A Summary of Craig's Reply to Mackie's Critique of the Kalam

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/mackie.html

In the above cited paper Craig replies to Mackie's posthumously published tome "The Miracle of Theism". Specifically, Craig responds to Mackie's attack on Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument. I will summarize, with too many direct citations to properly mark, Mackie's critique and Craig's reply.

The Kalam goes like this:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

2. The universe began to exist.

2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

Mackie objects to both premises, starting with the second.

The second premise is traditionally defended by saying that an infinite spatial or temporal distance cannot be traversed. Craig's version of this argument is found in premise (2.2) If it is posited that the universe has always existed, then it must be that the time the universe has existed is infinite. Since an infinite time cannot be crossed, today cannot be reached. However, today has come to pass, therefore the universe cannot have existed eternally, but must have had a beginning.

Against this Mackie says that the argument assumes a beginning point infinitely far away, and then argues that the distance between it and today cannot be traversed. Mackie contends that this fails to take infinity seriously, for from any point in the past there exists only a finite distance between it and today.

Against Craig's (2.1) argument, Mackie says that it fails to reflect a complete understanding of infinite set theory. The alleged absurdities that Craig draws from the notions inherent in the concept of infinity can be coherently explained by advanced mathematics. Our simplified understanding of "smaller" and "equal to" don't fully take into account the differences in adding and subtracting from sets versus adding and subtracting single members.

Against premise (1), Mackie says that there is no strictly logical a priori reason to assume that an undetermined event is utterly impossible.

Mackie goes on to say that in fact, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is problematic. If God had a beginning, then we run into the same question of causality. If God always existed, then we run into the same problem of infinite regress. If God doesn't exist in time, then we are left with something extremely mysterious.

Mackie asserts that the best way to go for the theist is to use the empirical evidence available to support the idea that the universe had a beginning. However, this position has a problem too: such a position assumes that God's self-existence and omnipotence are self-explanatory. Why should we prefer the mystery of God's self-existence to the mystery of the universe's self-existence? it begs the question.

Mackie argues that if we prefer to believe that the Big Bang had a cause, then we should begin to doubt that the Big Bang was the beginning. In other words, we should prefer that the Big Bang had a material cause to the silly notion that the Big Bang had an immaterial cause.

In summary, Mackie contends that the notion of Divine Creation is only temporarily satisfying until thoroughly examined, under which circumstances it is best abandoned.

Craig says that against (2.2), Mackie's rebuttal is a straw-man. For Mackie calls it a prejudice against infinity, while (2.2) does not deny the possibility of infinity, only the inability to reach it by successive addition. If infinity may be instantiated, then it cannot be reached by counting one at a time, or by days passing one at a time.

Regarding Mackie's contention about proponents of the Kalam assuming a beginning point of the universe infinitely far away, Craig says that he does not know of any proponents who do this. In fact, it is the proponents of the Kalam that are the ones who take infinity seriously, by arguing that if the universe has always existed it has no beginning point. This notion demonstrates just how difficult it is to even coherently imagine. For, if the universe never had a beginning, how could it have begun? How could we even begin counting the days between today and the "beginning" of the universe? The number of days is "infinite", or absurd to even think about counting, much less traversing!

Craig then offers Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. But in the case of the eternal universe theory, it would be as if Achilles had to cross an infinite series of intervals, from a beginningless and open end. Therefore it is unlike the tradition paradox, because in it Achilles only had to cross a finite distance in an infinite number of intervals.

The fact that the universe has no beginning, according to Mackie, makes the difficulty in rebutting the Kalam worse, not better.

Craig then demonstrates why a collection of the order-type *w is non-constructible, and therefore there is not reason to think it can represent an infinite series of past events.

Craig then turns his attention to Mackie's comment about a given point in the past having only a finite distance between itself and today. He remarks that this is a red herring, being completely irrelevant. For, even granting such point, the proponent of the Kalam requires an answers as to how the entire series may be traversed, not a given finite segment of it!

Then Craig addresses Mackie's contentions about coherent, non-Euclidean set theory. Craig makes the point that even if infinite set theory is mathematically coherent, there is no reason to suppose such infinities can obtain in the real world. If such infinities were instantiated in the real world, they would create logical absurdities like those found in Hilbert's Hotel.

Craig goes on to actually admit that even a proponent of the Kalam may grant the principle of correspondence in lieu of Euclid's theorem, and remind us that it brings no ontological commitment regarding the real world. It isn't as if we have any example of a real infinite collection sitting around somewhere.

Craig then points to all of Mackie's humble admissions that not every professional will grant his views, and that scientific evidence has in fact turned up plenty of support for the idea of a finite past for our universe.

So Craig continues working through Mackie's contentions by looking at Mackie's call for an argument in support of (1), that everything with a beginning has a cause. As Mackie had cited Hume, Craig digs into Hume's writings to pull out full-fledged contentions amounting to the premises of the Kalam! He then repeats his favorite line about how giving an argument for this premise might be unwise, as one ought not try to prove the obvious via the less obvious.

Does the reader of this really actually believe that at any moment an object like a Tiger may simply pop into existence right in front of him, uncaused? Can a whole universe simply pop into existence like that? Can God pop into existence? How does such a believe prove useful or explanatory or even remotely rational?

Craig then ceases to pull philosophical punches, and concisely unveils the view he takes on God and creation. Such view seems to avoid Mackie's critiques about the existence of God raising even more problems.

Craig states his view thusly:

...God without creation exists changelessly and timelessly with an eternal determination for the creation of a temporal world and... with creation God enters into temporal relationships with the universe, time [arises] concommitantly with the first event. This may be mysterious in the sense of being wonderful or awesome, which indeed it is, but it is not so far as I can see unintelligible, as is something's coming into being uncaused out of nothing.

Craig then briefly delves into modern cosmological science, which actually supports the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In order to make his case, it is incumbent upon Mackie to produce an alternate model of the beginning of the universe to the orthodox one. Craig briefly undercuts oscillating models of the universe.

Craig concludes with this, second-to-last paragraph:

What is Mackie's counsel? We should infer that the universe must have had some physical antecedents, even if the big bang has to be taken as a discontinuity so radical that we cannot explain it, because we can find no laws which we can extrapolate backwards through this discontinuity.' Here I think we see more clearly than ever the quasi-religious character of Mackie's atheism. Either we believe that the universe came to exist uncaused out of nothing or else no matter what the empirical evidence for an absolute beginning, no matter how deep a caesura we have to carve in nature, we should infer that the universe must be eternal. The existence of a creator God is not even an alternative. The theist can hardly be blamed for not impaling himself on the horns of this dilemma. On the contrary, in light of the foregoing discussion, of the three options, theism seems the most plausible route to take.

[ ] of the Gaps

When asked, "what was the sufficient cause of the universe?", two individuals respond.

Mr. Materialist Scientist answers, "We don't know the answer yet, but we have philosophical reasons to believe that it was a material cause that modern physical science will be able to discover. We have some theories that model how it may have happened."

Mr. Dualist Theist answers, "We don't know the details yet, but we have philosophical reasons to believe that it was an immaterial cause. We have some theories that model how it may have happened."

An Old Journal of My Introduction to General and Special Relativity Wherein My Skepticism and Dogmatic Newtonianism Was Dissolved

Forward:
Dear Derek, in the presence of many witnesses, in light of our brief conversation earlier, I here submit to you some of my thoughts from a Physical Science class I took in Fall of 2005. One of the assignments involved thorough interaction with a chapter of choice in Hewitt’s, Suchocki’s, and Hewitt’s, Conceptual Physical Science. I selected a chapter we hadn’t gone over in class: Chapter 35: Special and General Relativity. Please keep in mind that I have learned a lot since this writing, that this writing is a direct summary and response to a chapter of a textbook, and that this was a general ed, non-science major class.

I also highly recommend these two resources:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/
Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea

•••

Original Writing:
35.1 Summary: To record the state of something we use three dimensions, which have no robust meaning unless we also state the time that the dimensional descriptions applied to the object in question. This seems to indicate that space and time may be bound. Einstein’s theories support this; that things exist in a space-time continuum.
35.1 Comments: I have seen the PBS special “The Elegant Universe”, so I am going into this chapter with a little bit of background information about the theories of relativity, but not much. I have some speculations of my own, which begin with critiques of contemporary explanations of “space-time” observations. I would therefore like to note my initial hesitance to calling space and time, or matter and energy, the same thing; no matter how intimately they may be connected.

