assert (4).

(4) In a possible world where nothing in particular is colored red the necessary propositions expressed in (2) are true because they refer to the form of red, which is an uninstantiated universal. Therefore,

(5) Platonism in true.

The only way out of this consequence, it seems, is the denial of the last part of (3); namely, that propositions can only be true or false in virtue of the content they express and refer too. To say it another way, one must deny that propositions need not have intention to be true or false. But this seems crazy, and I cannot even begin to conceive of what this might look like, so pending further enlightenment by some sneaky Aristotelians, I must declare (5).

Well, assuming everything I’ve articulated adds up, consider the following proposition:

(6) Necessarily, to be a person is to have rational faculties (either dormant or otherwise).

If (6) is true, then so is

(7) There is a possible world where there are no instances of persons, but since (6) is necessarily true, it’s also true in such a world. But if (6) is true (and necessarily so),

(8) (6) is (necessarily) true in virtue of the fact that it expresses, namely, that a person necessarily has rational faculties (dormant or otherwise). If this is a fact, then there is at least one person, and He must necessarily exist, since (6) could only be true in virtue of this fact. And if there is a person that exists necessarily, then he can be nothing other than what men call God.

... No, I presume I may say that we
more certainly know that there is a
God than that there is anything else without
us. When I say we know I mean there
is such knowledge within our reach which
we cannot miss, if we will but apply our
minds to that, as we do to several other
inquiries.

John Locke,
Chapter X of Essay Concerning Human Understanding

St. John of Damascus' proof that there is a God.

St. John of Damascus
Alive around 680. To be commemorated on December 4th.





Proof that there is a God.
(from Chap. III in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.)

That there is a God, then, is no matter of doubt to those who receive the Holy Scriptures, the Old Testament, I mean, and the New; nor indeed to most of the Greeks. For, as we said [in Chapter 1], the knowledge of the existence of God is implanted in us by nature. But since the wickedness of the Evil One has prevailed so mightily against man's nature as even to drive some into denying the existence of God, that most foolish and woe-fullest pit of destruction (whose folly David, revealer of the Divine meaning, exposed when he said, "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" [Ps. 13(14):1]), so the disciples of the Lord and His Apostles, made wise by the Holy Spirit and working wonders in His power and grace, took them captive in the net of miracles and drew them up out of the depths of ignorance to the light of the knowledge of God. In like manner also their successors in grace and worth, both pastors and teachers, having received the enlightening grace of the Spirit, were wont, alike by the power of miracles and the word of grace, to enlighten those walking in darkness and to bring back the wanderers into the way. But as for us who are not recipients either of the gift of miracles or the gift of teaching (for indeed we have rendered ourselves unworthy of these by our passion for pleasure), come, let us in connection with this theme discuss a few of those things which have been delivered to us on this subject by the expounders of grace, calling on the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

All things, that exist, are either created or uncreated.

If, then, things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things, whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change, whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable.

For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence, that is to say, must have opposite properties: who, then, will refuse to grant that all existing things, not only such as come within the province of the senses, but even the very angels, are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world, I mean angels and spirits and demons, are subject to changes of will, whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness, whether a struggle or a surrender; while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction, of increase and decrease, of quality and of movement in space.

Things then that are mutable are also wholly created. But things that are created must be the work of some maker, and the maker cannot have been created. For if he had been created, he also must surely have been created by some one, and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. The Creator, then, being uncreated, is also wholly immutable. And what could this be other than Deity?

And even the very continuity of the creation, and its preservation and government, teach us that there does exist a Deity, who supports and maintains and preserves and ever provides for this universe. For how could opposite natures, such as fire and water, air and earth, have combined with each other so as to form one complete world, and continue to abide in indissoluble union, were there not some omnipotent power which bound them together and always is preserving them from dissolution?

What is it that gave order to things of heaven and things of earth, and all those things that move in the air and in the water, or rather to what was in existence before these, viz., to heaven and earth and air and the elements of fire and water? What was it that mingled and distributed these? What was it that set these in motion and keeps them in their unceasing and unhindered course? Was it not the Artificer of these things, and He Who hath implanted in everything the law whereby the universe is carried on and directed?

Who then is the Artificer of these things? Is it not He Who created them and brought them into existence. For we shall not attribute such a power to the spontaneous [lit. "automatic"]. For, supposing their coming into existence was due to the spontaneous; what of the power that put all in order? And let us grant this, if you please. What of that which has preserved and kept them in harmony with the original laws of their existence ? Clearly it is something quite distinct from the spontaneous . And what could this be other than Deity?