haha

Communism killed 100 million people and all I got was this silly t-shirt.

Blog Action Day

On October 15th, Raw (A)Theology will be participating in Blog Action Day. The only requirement is that we post entries whose subject is the environment. So think about what effort you want to make, start writing and refining, and let your entry loose on October 15th.

another dualism discussion.

see comments 6-8 to see me trying to defend dualism @ show me the agument.

the argument from propsitions. Redux.

Consider Goldbach’s conjecture:

(G) Every even number greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes.

No one, mathematician or otherwise, has either confirmed or refuted this conjecture. I suppose this hasn’t happened yet for two related reasons. No human mind has yet been able to cognize a set whose cardinality is ∞, and if they could cognize such a set, the task of confirming the conjecture would be an endless process- there just is no final member of a set with a cardinality of ∞.

But what’s crazy is that Goldbach’s conjecture, regardless of our failure to find it out, is either true of false; which means as of right now the proposition expressed in (G) is either true or false. Okay, so maybe that doesn’t seem crazy yet. But give me a sec.

Consider that propositions are things only minds can be acquainted with. Why so? Because minds are the only things that can think and therefore they are the only things that can be acquainted with propositions. What’s worse is that propositions seem to depend on minds for their existence. Why so? Because propositions are inexorability linked with intentionality; that is, propositions only have meaning in virtue of what they refer to. And minds are the only things that can refer; which is to say, minds are the only things that have intentions. Why so? Because no conglomerate of atoms ever refers to anything, silly. (just for a fun thought experiment think of the merelogical sum of any atoms you prefer (I’m currently thinking of Michelangelo’s David, and, well, my brain), after you have whatever atom conglomerate in your mind, ask yourself what thing those atoms refer to.)

So if propositions depend on minds and any unambiguous proposition whatever has a certain truth value out of de dicto necessity, then it follows there is a mind that is acquainted with the proposition expressed in (G). But if there is a mind that is both acquainted with the proposition expressed in (G) as well as its truth value, this mind must be of an infinite caliber, and this mind is what all men mean by the term ‘God’.

Lewis as the philosophically insane.

I’ve been reading van Iwagen lately and I now realize why he is so revered. A topic which has come up several times in his articles is the role propositions play in ones ontology. He critiques Lewis’ possible world assay almost entirely on the fact that his Lewis’ reductionism does violence to what we thought we mean when we express modal propositions. Consider the following:

(1) It’s possible that that JFK died of natural causes.

On Lewis’ account, the proposition expressed in (1) really means this:

(1)’ There is a world spatiotemporally unrelated to ours where JFK died of natural causes.

The ramifications of such a reduction are manifest, for it implies there really is world, full of atoms and space and even has JFK as one of its members that really exists (in the sense that it’s a concrete world), but we are spatiotemporally not related to that world. Other queer entailments include the following: The word ‘actual’ functions as an indexical: When we express the proposition ‘It’s actually the case that JFK was assassinated’ the word ‘actually’ is referring to the world we are spatiotemporally related to. When the people in W2 say ‘it’s actually the case JFK died of natural causes’, by ‘actually’ they are pointing out the world (W2) where they are spatiotemporally related. Does this mean that proposition ‘JFK died of natural causes’ (as well as its contrary) is both true and false? No, because the referent of that proposition is ambiguous- for it does not designate a specific world. HA!
The craziest implication of Lewis’ view, I think, is that there is not just one unique JFK, but possibly millions. Consider the following propositions:

(2) JFK never married.
(3) JFK lived until 1989.
(4) JFK was a Soviet spy.

(2)-(4) are all true in some really existing world and the singular term ‘JFK’ in each proposition picks out the JFK in that world where the proposition is true. What’s worse, every possible proposition that includes the singular term ‘JFK’ picks out a really existing JFK. Ergo, there is an uncountable (if not an infinite) number of JFKs currently in existence.

Are you kidding? What’s the fruit of a reductive analysis if it comes at such a cost? And back to van Inwagen’s point (and Plantinga, and Kripke, et al.), the proposition expressed in the sentence ‘It’s possible JFK died of natural causes’ I am predicating a modal term on a proposition, and to say what I really mean by this is the nonmodal proposition ‘there is world spatiotemporally unrelated to us where JFK died of natural causes’ is to change subjects.

I cant figure out how to delete this post!