35.2 Summary: Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity, based on Newtonian principles, states first that “Observers can never detect their uniform motion except relative to other objects”. A restatement of this postulate is that “All laws of nature are the same in all uniformly moving reference frames”. An example is given of being able to pour coffee while flying through the air on a jet plane. This is supported by any experiment that has been carried out. If it has been carried out on earth, the fact that the earth is in motion, and the experiment was carried out as if there was not any acceleration of the location it was carried out in (indeed, there was not any relative motion of the lab relative to the earth and its atmosphere), then it becomes more and more clear that if the entire frame of reference is moving relative to an outside object, then relative motion inside the reference frame is only relative to other objects inside the reference frame – the motion of objects outside the reference frame are not factors in the motion of the objects inside.
The second postulate is that “The speed of light in free space will have the same value to all observers, regardless of the motion of the source or the motion of the observer. The speed of light is a constant.” This postulate is confirmed by our measurements of the speed of light. If both postulates accurately describe reality, then when two observers in relative motion to each other and a light source disagree about the time of a certain event, they may both be correct – the only thing to budge in the equation is time. A note is made that points in space and time are both quantized, i.e. there are fundamental units for them.
35.3 Comments: I like that the wording of the first postulate does not deny objective uniform motion or location. It does not affirm them either. If you start with relative motion, you will get relative motion. In other words, if we measure motion relatively, or call motion “change in position relative to a frame of reference” then of course we will conclude that motion is relative. Rather, the postulate simply states that it is impossible to detect uniform motion (if it is a phenomenon that actually occurs in our universe). I am however, skeptical of even this. What, logically, was Einstein’s reason for believing that humans will never discover a universally objective frame of reference, nor be able to develop the technology to measure motion in relationship to it?
I have also wondered about the famous experiment involving two clocks on two airplanes flying in opposite directions around the world. Their clocks showed a difference in displayed time at the end. But couldn’t that have been due merely to the physical strain exerted upon the inner workings of the clocks during the experiment? I would wonder then, what were the clocks measuring? Is it possible that what we call “time” is actually two different things: ‘age’ and ‘time’. ‘Age’ being the physical change or decay of an object, and ‘time’ being the objective, steady progression of events in this world. Time might be the cursor of history marking where everything is. How else would it be that the pilots of the planes could see each other after the flight? Wouldn’t they be living in two different planes of reality – different “times”? One would be a few split seconds ahead of the other! Or perhaps at the end of the day they both wound up in the same time plane, but traveled through less “time” to get there. I wonder then, what the nature of the “time” is that they traveled through; could they have seen each other during their journeys? How much of the Special Theory has to do with mere perception, and how much of it with the actual bending of time? Could it be that our methods for measurement are flawed?

35.3 Summary: The notion that time can be stretched is called “time dilation”. A very compelling illustration is given. Suppose that we could observe a light flash bounce between two mirrors inside a transparent spaceship. An observer onboard the spaceship, and an observer on the ground would both measure the speed of light as the same rate, denoted c. Yet to the observer onboard the spaceship, the flash of light is only moving up and down (which it is – relative to the environment of the spaceship). However to the observer on the ground, the flash of light will actually be moving up and down, and horizontally as well (in a zig-zag pattern). This is because the entire spaceship, including the mirrors and the light flash, are moving parallel to the ground. To the observer on the ground, the flash of light will then be covering more distance than to the observer on the spaceship. If speed is equal to distance divided by time, and the speed of light is constant, and the distance stretches, then the time must logically be stretching, or dilating, as well. This occurrence can be expressed mathematically.
The text then contends that time is actually dilating, there is nothing unusual about the functioning of a clock itself, as indeed there is nothing unusual about clocks here on earth now, though they are all whizzing through space (because the earth on which they are is whizzing through space). Next the text explains that as a result of time dilation, according to the measurements we have made, as speeds approach the speed of light, time slows down and seems to approach zero. A mass at the velocity of light, c, takes an infinite amount of time to elapse one second, and zero amount of time to travel an infinite distance. Thankfully, the Law of the universe has set c to be a type of cosmic speed limit such that it is impossible to reach or exceed c. It is important to note that time dilation, to be perfectly accurate, most be taken into account even for small masses and slow accelerations. It is also important to note that as speeds approach c, mass approaches infinity, length approach zero. However light, which moves at c, will always be measured to be moving at c, regardless of your frame of reference.
Space travel is also discussed in this chapter. At high speeds it would be theoretically possible to spend 5 years traveling at 99.999 % of c, and return to earth only to find that 1100 years have passed for it and its inhabitants.
35.3 Comments: This chapter hasn’t mentioned it yet, but c is only the speed at which light moves in a “vacuum”. Light moves significantly slower in gas, even slower in liquid, and slower still through solids (if at all). This chapter coaxes another question. If Einstein is right, then why can light go the speed of light? Isn’t light made up of photons? Why are they exempt from the c speed limit? Well, if photons have zero mass, then perhaps it is not so absurd. I would also like to note that this section does not assert that time can be turned backwards. It can be sped and slowed (relatively), but there is nothing in this section that argues for bending and twisting time like a pretzel, or going back in time. In fact on page 845 it says that time accelerated astronauts will not be able to go backward in time.

35.4 Summary: Length contraction is related to time dilation. As was mentioned, as a mass approaches the speed of light, its length approaches zero, when measured by an observer who is not traveling relative to a common frame of reference. This contraction only takes place in the direction of motion. This phenomenon is related to time dilation, as distances will flatten to zero when a mass approaches them at c. In this way, one could travel an infinite distance in zero amount of time. Furthermore, if a mass approaches the speed of light, its length does not change relative to itself. Rather, the time it has to travel through in order to reach its destination is collapsing. However from the perspective of an outside observer, lengths are contracting.

35.5 Summary: In this chapter relativistic momentum is explained. The speed of any mass has a limit: c. However, momentum may increase without limit. This is illustrated by Einstein’s new equation for calculating momentum, which accounts for the Lorentz factor. Therefore as speed approaches c, momentum approaches ∞. With any progress toward c, objects appear to increase in mass, because they display an increase in inertia. Einstein however, seemed to think later in his life that mass is the same in all frames of reference, but space-time changes with speed.
35.5 Comments: It seems to me that if you accept Einstein’s initial premises, then all of this follows logically. To be honest, I think I might just have a lot of emotional struggles with accepting all of this.

35.6 Summary: Einstein asserts that matter and energy may be exchanged according to the expression E=mc2; E being energy, m being mass, and c being the familiar uninhibited speed of light. When fuel is used to produce energy, the system will afterward be found to be less some mass, in accordance with Einstein’s equation!

35.7 Summary: A desire to describe nature using standard forms and perspectives motivated Einstein to pursue a description of the phenomena he was examining, which came to be know as his theory of General Relativity. By thinking about a spaceship accelerating at g, the principle of equivalence became manifest, that “local observations made in an accelerated frame of reference cannot be distinguished from observations made in a Newtonian gravitational field”. A few thought experiments quickly establish this theory as reasonable, but Einstein elaborates on it by saying that, (in a free environment) because the trajectory of a beam of light relative to an accelerated mass is identical to the trajectory of an additional object relative to the same accelerated mass, space-time itself curves. He contends that matter and energy are two aspects of the same thing.
Euclidean geometry produces accurate results when dealing with objects on a flat surface. However, Einstein’s observations and calculations argued for a four dimensional warping of space-time. This is seen when the shortest distances between three planets form a triangle whose angles add up to greater than 180 degrees. The lines making up the legs of triangles such as this are called geodesics. The lines are technically not straight, but they are short. If this curving of space-time is positive throughout the universe, then the universe is warped like a sphere. If it is negative, then it is shaped more like a Pringles potato chip. This curvature of space-time causes what we perceive as gravity, and is proportional to mass. This principle is seen when we calculate the effect of large masses as they change position. It would seem that, rather than a sudden ceasing of gravitational force on other masses, a large mass that changes position creates gravity waves, similar to the waves made on the surface of a waterbed when a bowling ball is rolled across it.
Einstein’s calculations, when applied to planets in Our Solar System predicted precessing orbits. When Newtonian physics were used to predict the orbits of the planets it pretty much worked out – except for the missing 43 seconds of arc that Mercury displayed. Einstein’s equations had produced the right predictions.
Another confirmation of Einstein’s theory occurred in 1919 when a solar eclipse revealed that his predictions about the exact arc beams from distant stars display when passing near the Sun where dead on.
A third test confirms General Relativity, and it becomes clear that in General Relativity, the gravitational “red shift” is relative to location rather than speed (because c is a constant). It is also important to note that time is never sped or slowed for an object relative to itself (obviously). This is to say that though an object may pass through time more slowly than another relative to it, its lifespan is never extended from its own perspective.
35.7 Comments: I heard once that Einstein responded with a complete lack of surprise when his predictions about starlight arc were shown to be accurate. He said something about being certain from his equations alone; observation is secondary.

Concluding Thoughts:
This chapter has brought many questions and ideas to mind. For example, if God has no mass, then (if Einstein is right), He is not subject to time. Perhaps He can interact with this universe in the ontological now, all the while being atemporal and eternal. Maybe that photons have no mass somehow plays into a facet of God’s foreknowledge or omniscience.
This in turn raises thoughts concerning humans and the resurrection. If human souls have no mass, maybe it is so that, upon death (separation of body and soul), a soul zooms to resurrection day, upon which it meets its body and enters into temporality again. I understand this to be a much bigger scriptural and scientific topic to be researched than is feasible here, but it is interesting to be introduced to such musings.
I cannot keep from thinking about the implications of God stretching out the heavens. Could this skew our observations of the age of the universe? What if our solar system was accelerated altogether such that the age of our solar system is different than the age of another? I have heard some compelling arguments for a very young earth, and some for a very young solar system. But I have also heard about evidence that seems to support an older universe. Could it be that when God stretched out the heavens, galactic clocks spun at different rates relative to each other?

Consider:
Job 9:8 “[God] stretches out the heavens”
Ps. 104:2 “stretching out heaven like a tent curtain”1
Isa. 40:22 “He ... stretches out the heavens like a curtain and spreads them out like a tent”1
Isa. 42:5 “... God the Lord, who created the heavens and stretched them out”
Isa. 44:24 “I, the Lord, am the maker of all things, stretching out the heavens by Myself”
Isa. 45:12 “It is I who made the earth and created man upon it. I stretched out the heavens with My hands”
Isa. 48:13 “Surely My hand founded the earth and My right hand spread out the heavens.”
Isa. 51:13 “the Lord your Maker, Who stretched out the heavens and laid the foundations of the earth”
Jer. 10:12 “He has stretched out the heavens”
Jer. 51:15 “He stretched out the heavens”
Zech. 12:1 “the Lord who stretches out the heavens”

Please also see:
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/SpeedOfLight/measure_c.html
http://www.creationscience.com/onlinebook/FAQ111.html#wp1885480
http://www.cosmicfingerprints.com/

Lastly, I would like to leave the reader with the following thought. When God destroys nature, and recreates it (Rev. 21:2), will he do so with a new set of universal constants, quantities, and forces? Did the fall of Adam knock a lot of forces and constants off track? Humans have the opportunity to seek the answers, but let us give glory to God, above all.

What is Religion? And Dawkins isn't too bad a fellow - he does have some good stuff to say.

[Although it is often difficult for me to escape what may seem to be condescending or at least certain rhetoric, much of this blog has been a journey for me, and I hope at least some of my honest inquisitiveness is visible through the veil. For all actual condescension and wrongfully dogmatic or inflammatory language I apologize, whether I did it intentionally.]

Is religion the designation for a group of topics, one's opinions about which constitute his religion? This can't be it, because choosing to believe that there is a God makes a person religious. But according to this definition of religion, taking the opposite position, that there is no God, is also a religious belief. I doubt most atheists want to call themselves religious.

Is religion a set of traditions? If this is so, then going to Starbucks every day would be a religious activity. Celebrating birthdays doesn't seem to qualify as religious either. Let's try again.

Is religion a set of propositions that render a man religious upon affirmation? This might be closer. If anyone affirms that there is a God, gods, or anything supernatural, then he is called religious. If this is so, then religious beliefs shouldn't be disqualified merely on the basis of their category. Rather, they should be investigated to determine whether they are reasonable. In this case, the proposition "God exists" is something that a free thinker, scientist, or philosopher may inquire as to the truth of. Such an inquirer may come to agree with the proposition in question, rendering him religious. Or, he may come to disagree with the proposition, rendering him, in this case, irreligious. Either stance, if arrived at rationally, may turn out to be a scientific or philosophically defensible position.

Is religion an epistemology that derives belief from authority, tradition, intuition, and/or feeling? This also comes close to the popular use of the term. Most classified "religions" such as Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and yes, even Christianity, hold epistemological frameworks that elevate tradition (pick your holy book), authority (pick your religious leader), intuition (pick your bosom-burning), and/or feeling (can you feel the Spirit?). If this is what religion is, then I want no part in it.

My personal goal is to seek to believe in what is true, meaning what is accurate to reality. In my humble and limited experience I have come to esteem science and logic as avenues to arrive at truth. I am a sort of free thinker, an arm-chair scientist, a lay anthropologist, and a budding young philosopher.

On an only semi-related, but very important note...

I have recently sworn off all conspiracy theories. These include common Christian presumptions about the hatred and deceitfulness of atheists and other non-Christians. I have actually been finding Dawkins to be quite a reasonable man. His scientific discourses are interesting, clear, and informative. I think that his qualms with religion are valid, and in fact I share them. He is right to rebut screwy epistemology, promote science and free inquiry, as well as common sense.

I think that people of all religions, including Christianity, have more to learn from him than teach him. I have always been uncomfortable with the notion of "blind faith". I grow increasingly frustrated with with what I call "folk Christianity", and with the Religious Right.

I have even been reforming much of my own world view and behavior as of late. I feel like I have a large humility pill I need to swallow. I feel that I have been guilty of a lot of ad-hoc thinking, red herrings, and ad hominems. I have been guilty of sweeping aside arguments merely because of their source (genetic fallacy). But I am young, and this transition in my development marks only an important period of growth, and the beginning of a new stage of thinking.

Perhaps instead of fighting Dawkins, Christianity should embrace what he has to say and teach. Perhaps we need a wake up call. This is not to say that we can't engage Dawkins logically, however.

After all, we were the ones who use to build the universities, kick off the science experiments, and promote literacy. We use to drink, smoke cigars and pipes, experiment with music, talk philosophy, engage the culture, make friends with prostitutes, and love the homeless. Yes, there are many who do this today, and yes, we've certainly had our dark and hateful times in the past as well. We have a lot to learn, and a long way to go in many areas.

Why don't modern Evangelicals clearly see the destructiveness in accusation and judgment as much as they see the destructiveness in individual sins and disbeliefs themselves? Why are we so scared to encourage doubt? Why are we glad to see our children and friends believe in the right things for the wrong reasons, or using the right beliefs to motivate wrong behaviors?

The average "Christian" today couldn't give a rational defense for his beliefs. This grieves me.

At the end of the day, I remain a Christian. By this I mean that I believe that the Bible is true, I believe there is a God who exists as three persons, and I believe that Jesus is fully and completely God, as well as fully and completely human. I believe that He died for my sins, and that my trusting in Him is an important part of accepting the gift of eternal life. I believe that He can offer this to me, because despite the wages of sin being death, Jesus died as a penal substitution for me. Communing with Him is exactly that, and will persist after bodily death. I will one day reunite with my body in some capacity, and all of creation will be redeemed, from the stars to the rocks to the plants to the animals. Those who reject Christ (whatever form that takes, and whoever they are - I am not placing judgment) will be dealt with justly and permanently.

But why I continue to believe in these things follows an ironically more traditional line of thought than many modern Evangelicals. I do not choose to believe in these things, and allow these beliefs to motivate certain behaviors, merely because my parents taught them to me. Nor do I believe in them because millions of people do. I don't accept the Bible on blind faith, then follow everything it says without question. I don't believe that doubts and questions should be suppressed.

Now I have to admit, I grew up in a Christian family, who went to church weekly. I am white. I am an American citizen. I "accepted the Lord", so to speak, when I was two years old. What this means for my position as an objective observer, I fear. Forgive my vulnerability.

Nevertheless, as of today, I maintain that there exists a sufficient body of empirical and logical evidence to render my beliefs at the very least reasonable. Furthermore, I have experiential warrant for the continuity of my faith. Any attempt at persuading others on certain matters should be done so based on evidence of varying kinds; I don't pretend I have all the answers, but I don't ask anyone to accept my world view without good reason.

I may have grown up thinking like a Christian, but any beliefs that have persisted have done so because of what I judge to be good reason. I ask nobody to take my word for it, but encourage everybody to investigate these matters on their own.

The God Delusion

The Genuis of Max Alan Clark

By sheer intuition I Googled one of my best friends, Max Clark. Given his status, think of my shock when I uncovered a rather consistently kept-up but obviously somewhat secret blog of his from of old. I read a couple posts, and was not surprised by how insightful they were. But then I got hit by the most impressive fact. What packed the punch was that he hadn't touched it since he was like 15. I like that he gives credit where credit is due, not trying to steal the glory for good jokes and important insights. One thing he brought to a post was a quote from a younger boy he had met,

saying
"it works in theory, but not in reality"
is wrong.

you just have a bad theory.

I agree, Max.

What Atheists Say About Intelligent Design

1. Some atheists say that Intelligent Design is dead. If this is so, then why can't they shut up about it? This is especially ironic, as they turn right around to harp on the fact that they are in the minority, presumably to gain sympathy and pretend that they are so unique and lonely in their genius. Humans have this tendency to want to make themselves out to be victims; it's like, the thinking man's opium.

2. Some atheists say that Intelligent Design is just religiously motivated, dressed-up Creationism. This is not very precise, as Creationism, (along with it's critiques of ID), is the view that everything was brought into existence by a special act of divine creation. Intelligent Design differs from this, as it does not necessarily posit any deity. Rather, ID posits that design by an intelligent entity is a better explanation for the origin of life than untintelligent processes. The difference is significant, because the Creation Science movement never got far, while the Intelligent Design movement has been advanced, even advocated by some atheists and agnostics, with the help of other atheists. In fact, there are even some atheists using the term to describe their message, that humans were intelligently designed by other humans. The fact that many religious people have latched onto it for obvious reasons, or the claim that it has religious implications, has nothing to do with whether the theory is scientifically credible. Intelligent atheists say, 'let's hash it out, not censor it it'.

It seems to me that we all need to put history, statistics, and even implications aside and just find some common epistemological ground, some common goals, and some love, then set out to do good science and good philosophy in the areas of the origin of the universe, the origin of life, and the origin of species. I don't care what the effects or implications of believing in certain propositions are, I care about whether they are true--pragmatism be damned!