Theories: Creation, Critique, and Cooperation

Upon reflection on a few conversations I've had lately, I have allowed the beginnings of a picture to materialize in my mind.  I paint it for you modestly and embrace it loosely.

It seems to me that when it comes to certain domains, such as psychology or church-planting, there are, broadly speaking, two categories of workers.  One group works with theory, and the other with application.

Those who work with theory, hypothesize, test, review, critique, and theorize.  Broadly speaking, they are scientists and philosophers.  Their position does not exempt them from a degree of involvement and application (ie research psychologists and missiologists still bear the responsibility of coming alongside other humans to help them), however their main, every-day work is in the ivory tower, proposing and criticizing theories.  Without these people, we wouldn't have many paradigms, and we would have fewer good ones.  The status quo would never be challenged, innovation would be stifled, and progress stunted.

Those who apply theories usually have to accept whole paradigms at a time.  Psychotherapists and missionaries operate according to particular modes, created for them by theorizers.  They may be smarter or stupider, more talented or less talented, then the theorizers.  But their function is completely different.  They perform therapy, they plant churches, they are on the field with their hands in the dirt.

I have been struggling with my own calling as I thought it clashed with my built-in passions.  While I am more certain of few things than my calling to Missions (To Be Defined at another time [UPDATE: I defined "Mission", and "Missions"), I am more passionate about fewer things than theorizing.  I used to think that in order to work in Missions I couldn't be a philosopher - I had to do church-planting or Bible translation or relief and development.  I was conflicted.  How could a philosopher help people?  How could a missionary philosophize?

A professor once told me that I have to die to myself in order to live for Christ.  He wanted me to give up my passion for philosophy (which he interpreted as a selfish desire for fame - which makes me laugh now).  But about the need to give oneself up, so to speak, for Christ - I agree.  I also believe that God has built me with a unique skill set and particular drive for a purpose (think about Paul's metaphor of the body of Christ).  How these two principles cohere I am not entirely certain as of yet.

God called Moses to lead a nation despite his speech impediment.  He can call me to tell stories to remote people groups in order to communicate the gospel to them despite my lack of story-telling ability.  He can call me to do relief and development work while I'm at it, despite my lack of administration skills.  He can call me to lead a revolution (although I believe in non-violent revolutions as a principle, and by the way I have no immediate intention to start or participate in any revolutions.  At least not any political revolutions; although the idea does appeal to me.)

And if He ever does, I hope that I will submit.

But until then, I am only certain of His calling to "Missions".  And I am very certain of it, if I haven't communicated that already.

So, is there room for theorists within the domain "Missions"?

I assert so.  And until I encounter reasons to do contrary, I intend on entering such a category.

It's not that I think I am a good philosopher, or will become so.  It's more like, if I don't go there, I'm not sure where I'll go.

Upon hearing such a sentence, Lindsey once comforted me by asserting that she is confident in my ability to do other work well.  I was touched and she succeeded in showing me something. However, I think the essence of my point is something more like:

If I don't get to work as a philosopher, my conscience will not be satisfied.

On Chess, But Applicable to Anything

"Its not enough to be a good player; you must also play well" - Tarrasch

James 4:11-12

Brothers, do not slander one another.  Anyone who speaks against his brother or judges him speaks against the law and judges it.  When you judge the law, you are not keeping it, but sitting in judgment on it.  There is only one Lawgiver and Judge, the one who is able to save and destroy.  But you--who are you to judge your neighbor?

the argument from universals.

An argument for platonic realism regarding universals (that abstract entities exist and can do so without dependence on their instances) takes the following form:

(1) There is a possible world where there are no particular things colored red.

(2) Despite the fact of (1), the following propositions are true, and necessarily so; that ‘necessarily, red is a color (there is no possible world where red is not a color)’, and ‘necessarily, red resembles orange more than it does blue, (there is no possible world where red doesn’t resemble orange more than it does blue’, and also that ‘necessarily, no single indivisible entity can be both red and green at the same time (there is no possible world where a single thing can be both red and green).

(3) Since the propositions expressed in (2) are necessary truths, they are also true in the possible world expressed in premise (1). But (1) stipulated that that there is a world where no particular thing is colored red. So the question is, if propositions are true or false in virtue of the content they express, how can it be the case in the possible world where there are no instances of red that propositions expressed in premise (2) are true? The way it out is to assert (4).