In Response to Known Critiques That Chris Has of the Cosmological Argument, and a few comments in reply to his response to the first part of God II

This is my reply to a passage detailing alleged problems with the cosmological argument taken from Chris' reply to my second major contribution to the original existence of God discussion. Chris says,

A self-existent universe is no less believable than a self-existent God. This is not a strictly atheist take on it, the Buddhist and Hindu religions believe this. This is not to say I'm endorsing one religion over another. I'm just trying to show that, well, as a great astronomer once said:

"As far as I know. It is the only ancient religious tradition on the Earth which talks about the right time-scale. We want to get across the concept of the right time-scale, and to show that it is not unnatural. In the West, people have the sense that what is natural is for the universe to be a few thousand years old, and that billions is indwelling, and no one can understand it. The Hindu concept is very clear. Here is a great world culture which has always talked about billions of years."

"Finally, the many billion year time-scale of Hindu cosmology is not the entire history of the universe, but just the day and night of Brahma, and there is the idea of an infinite cycle of births and deaths and an infinite number of universes, each with its own gods."

-Carl Sagan

Footnote [2] of my cosmological argument argues against the possibility of transgressing the infinite. But I would also like to point out the difference between billions and infinity. No matter how large a quantity is, if it can be depicted with a number, it is finite. In my cosmological argument I do not suggest adopting a view of any definite age of our universe, or whether it is billions of years old or several thousand years old has no bearing on my argument. All that needs to be true as regards the age of the cosmos for my cosmological argument to work is that our universe not have an infinite physical history.

Sagan does mention that the Hindu billion year time-scale isn't descriptive of the entire age of our universe, so I suppose that in this passage you are arguing that because other humans have found it possible to believe in an infinite universe, then it we should not be so afraid to follow suite. Or maybe you are saying that it is not unnatural for humans to believe in an infinite universe. Perhaps you are right in this, and some humans have been able to postulate an infinite universe, but I would like to offer footnote [2] then, as evidence against this postulate for such humans to consider. In it I raise both logical and empirical arguments that the universe had a beginning. Perhaps the Hindus, along with Sagan, should reconsider the logical coherency of a universe whose physical past stretches out forever. I would also like to add a note that Hindu cosmology and soteriology is cyclical (which is precisely how they believe that it is eternal while avoiding the strict chronological infinite regress problem, although they do so at the expense of taking on the burden of a whole new set of problems), and logically depends on both reincarnation and the existence of immortal souls. Are you and Sagan prepared to grant these as well?

You also mention self-existence; so perhaps you maintaining that physical things can be self-existent. Is your view of this different from your view of infinity? My personal belief is that God is not infinite in the sense that the timeline of His existence stretches out in both directions without end. As my answer to objection one states, God is outside of time and is not susceptible to being objected to on the grounds of the impossibility of an infinite regression. In His case, self-existence is different than chronological infinity.

Perhaps then you are advocating universal self-existence just as I am advocating Divine self-existence. Alas, you do say, "A self-existent universe is no less believable than a self-existent God". My answer to objection four, and footnote [4] both address this issue, and explain why it is that God can be self-existent, while matter and energy cannot be. The simple reality is that objects that are extended in space are by necessity also extended in time. Their past cannot be infinite, as they would never approach the ontological "now". Nor can they have brought themselves into existence, for such a notion is a logical contradiction. How can matter that exists not only be the cause of its own existence, but the source of existence itself?

But an object Who is not extended in space and time, Who does not experience a series of moments, an ontological starting line, or a coming into being, may certainly be the very Fountainhead of existence itself. Such a Being may certainly be the everlasting source of even His own existence. The clever turning of the verb "to be" into the proper name "I AM" would be the way I would expect such a Being to introduce Himself.

The next objection reads,

Moving backwards in time the further back you go, the closer you get to the actual big bang, the more the laws of physics as we know them break down until they cease to apply.

The theist could easily turn this around. Why not say that the fact that the closer you get to the Big Bang, "the more the laws of physics as we know them break down until they cease to apply", should indicate that the physical laws were in the process of being created? Wouldn't the behavior of the universe in ways that deviate from physical laws be classified as a miracle? See also my answer to objection 6.

The next one is:

[The] laws of physics here and now may require causality, but in the Planck epoch or {10 to the -43rd}th of a second after the big bang and earlier it's not so clear. Also, newly emerging models of parallel worlds as well as other cycles of expansion and collapse of the oscillatory model of the universe may have physical laws are very different than they are in this universe.

This is thoroughly addressed in my answer to objection 6, and footnote [2].

Then Chris says,

Assuming for the moment that all that is had a first cause, nothing suggests that cause was a god.

This is a common objection to the cosmological argument, and I basically agree with it. The cosmological argument cannot tell us much about the creator of our universe. All we learn from it is that it is nonphysical, it created everything, and it is self-existent. According to the cosmological argument, there could be multiple nonphysical, self-existent objects, one or more of which (or whom) were involved with the causation of our universe. Calling the first cause "God" is quite a bit pretentious. Because I hope to develop my argument over the course of several months, I am simply using the conclusions of the cosmological argument as my starting place for defining "God". I have not claimed that the cosmological argument proves the Christian view of God.

Chris then says,

You state you're not making assumptions about the 'first cause' then you claim prima fascia evidence for a 'creator'. The word creator implies an intelligence entity. That's a rather large assumption.

In the version of my cosmological argument, I do cite a dictionary to ground my use of the term "creator". I don't mean to imply intelligence by this term, although I hope to go on to argue for the intelligence of the creator in later posts. If you feel that the act of creation itself implies intelligence or at least intentionality, then that is your own intuition, and perhaps you should reflect on it. I hope that the argument I developed no longer causes my evidence for a creator to fall into the category 'prima fascia', even if I end up being wrong.

Chris asks me,

"scientismists?"

"Scientismists" was meant to be two things. First, a mockery of George W., who consistently says things in the tradition of his classic "strategery", and I occasionally like to allow myself to be caught up in Bushisms. The second thing the term is supposed to be is a statement about some scientists, who believe that science is the only veridical enterprise. Such a view has been labeled "scientism", and the word "scientist" is already taken, so why not call them scientismists? I guess its not that funny, sorry. See also my reply to your comments about science quoted below.

Chris next comment in the course of our discourse is,

I've run into many explicitly non-Christians who talk about an afterlife but I never met anyone who claims to be an atheist that does.

I don't really mean to get into arguments over whether or not some atheists make claims about the afterlife. But I am enjoying the general ebb and flow of our conversation, and although this post will inevitably be long, I would like to make a comment.

I think you misinterpreted me. I didn't mean to say that a lot of atheists make claims about what the afterlife will be like. I meant to say that a lot of atheists make claims about the afterlife based on science (e.g. "there is no afterlife"). I guess what interests me is that modern science often qualifies itself as only responsible for handling physical data. If souls are nonphysical, how can one object to belief in their existence or that they persist after death, based solely on science? It seems their analysis lies outside the domain of physical science.

Although only semi-related, I thought I would drop in a quotation of an atheist on the topic. I find the first paragraph of the quotation interestingly in support of premise (4) of my cosmological argument.

And now as to life after death. Endless life after death would be a form of infinity, and for actual infinities there can be no good evidence. But is there good evidence for any life after death?

A great deal of the evidence offered for life after death depends on the doctrine that there is a god, and is valueless because that doctrine is false. However, some people have believed that there is no god and yet is an afterlife; and spiritualists and mediums offer us evidence of survival independent of the question whether there is a god. I have never attended a spiritualist performance, but I have read some of their reports. I think I can safely say that no afterlife of any difference in quality from this life has been reported, and no afterlife of any interest. The stuff they offer us is deadly dull. However, it might be true for all that. Homer believed that there is an afterlife and it is deadly dull.

I judge that it is false, and that all these reports of messages from the dead are false. (By which I do not mean that they are all frauds or lies. No doubt many of them are sincere. It is desirable to repeat from time to time that a falsehood is not the same as a lie. A falsehood can be sincerely uttered, and a lie can be true.) These reports have the pattern of inventions, the vagueness, the poverty, the similarity to each other, the comfortingness, and the insistence on circumstances that make criticism difficult, such as darkness and reverence.

My main reason for thinking there is no afterlife is that it seems immensely probable that everything we know as life depends on there being a living body. All that part of life which consists in the activity of a living body selfevidently depends on there being a living body, for example, eating, tasting, running, laughing, kissing. The life that does not selfevidently depend on there being a living body is the interior life of the mind, including reasoning, imagining, dreaming, and other activities and experiences. But it seems quite clear that we have overwhelming physiological evidence that this mental life, too, depends on the activity of a living body, and ceases when there is no longer a good brain with good blood flowing through it in the right quantity.

-Positive Atheism

I am not really trying to prove anything here, and I will have to consider his claims in another post about souls, but I found it interesting enough to pass on. It's also interesting that his argument against the afterlife only works on the assumption that there is no God, and that naturalism is true.

Ok, so you go on about souls,

Many people atheist and otherwise talk of the soul as an abstract aspect of the human psychology...