(4) In a possible world where nothing in particular is colored red the necessary propositions expressed in (2) are true because they refer to the form of red, which is an uninstantiated universal. Therefore,

(5) Platonism in true.

The only way out of this consequence, it seems, is the denial of the last part of (3); namely, that propositions can only be true or false in virtue of the content they express and refer too. To say it another way, one must deny that propositions need not have intention to be true or false. But this seems crazy, and I cannot even begin to conceive of what this might look like, so pending further enlightenment by some sneaky Aristotelians, I must declare (5).

Well, assuming everything I’ve articulated adds up, consider the following proposition:

(6) Necessarily, to be a person is to have rational faculties (either dormant or otherwise).

If (6) is true, then so is

(7) There is a possible world where there are no instances of persons, but since (6) is necessarily true, it’s also true in such a world. But if (6) is true (and necessarily so),

(8) (6) is (necessarily) true in virtue of the fact that it expresses, namely, that a person necessarily has rational faculties (dormant or otherwise). If this is a fact, then there is at least one person, and He must necessarily exist, since (6) could only be true in virtue of this fact. And if there is a person that exists necessarily, then he can be nothing other than what men call God.

... No, I presume I may say that we
more certainly know that there is a
God than that there is anything else without
us. When I say we know I mean there
is such knowledge within our reach which
we cannot miss, if we will but apply our
minds to that, as we do to several other
inquiries.

John Locke,
Chapter X of Essay Concerning Human Understanding

What if the Universe is Infinite?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the universe really has existed forever, without beginning. Although I have objections to this, I will concede it momentarily.

Imagine the universe exists without a beginning. Does this entail atheism? Of course not. There may have been a God who created an eternal universe. Does the existence of this possibility entail theism? No, of course not.

But if the universe exists eternally, certain cosmological arguments are undercut. For example, those that require that the universe had a beginning. My cosmological argument is one such, and would be undercut should it be shown that the universe is in fact infinite.

But cosmological (and ontological) arguments that only require the universe to be contingent are not undercut. Those atheists who posit an infinite universe still beg the question of why there exists a universe at all, rather than no universe. Such a universe would still require something logically prior to it.

Can't the universe exist by necessity? I posit 'no', as I commit no logical fallacy when I imagine a "world" in which nothing exists - no matter, no energy, no time, no space. Anselmian theists maintain that God is logically necessary, unlike the universe. Thus, He may be logically prior to the universe.

On Love

Love hath not to do with naught but the lover, nor hath it to do with naught but the beloved.

If the Hotel Can Have an Infinite Number of Rooms, Why Can't the Universe Have an Infinite Number of Days?

In my previous post, wherein I attempted to provide an undercutting defeater of Craig's Hilbert's Hotel argument for the impossibility of an actual infinite number of things, I allowed for the conception of a hotel, the set of whose rooms is infinite, and has a cardinality of aleph-null. And yet, I also provided a small argument at the end that I believe may better perform the same function as Hilbert's Hotel in the greater Kalam. But as I thought about what I had done, a possible reply came to mind: If the Hotel can have an infinite number of rooms, why can't the universe have an infinite number of days? I do not have a polished answer, buy I here journal my initial musings.

In the Hotel conception, I said that God built the hotel by the power of His word, and sustains it by His power. I don't actually believe that Hilbert's Hotel exists in this world, but I can conceive of it pretty good, and I think I have illustrated such a conception in a satisfactory way. At any rate, if one claims that he does not know whether he can conceive of such a hotel or not, I think I have made it more difficult to say that it is impossible to conceive of it, such that an argument for the impossibility of such a hotel, or any actual infinite number of things, is not as easy as pointing to the abnormal phenomena such a hotel might give rise to.

Nevertheless, it might appear incoherent for me to posit such a hotel and at the same time argue for the impossibility of an actual infinite number of days in the universe. After all, why can't God simply just create such a beginningless universe and sustain it by the power of His word? Such a question might be unfair for an atheistic infinite universe argument to utilize at face value, but really it is just a call for internal coherence on my part. Well, I believe that there is a fundamental difference between the Hotel and the number of days in the universe.

In the case of the hotel, the rooms are instantly built by God, such that there is no temporal transgression of an infinite spatio-temporal distance. One minute the Hotel is not, the next minute, God speaks such a structure into existence. The set A of all Hotel rooms is at T1 empty, and then the set B of all Hotel rooms is all at once at T2 infinite, and of the cardinality aleph-null.