The same way they talk of unicorns not existing. There's been no credible evidence of a soul as thought of in religious terms existing so there's no reason to act as if one does. There is no burden of "dis-proof" science bares. You want them to believe in a supernatural soul, give them some proof

In response to the first comment, I say you're right. In fact, to be a naturalist, one has to account for qualia physio-neurologically, which is a very shaky ground to find yourself on. The arguments of David Chalmers are pretty persuasive that such accounts (such as epiphenomonalism, other less successful wannabe dualisms, and naturalism) ultimately fail to make sense of a lot of facts (cf. especially his work on zombies, and Searle's Chinese Room Argument is good too - even though Searle refuses the label "substance dualist", well... he is one). But aside from these most excellent philosophers, take a look at what the neurologists and agnostics themselves are coming up with these days.

Penfield began his scientific career with the belief that a complete explanation of the brain mechanisms underlying our various mental functions would amount to an understanding of the mind itself. In 1975, a year before his death, he published a book significantly titled The Mystery of the Mind. In that book, after reflecting on what he had lent about brain mechanisms after decades of research, he declared that 'it comes as a surprise now to discover, during this final examination of the evidence, that the dualist hypothesis seems the more reasonable' (p. 85)... Penfield was drawn to the 'dualist hypothesis' because not once in countless surgeries did artificial stimulation of brain tissue ever 'cause a patient to believe or to decide' (p. 77). Furthermore, he knew of no cases in which the initial brain activity associated with an epileptic seizure induced a belief or decision.

-[Cooney, Brian (2000). The Place of Mind. United States: Matrix Productions Inc.]


In the past, atheists suggested that the mind is nothing more than a function of the brain, which is matter; thus the mind and the brain are the same, and matter is all that exists. However, that viewpoint is no longer intellectually credible, as a result of the scientific experiments of British neurologist, Sir John Eccles. Dr. Eccles won the Nobel Prize for distinguishing that the mind is more than merely physical. He showed that the supplementary motor area of the brain may be fired by mere intention to do something, without the motor cortex of the brain (which controls muscle movements) operating. In effect, the mind is to the brain what a librarian is to a library. The former is not reducible to the latter. Eccles explained his methodology in The Self and Its Brain, co-authored with the renowned philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper (see Popper and Eccles, 1977). In a discussion centering on Dr. Eccles’ work, Norman Geisler discussed the concept of an eternal, all-knowing Mind.

{That book reference is: [Popper, Karl R. and John C. Eccles (1977), The Self and Its Brain. New York: Springer International.]}

From evidence such as that presented here, Robert Jastrow (an agnostic, by his own admission) was forced to conclude: “That there are what I or anyone would call supernatural forces at work is now, I think, a scientifically proved fact” (1982, p. 18). The evidence speaks clearly regarding the existence of a non-contingent, eternal, self-existent Mind that created this Universe and everything within it.

{That book reference is: [Jastrow, Robert (1982), “A Scientist Caught Between Two Faiths,” Interview with Bill Durbin, Christianity Today, August 6.]}

-The Case For the Existence of God

Chris, its not that there is no scientific or credible evidence of souls existing, and dualists, such as us Christians, bear the burden of proof. The simple fact is that I experience life as a soul, I feel, I think, I decide, etc. If you want to make the claim there is no soul, then you bear the responsibility of demonstrating such a claim. The default position seems to be dualist, as we all experience life from our own perspective, as if there was some sort of consciousness inside.

So the next thread is:

Though there are Christians who act with love and strive for excellence, I wouldn't say love and excellence are themselves typical Christian behavior, particularly when it comes to Christendom's lamentable influence on both non-believers and on scientific progress.

Although love and excellence have not always characterized the behaviors of Christians, they are Christ-like traits. Indeed, "Christian" insofar as it means "Christ-like" is a bit of a misnomer. Historically those claiming the name for themselves haven't always exhibited the corresponding traits. The behavior of Christians, along with what it means to be Christian, will have to be dealt with in a separate post someday.

But do you really lament Christianity's influence on scientific progress (also cf. "Men of Science/Men of Faith" HIS, May 1976, pp. 26-31)?

I will admit here that certain churches at certain times (like the Roman Catholic church in Galileo's time) have inhibited, rejected, refuted, or burned important scientific works. This is tragic and regrettable.

In Galileo's case, men who took both clear thinking and Biblical special revelation seriously were motivated to take a second look at what scripture actually teaches. The Bible itself in many places instructs us to observe the natural world in order to learn about God, and find illumination for scripture. We should be consistently going back to the Bible and rechecking our interpretation work according to sound hermeneutics so that we can be sure we are getting out of it what we are meant to. As to astronomy, once those Christians looked again at the meaning of the passages the Catholic church used to reject Galileo's findings, they found that, had they interpreted them correctly and according to solid interpretation principles, they would not have been led to reject Galileo's findings. Moreover, had the Catholic church listened to Jesus, they wouldn't have rejected Galileo merely on the bases of his scientific beliefs anyway - even if they disagreed. The problem was with Papal Authority being made equal to and/or greater than scripture, a problem scripture warns against, and one of the reasons for Great Schism and the Reformation.

Next comment:

The insular life many Christians lead (fundies especially), socializing primarily in church circles, home schooling and attending religious colleges, enjoying primarily religious entertainment media and such keeps them from being exposed in a meaningful way to differing ways of thinking and from hearing first hand about divergent opinion and worldview. When they learn about science and evolution it's with a "theized for your protection" Christian slant.

You are correct in your assessment and judgment about this, and it is unfortunate. Such Christians are not living Biblically, as the Bible teaches us to live in the world (while maintaining distinction from it in terms of moral living and correct beliefs about God). We are supposed to be dynamically engaged in pop culture, exposing ourselves to various viewpoints and making friends of all types. Pastors themselves should preach with a Bible in one hand and a newspaper in the other. Sectarianism is not the way to go. But anyone who holds firm convictions about anything (even atheists) should avoid syncretism as well, as it degrades the human will, by saying that all choices are ultimately the same.

As to my own life, I admit heavy exposure to scientists who are Christian, but this was not the case for me in high school, and it I have been making concerted efforts to read from a variety of philosophical, theological, and scientific sources over the last year.

As to whether my secular/sacred balance of informational sources and social relationships is healthy, I can't help but say that you probably have no idea, and are not positioned to make a judgment (not that you are, I hope).

I emotionally feel the need to defend a place like Biola University from your accusation that its classes on science and evolution are "theized for your protection", but with all due respect, your comment just reflects ignorance of the facts.

As to other colleges, such as Calvary Chapel Bible College, I can't make any judgments, as I don't know very much about them. I do know that they are not accredited, and make no claim to being liberal arts oriented. Hence "Bible college".

Christianity is incoherent with logic or science. (ex. water into wine, regaining life after dying and three days of decomposition)

Turning water into wine and bodily resurrection aren't scientifically impossible. Perhaps improbable, but that doesn't make Christianity irreconcilable with science and logic. Sometimes "miracle" is defined as a breech in physical law, in which case Christianity does not demand that one believes in them. It is an epistemic possibility that both events actually occurred, and, should we have had the appropriate knowledge and instruments, we could have examined the details to discover how it is that they came about. Other times "miracle" is defined as "something remarkable", something awe-inspiring. In this case, one best believe that certain things are worthy of awe. There are things that only occur rarely. Indeed, such things as random genetic mutations defy common experience at face-value. However, when we begin examining the microbiological issues surrounding mutations, we start to unravel their causes. Could it be that in similar cases, unexpected or rare occurrences such as the transformation of water into wine, and the bodily resurrection from the dead of a person, could maintain both their rarity and their scientific plausibility? In fact, many who deny the teleological argument admit that although it was unlikely, the universe was actually caused by unintelligent, random processes. To believe in such an improbable event and then turn around and deny miracles is problematic.

Or is it possible that "miracles", defined as breeches in physical laws, are possible too? If it were so that a nonphysical, self-existent being created everything, maybe even physical laws as well, then it might not be that difficult to imagine. Just as the programmer of Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 4 can temporarily "break" the laws that he has set up to govern gameplay, in order to accomplish something he wants to. If we are operating under the definition of "science" that excludes exceptions to physical laws, then miracles in this sense are not classified therein, even if they are possible in a broadly logical sense. But we have to qualify that science in this sense isn't the only means to knowledge. If we are operating under the definition of "science" that includes all means to knowledge, then Divine Revelation and historical records would count, in which case miracles of this type may be categorized as within the realm of science (more on this a little further down this post).

When you define science in the way that excludes exceptions to physical laws, by the way, you will run into problems when trying to scientifically learn about our universe before the Planck Epoch.

To make the brute claim that the future will always and necessarily resemble the past in such a way that miracles (as breeches in physical laws) are impossible, then you will violate an important principle of the Skeptic's:

For all inferences from experience suppose as their foundation that the future will resemble the past and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar qualities. If there is any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless and can give rise to no inference of conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed up to now ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument of inference, does not prove that for the future it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature and, consequently, all their effects and influence may change without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes and with regard to some objects. Why may it not happen always and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point, but as a philosopher who has some share of curiosity--I will not say skepticism--I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no inquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance.

-David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Section IV, Part II).

The "scientific", "skeptical" materialistic atheists will claim that just because we haven't found physical causes for things like the existence of our universe, doesn't mean that they don't exist. Science is committed to finding them. This commitment is an argument from ignorance, and it is based on faith. There is no logical proof that could ever justify the claim "there are always and only physical causes according to physical laws". And because there is no justification for belief in such a proposition, it can only be accepted by faith. Science should be more open minded than this. I put quotes around "skeptical" as well, asserting that the discounting of nonphysical factors in the causation of things like the existence of our universe, turning water into wine, or bodily resurrection, is an unnecessary narrowing of the mind. Consider another quote from the same author, in Part I of Section V of the same work:

There is, however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity; and that is the Academic or skeptical philosophy. The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgment, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the inquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which do not lie within the limits of common life and practice.

The medievals thought that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible. To them, belief that the sun might not rise tomorrow would be silly. But now we know that stars are born, and stars explode. It is not so irrational to think that despite the experience of every human on record it just the sun just might not rise tomorrow. It just might explode instead. We know that this is scientifically possible, and even probable over the long term. Could it be that although we think we understand the human body and its death and the nature of liquids and their synthesis, but are not considering possible factors that have not yet been thoroughly understood? Is the miraculous any more impossible, or even different than, an apple's attraction to the earth, a baby being born, a star collapsing, or a lover's sacrifice?

When I ask skeptics about miracles, they usually say that they have never personally heard of any happening. But what about the case that Brianna cited? What about the case that I cited? I can collect more testimonies if you want. How many would you need to be convinced? How many doctors would need to be dumbfounded by the results of post-prayer tests for you to believe in miracles? How many historical records of miracles would you need to read about before you are convinced?

What's interesting is that the book of Isaiah records God Himself as actually using the reliability of physical laws as a basis for telling people to trust in Him.

Regarding the Catholic Church, could it be that because they defined miracles as breeches in physical laws, they ran into problems when science started showing that physical laws are reliable? Maybe they should have viewed miracles as merely awe-inspiring, rare occurrences. And shouldn't they be attributing everything to God in some sense, even the ordinary?

If you can show me specifically how it is that you can know that it is literally and terminally and by all reasonable accounts impossible for the dead to rise or for water to be turned into wine, then I will have to start taking objections to miracles more seriously.

I also highly recommend C. S. Lewis' and William Lane Craig's works on miracles, they explain a lot.

Next you say,

You keep trying to advance the idea that science is a religion. It isn't.

Ok, sorry. Let me elaborate. Science is not a religion, and I never meant to claim it as such. It is a method. In my opinion it is a good method for acquiring knowledge, but certainly not the only veridical one.

"Scientism", according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is the

excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques.

The same also offers one definition of religion as

a pursuit or interest to which someone ascribes supreme importance

and faith as

complete trust or confidence in someone or something... a strongly held belief or theory

Under these definitions "scientism" falls into the category "religion", even though science is not a religion.

"Empiricism" (which often goes hand-in-hand with Scientism) is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as

the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience

This would discount logic as a means to acquire knowledge. This would constitute a religious belief under the above definitions. Moreover, this is what the scientific method post was in refutation of. To make the claim that sensory data is the only veridical type is in itself a philosophical claim, undermining Empiricism itself. What sensory data can one provide that justifies the claim that only sensory data is veridical? And the moment one gropes for philosophical data, he concedes the philosopher's point. I am not calling you an Empiricist or a "Scientismist", as you allow logic to be used in the quest for knowledge, but we seem to be missing each other here with these terms, so I am clarifying my use of them.

I would like to note that empirical evidence carries weight with me, but I reject Empiricism as defined here.

"Naturalism" is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as

a philosophical viewpoint according to which everything arises from natural properties and causes, and supernatural or spiritual explanations are excluded or discounted

Quite often modern scientists hold to such a philosophy, but they should not pretend that the philosophy itself is the only paradigm science can operate within. There are plenty of respectable scientists and philosophers who are not naturalists.

Some define "science" in a more philologically correct way. Scienta is Latin for "to know", in which case all means of acquiring knowledge fall into the category "science". The medieval philosophers, scientists, and theologians considered theology to be "the queen of the sciences", because it is a means to acquire knowledge of the most important Object in existence.

I have time for one more today:

To reiterate what I've probably said before; there's a difference between the meaning of the word 'theory' in common usage and in scientific usage.

I understand the scientific use of the term "theory", and was crediting Evolution as being one. It was a compliment. This is of course not to concede Darwinian Evolution as my viewpoint, but I was indeed trying to demonstrate my understanding of the term, and show some respect for Evolution as a theory.

Anyway, I know there is still more to your reply that I haven't addressed, but I'll get there. I am dying to hear from you, though. How are you? Where are you at with all of this? Are you in a place where you're saying "these kids are so stupid, they misinterpret me, they don't know what they're talking about, and there is no use trying to argue with them." Or are you reconsidering certain details of your world view, or are you just taking a little hiatus?

All the best to everyone.

My Solution to Hume: An Addendum to My Journal on the Problem of Induction

I believe that Hume's skepticism then, is completely justified when it comes to induction in the broad sense. For example: looking at one (or one million - what does it matter?) crows and reasoning that all crows are black. Or interacting with one (or one million) females and concluding that every female is irrational. These conclusions may be reasonable, but they are not certain.

But I think we can save, or maybe strengthen, the sciences (at least in part). The difficulty is that when it comes to geometry or algebra, one can investigate these things a priori. But with the physical world, the only way we can even possibly find out about physical laws (e.g. whether matter and energy are conserved) is to examine the evidence. Although not necessarily within the category of Empiricism, science is empirical: a posteriori.

So what I would like to do is posit an a priori grounds for science. I believe I have already laid the foundation for it.

If it is true that the nature of the necessarily existing order is necessary (i.e. if it is not arbitrary that this order is the order), then, not only does science help us to learn about the order (just as a teacher helps me learn about calculus), but it helps us discover which possible world this one is.

So, we can know that there is order a priori. We can know about order a priori. We can even speculate about different potential types of physical matter or all the different possible worlds a priori. But, we cannot know which of the possible worlds is the actual world a priori. In fact, as soon as we open our eyes we have already participated in a sensory experience, rendering our enterprise an a posteriori one.

So science is about aiding our naked eyes with instruments, gathering in information about the contingent world. When we generalize the behaviors of physical objects, we are actually describing two things. First, we are describing the nature and constitution of the physical objects in question. Next, we are describing the laws by which they relate to each other (and my position as of this writing is that these laws are inherent in reality and therefore necessary). This second thing is actually compound. The way things relate to one another is determined both by the inherent order of reality AND by the constitution of the objects. It is difficult to describe the physical nature of something without analyzing how it behaves. Therefore science involves BOTH a priori and a posteriori tasks, but its foundation is laid a priori.

What about laws that have exceptions? If a law is shown to have exceptions to it, then we are not describing the ultimate enough reality. For example, if a white crow is found in Pasadena, then it is demonstrated that it never was actually a law that all crows are black. Laws describe the ultimate reality, where exceptions don't truly exist. If free agency and miracles are real, then the underlying laws are somehow setup to allow for these things. The reasons for their rarity may be accounted for by contingent factors (e.g. stars very rarely explode. In fact, we have no human record of our sun ever exploding. However we know that it will if left alone for long enough. Just because we haven't found out how it might be possible for a man to synthesize wine from water without modern tools, doesn't mean that it is impossible. To conclude so would be an argument from ignorance unless it is shown precisely why it is logically incoherent.). It cannot ever be that a true law, one accurate to the inherent order of things, gets broken. Chaos (randomness, chance, probability) is metaphysically impossible. When thinking about crows, one can see that they are contingent beings. So to incorporate them into the description of a law is problematic from the outset. This problem will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid in science, however. But we should want to get at broader and broader generalizations.

So we are justified in performing scientific tasks, because we know a priori that the order inherent in reality is necessary. Science has as its goals, firstly to help us learn about order (God), secondly to help us learn about this world (creation).

Scattered Thoughts on Crow Blackness Likelihood, Solipsism, and Order

I have been musing about crows, blackness, and probability since I met with Derek von Barandy and James Gibson about Hume and Bonjour last Thursday night. Let me share a snippet of my thoughts with you, as writing it down helps me to work it out in my mind.

This is not meant as an argument, but my own unorganized ponderings.

There are ten birds in a cage, five of which are white. The likelihood of me selecting a white bird with my eyes closed is 5/10. In a bird cage whose total number of birds is unknown to me, I cannot calculate the likelihood of white bird selection.

Such is the case in our world, whose total number of crows is unknown to me. If I examine 1 crow and find it to be black, my probability of selecting a black crow in the future becomes 1/X. If I examine 2 black crows, I increase my odds, but I can never reach a point at which it is true to say that my odds make it more likely that I will select another black crow for examination. For it is an epistemic possibility for me that there exist but 2 black crows in a world whose crow population remains unknown.

After selecting 2 black crows I can truthfully say that, on account of my experience, it is more likely that another black crow is found (in this case "more" is a term relating to my first trial). This is so because last time my odds were 1/X, and this time my odds are 2/X (we are assuming X is a finite number - there are only so many crows that exist at the time of the exam).

Thus, although I am able to increase my epistemic odds by examination, I am unable to know my actual odds.

Advancing from black crow selection to crow population description raises the problem I want to illumine. Suppose I want to support the claim "all crows are black". To do this I can examine one million crows, lending support to my hypothesis and perhaps rendering it a theory. The "odds" of blindly selecting a black crow after such an experiment are 1,000,000/X.

Terms like "probability" as applied to the truthfulness of my theory are problematic. I cannot say that my theory is "probably true", as I cannot express it as probabilities are expressed. What I can say is that now that my hypothesis is a theory it is relatively more probable to be true that it was when it was a mere hypothesis. I am not telling the truth if I say that my theory is "probably true".

Actual probability calculated for such a claim defeats the relevancy of such calculation. This is so for all exhaustive claims about reality. To start with, I cannot find terms to fit the probability schema. What is to be the numerator? What is to be the denominator? If this world is the numerator (i.e., if it is true that all crows are black in this world), then my numerator is 1. If I somehow know the number of possible worlds (assuming that it is a finite number), then I suppose I can use it for my denominator. I would also have to know the number of possible worlds whose entire crow population is black (never mind the difficulty in examining every crow in every possible world).

But in discovering what I can truthfully place in the numerator position I have found the relevant information. I will have had to find out already whether all crows are black in this world. In discovering this truth I have eliminated the need for me to calculate how probable it is that all crows are black (in this world).

Perhaps it would be helpful on another front to learn how narrow the parameters are that our world lies within. If the denominator of our "probability", or number of trials (i.e. number of possible worlds), is large relative to the numerator, or number of possible worlds that only have black crows, then we can count it remarkable that our world is one in which all crows are black. For example, if we can somehow learn that 12 out of 1,000,000 possible worlds have naught but black crows, then we should marvel at the fact that our world lies within the parameter of 'having only black crows'.

If we are careful, we can see that actual probabilities do not exist. If it is true that all crows are black, then the probability is 1. There is no crap shoot.

But what about the probability of this world being the one that occurred? Isn't that an actual probability? Here is where care must be taken. We must not mistake probability with possibility. Let's examine what it means for something to be possible.

There are four categories that a thing can fall into:

1. Necessary
2. Contingent
3. Possible
4. Impossible

Necessary things are those that cannot be otherwise than they are. They exist in every possible world.

Contingent things are those that can be otherwise than they are. They exist in this world, but not in every possible world.

Possible things are those that can be. They exist in at least one possible world, and they do not exist in at least one possible world.

Impossible things are those that cannot be. They do not exist in any possible world.

Although it may be true that all crows are white in some possible world, it may not be so that any crows are white in this world. What I mean is that the truth of my theory, that all crows are black (in this world), does not depend on whether the contrary is possible in another world. In fact, the truth of my theory depends on whether it is true in this world.

In discovering whether it is true in this world, I do not eliminate the possibility of its falsehood in another world. But whether it is true in this world is not probabilistic. This world is this world, and our tomorrow is not arbitrarily selected from among possibilities. Rather, tomorrow is created by the state of affairs that exist today, combined with personal determination.

Let me show you what I mean. If all crows are black in this world, and it is because of something in crow genetics that doesn't change as time advances, then it will be so tomorrow that all the crows in this world will be black. Crows will mate, the earth will rotate on its axis and advance its revolution 1/365.25th, and we will examine all new crows spawned and find them all to be black.

I say that personal determination is the other force that creates tomorrow because, as a certain set of meteorological circumstances yields a rainstorm, I can choose to operate upon the immediate sky above Los Angeles and alter the outcome of today. I could do this by creating a large fan, blowing the warm front out of the course of the cold front. While physical states of affairs are deterministic of their following physical states of affairs, personal agency can alter states of affairs. Such agency is not arbitrary, but it is not itself determined. Rather, it is determining. The nature of its ability to determine rests upon the power and authority whereby it determines, as well as its options in determining. Thus all things have as their first cause (a) choice(s) made by (a) person(s). My physics/metaphysics is not the key, however.

What is the key is that what produces tomorrow does so determiningly and according to a framework, not probabilistically and/or without boundaries. Thus, in cases that are produced within systems of pure physical causation, the outcome may be predicted. For example, once a pair of dice are thrown, if a physicist is given the opportunity to measure the velocity and spin of the dice, as well as their distance to the ground and the shape and exact physical nature of any obstacles, he is capable of predicting the outcome. The outcome is not probable, it is certain.

In systems that contain personal forces, outcomes are not produced probabilistically either. A person's choices are not made for them arbitrarily or randomly. The person is responsible for determining the choice. Moreover, he must do so with the burden of forces and compulsions influencing his will. The decision must also be one of available decisions to make, and it must be according to the laws in operation.

If you do not accept my physics/metaphysics, then it is even easier for you to see the non-arbitrary, or non-probabilistic nature of outcomes. For it may be that even personal decisions are nothing more than the tantamount of complex and layered physical phenomena.

In the case of the dice roll, outcomes are not probable, they are certain and fixed. Outcomes are, however, possible. If our epistemic situation is limited (i.e., we are not aware of the initial states and governing laws of the dice), then we call given outcomes probable according to what we know is possible. There are six sides to a die, and only one will be facing upwards at the end of the roll. We call this a probability, but it is only one epistemically. The trajectory of the dice will be determined by the person, and the rest is up to physical states of affairs that are reliable (the size of the dice and the force of gravity, etc.).

In the case of my theory that all crows (in this world) are black, it either is so or it isn't. My theory is possibly true, but it cannot accurately be said to be probably true, unless by this we only mean that we have warrant to believe in it and our warrant increases with every black crow that is found.

We therefore cannot ever elevate a theory contingent upon experience to the status of certain truth. To be rational, we must therefore choose to believe what we find to be the most epistemically probable truth (when it comes to some beliefs, warrant may consist of both empirical and logical evidence). This is what I call faith: belief in a proposition for which evidence exists, but irrefutable proof one way or the other is not observed. It is an active belief, but should not be held without reason.

When considering whether to believe in something, one ought to consider first the evidence in favor of it, and then consequences of accepting such a belief. This is what Jesus speaks of at the end of chapter 14 of Luke's gospel when He says, "Whoever does not carry his own cross and come after Me cannot be My disciple. For which one of you, when he wants to build a tower, does not first sit down and calculate the cost to see if he has enough to complete it?"

An issue entangled in this pondering is the reliability of science. Hume argued that for inductive enterprises (such as physics), in contrast to a priori enterprises (such as mathematics - within which domain we are able to fully examine just a single case of 2 + 2 equally 4 and make justified conclusions about all instances of 2 + 2), there cannot be found rational justification. In other words, why do we assume causation, and expect that the future will resemble the past? Couldn't it just be coincidence that the cue ball was accelerating South at 3 miles per hour, and when it reached the eight ball it lost its energy, and then the eight ball (unconnectedly) assumed the same amount of energy (minus friction) and continued South? What, exactly, is to assure the same "effect" in the future? The "law" that we think is governing billiard ball behavior is only a description of past experience, and causality is assumed.

A physicist will explain the mechanical issues that "caused" the transfer of energy at the time of the collision, but his world contains that same problem, on a smaller level. Why is it that atoms operate the way they do? Then - why is it that particles act the way they do? This will go on until objects get too small for us to examine at the present, and the only answer scientists can give us that they have run experiments and written descriptions of the way physical things interact with each other. They used these descriptions to predict the future, and the future did indeed resemble the past.

But we have run into our crow problem. We cannot calculate even the epistemic probability of the future without knowing about every case. Our "odds" only increase. There is never a point where we know that we have examined a majority of the cases of a physical occurrence within the universe. We can therefore never make the claim that something is "most likely". We never know how big our sample size is relative to the whole.

Bonjour's solution is to say that if we continue to find that a scientific law predicts the future, then we have reason to believe that there is something causing the outcome, and it is most likely that there exists a real reason (a determiner) that we keep on finding black crows.

But this doesn't satisfy - it begs the question. In one sense, of course something caused the cases we found. Of course something caused the crows that we found to be black. But that doesn't mean that this cause operates upon all crows.

Even if we say that it is likely that there is a reason that most or, in our case, all of the crows we found were black, we run into problems. As I illustrated above, "probable" or "likely" is a fallacious descriptive. We cannot calculate actual probability, nor does it exist as regards the truth or falsehood of a proposition (a proposition either is true or it isn't - there isn't a chance as to whether it will become true or not, as we are inquiring as to its current state). At best, Bonjour's claim can be reconstructed to specifically epistemic probability as outlined above.

It seems then, that induction has its limits and we are forced into humility when it comes to all a posteriori enterprises.

Another issue related to these musings is the reliability of physical laws and, as I will show, the a priori argument for meta-order.

One can object to my reasoning by separating my claim into two. The first would be that the extant truth of a proposition is not probabilistic. The second would be that the truth of a proposition about the future is not probabilistic.

As to my first statement, it should seem obvious (although many thinkers today inadvertently undermine with their writings). If a proposition regards the way things are - reality - then it is either true or false. Whether or not we are aware of it, reality is as it is.

The second statement is more contentious. Is a proposition that concerns the future probabilistic? I hope that by now I have made my case for why the answer is 'no'. The future is determined. Certain facets of the future are not determined yet, but they will be determined by something or someone. Pure probability is not an operating force unto itself - it is a false notion.

One might do well to say that 'if physical law (x) remains in effect throughout our next experiment, then the outcome will be the same as last time'. I like this statement. Let's explore it: can I have a priori justification for believing that if every relevant factor remains the same, an identical outcome may be produced? Certainly we trust this in science, but can we know it with justified certainty?

Even though this type of humility ('if' physical laws stay the same - allows that we do not know whether physical laws are contingent and/or consistent within this world), it still assumes a meta-order. Let's describe the application of this assumption in our case. The one who says 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome' is assuming that 'if all remains, an identical procedure will produce an identical outcome'.

Although these are identical statements, the second emphasizes the structure or necessity whereby the conclusion is drawn. You see, although we are now allowing even for the strange possibility that physical laws may not apply, we are saying that it is obvious that if they do then we can produce the desired outcome again. We are assuming that our experiment will follow some order. It is clearly impossible for us to repeat a literally identical experiment under literally identical conditions and produce an entirely alien outcome.

To apprehend this IS to understand its truth, just as to understand what it means when we think that 2 + 2 = 4 is to understand that it is true. Perceiving these propositions a priori is to perceive their justification.

This brings me to what I find to be the single most foundational and profound assumption of science: that the universe is intelligible. This order that exists outside ourselves can be understood.

To complicate my undertaking I want to consider the solipsists cosmological argument. I heard about a lady who wrote a philosopher, 'I am a solipsist, and I just can't understand why there aren't more of us'... he found her statement hilarious.

Suppose that I am disembodied, and have no experience of anything other than myself. I have never seen, felt, heard, smelt, or tasted. I have perceived of nothing. I am only capable of thinking, and so I begin to do so...

"I exist." I begin, without knowing that Descartes says that I should begin here. "I know this because I am thinking. I have not always existed, and I did not bring myself into existence. There must be something that brought me into existence. I cannot conclude that it is a person, as there may be a rule that solipsis like me just pop out of nowhere uncaused. But such a rule is a cause. Maybe there is no rule - I just popped into existence from nothing, not of myself, nor of a rule. But then, wouldn't that be a rule? It would state something like 'for X amount of time, nothing will come about, then at time Y, a solips will come into existence'. I can go on thinking about what possible scenario possibly accounts for my existence, but I cannot imagine it as unordered by some account. Therefore I can say with certainty that I exist, and that some order exists outside myself. The very fact that my thoughts are linear, and I am able to construct rational, ordered sentences attests to this fact. I did not create the logic by which I am thinking."

Solips L knows that he came into being inside this permeating order, and he is subject to it. The order seems to be built in, permanent, or eternal. And so surely the order within which SL was conceived must be greater than him, for he fits inside its bounds. Certainly then, the order is personal, just as he is personal.

The equation of this order with a person is professed by John, in the first chapter of his account of the gospel:

1. In the beginning was the Word*, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
2. He was in the beginning with God.
3. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being.
4. In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men.
5. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.
6. There came a man sent from God, whose name was John.
7. He came as a witness, to testify about the Light, so that all might believe through him.
8. He was not the Light, but he came to testify about the Light.
9. There was the true Light which, coming into the world, enlightens every man.
10. He was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him.
11. He came to His own, and those who were His own did not receive Him.
12. But as many as received Him, to them He gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in His name,
13. who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God.
14. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.
15. John testified about Him and cried out, saying, "This was He of whom I said, `He who comes after me has a higher rank than I, for He existed before me.' "
16. For of His fullness we have all received, and grace upon grace.
17. For the Law was given through Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ.
18. No one has seen God at any time; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, He has explained Him.
19. This is the testimony of John, when the Jews sent to him priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, "Who are you?"
20. And he confessed and did not deny, but confessed, "I am not the Christ."

*This Greek word is logos, referencing the Greek's notion of order, logic, reason, that by which all things have existence and orderly relationships with each other.

Another man identified this logos, this personal order who became incarnate as the very order that holds all things together.

When reasoning with the Greeks in Acts 17:28, Paul says,

"In him [that is, Christ] we live and move and have our being, as even some of your own poets have said,'For we are indeed his offspring.'"

The first part of the sentence is possibly a quote of Epimenides of Crete, but the obvious quote is of Aratus's poem "Phainomena".

Then, in his letter to the believing community in Colossae Paul writes in chapter one:

"For by Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities--all things have been created through Him and for Him. He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together."

Thus is can be seen that even Solipse L can perceive the existence of personal order a priori.

As to physical laws, I agree with Hume, that unless we have some perpendicular reason to believe that they will persist, we can but humbly continue to trust them. Unless...

The crow case may not be our best example. Doesn't it seem silly to say that it is a physical law that all crows are black? It doesn't seem ultimate enough. The blackness of crows may be caused by the culmination of several intersecting laws and conditions. A crow is a pretty complex being.

Could it be that if we were not epistemically restricted we might be able to perceive why it is so that physical laws are as they are. Just as I shown by experience how to do calculus (although it is an a priori enterprise), can it be that if I were shown why it is so that physical laws could not have been otherwise - that they are necessary? Is it possible that I am in a fragmented state and cannot perceive with pure rational insight such necessity?

Imagine such a case: a perfectly functioning (but limited) Solipse L. I am back in the situation described above, thinking about things. I begin to think that if something physical were to exist (all conceivability objections aside), then such stuff would behave in certain ways that make sense. Not only that order exists is perceived by me, but which order exists. In fact, the very nature of order can only be one way. Given exactly what it is that particles are made of, they are required to behave accordingly. Their behavior flows logically from their very nature.

For Solipse L to imagine a given nature for potential particles that might one day come into existence IS for him to imagine the nature of their interaction with each other. In this case, what it is that is underlying these "laws" is the pervading order that exists - the fabric of reality. Even a posteriori enterprises, such as science, if clear thinking is excersized and intellectual limits are not applied, could get to the bottom of the way things operate. In such cases, more than mere physical laws can be described, but the nature of the underlying order can be: mathematics, logic, and other purely relational domains. Summaries that accurately describe mathematics and other such necessary truths are indeed descriptions of God Himself.

In what way was creation voluntary then? Aside from the fact that creation at all was voluntary, God was creative in His creation. He made choices as to how creation was to look like and operate.

When we look at the physical laws, we see them as incomplete in a description of the universe. Not only do there seem to be laws in effect here, but there are also constants and quantities. Constants are types of forces which behave in certain stable ways, and persist evenly as time advances. Quantities are amounts that seem to have been arbitrary put in at the beginning of time. The amount of matter and dark matter, for example. Also the amount of energy and dark energy, the amount of radiation, the amount of entropy, and a few others. God made choices as to how much of what ingredient to put into the universe, as well as the velocity to start us off at. He also interacts with His creation in other ways after the initial creation.

What I find interesting is that the number line contains the infinite set of numbers. For a constant to be what it is, the "odds" or really "possibilities" for its value are literally infinite. Planck's constant, for example, could have been (in the broadly logical sense) any value at all. Its chances were 1/(infinity). That it is what it is, is something to marvel at.

But not only is there Planck's constant to consider, there are a host of others. The "odds" of them occurring in the relationship that they did to one another are [1/(infinity)] X [1/(infinity), et al. The "chances" that all the constants line up properly are staggering. When considering quantities as well, marvel should skyrocket.

Science has shown that if any given constant were to be changed a tiny bit, the effects would be devastating. The constants are finely tuned to accommodate human life.

Not only does metaphysical probability not exist, but the possibilities for worlds are infinite.

The Creator is great, and greatly to be praised.

As I continue to let my imagination run away with me as I journal, I think about other scattered issues. For instance, computers sometimes have random number generators. But, they have processes for selecting such numbers. The outcomes are unknown to us, as are the processes. They are only epistemically random. If we knew the rules and the initial states, then we would not call them random. Randomness does not exist.

Another thought: are all intelligible things produced by intelligence? When Lindsey says something intelligent, I can make sense of it. It is orderly. When we have a baby, it will probably speak some gibberish (until age two, when he will unify the theories of quantum physics with general relativity). I will tell him that his gibberish is unintelligent, because it is unintelligible. If our universe is intelligible (the fundamental assumption of science, remember), does it imply that it is produced by a Mind?

Even if chaos is possible, and if such theoretical chaos could produce something orderly or intelligible, it does not account for the existence of the order that such an effect exists within. There remains a need for a law giver.

I studied Turing Machine Functionalism for a short while a couple years ago. While there are so many issues to think about, I want to highlight that the Turing Machine Functionalists still have to admit that such machines must acquiesce to order that existed before the machines, and will persist after such machines expire. What accounts for that order?

I will tell you that it is permanent, necessary, personal, self-existent, and the initiator of the existence of everything other than itself.

More unorganized journals to come. Maybe on these matters, maybe on others.