But in the case of the days in the universe, they cannot exist all at once. Rather, this moment exists and naught else. Thus, by "days" we mean to denote a segment of temporal transgression made by temporally bound objects. There does not exist, "now", all moments in time. This view, Presentism, is something I hold but do not care to explicate and defend here. I am interested in researching it further, and perhaps writing on it someday. My Philosophy of Religion professor, Thomas Crisp, is also a presentist. I am not sure whether my argument for the beginning of the universe is altered whether or not Presentism is accepted, but I will go forward as if it is.

This difference is all that is necessary to establish why it is that a hotel with an infinite number of rooms is conceivable, but a universe whose temporal past is not. For, as was shown in my argument in the previous post about the Hotel, there is no room with the number -∞ (negative infinity). Nor is there a room with the number 'infinity' on its threshold. For infinity is the state of a set, not a number unto itself. Any given number is finite, while infinite sets of finite numbers may be considered.

Similarly, if 'now' is labeled "0", and yesterday "-1", then it is seen that there cannot be a day with the label "-∞". Any given day in history will have a finite label. But why can't the set of all past days be infinite? Because of the impossibility of transgressing an infinite spatio-temporal distance. Just as the present must transgress the moments in today to get to tomorrow, so it would have had to transgress the past in order to get to today. This is what was illustrated in my thought experiment by the runners who attempted to begin their race infinitely far away. They will begin by crossing room numbers 0 through -10, and then they will transgress rooms -10 through -20, and continue running for eternity, without ever finding a starting line from which to run back to room 0. This is a textbook example of a potential infinite. At any given time, the runners will be in front of a room with a finite number, and the cardinality of the set of rooms they will have transgressed will be ever-increasing. But a potentially infinite set will never become an infinite set. In the same way that even God, if He counts one number at a time, will never reach infinity. He will be counting forever, and the set of numbers He utters will be potentially infinite. For at any given time, He will be uttering a finite number. Not even God can transgress an infinite spatio-temporal distance.

The universe cannot have existed from infinity past because it is impossible to cross an infinite distance, or an infinite amount of time. The Hotel can have an infinite number of rooms, because its construction was instantaneous. This would be like God thinking of an infinite set of numbers all at once - something He is no doubt capable of doing.

An Argument Against Craig's Hilbert's Hotel Illustration and a Proposed Solution

Jon Wright pointed out to me that the prior post did not handle the particular type of transfinite subtraction Craig says cannot be done. Namely, subtraction involving infinite quantities. I spoke about this with my math professor, Matthew Weathers. I proposed my argument, and he helped clear up some concepts for me, and explained the nature of cardinalities in a helpful way. Generally drawing from that experience, while sitting here in a class called "Mission in Political Context", I here provide an undercutting argument against Craig's Hilbert's Hotel argument for the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things. Afterward, I propose an alterative argument that serves the same purpose in the overall Kalam.

In the broader context of the Kalam, Craig says,

Perhaps the best way to bring home the truth of (2.11) is by means of an illustration. Let me use one of my favorites, Hilbert's Hotel, a product of the mind of the great German mathematician, David Hilbert. Let us imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full. There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4 and so on, out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there are now no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest's name to the register and gave him his keys-how can there not be one more person in the hotel than before? But the situation becomes even stranger. For suppose an infinity of new guests show up the desk, asking for a room. "Of course, of course!" says the proprietor, and he proceeds to shift the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #4, the person in room #3 into room #6, and so on out to infinity, always putting each former occupant into the room number twice his own. As a result, all the odd numbered rooms become vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet, before they came, all the rooms were full! And again, strangely enough, the number of guests in the hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests check in as before, even though there were as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the proprietor could repeat this process infinitely many times and yet there would never be one single person more in the hotel than before.

But Hilbert's Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician gave it out to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not according to the mathematicians-but just ask the woman who makes the beds! Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don't talk to that laundry woman! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any less people in the hotel. But suppose instead the persons in room number 4, 5, 6, . . . checked out. At a single stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied, the guest register reduced to three names, and the infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would remain true that the same number of guests checked out this time as when the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . checked out. Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things.

-http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html

Now, his immediate premises and sub-premises are,

2 The universe began to exist.

2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an
actual infinite.

2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.

That the universe began to exist I agree with. That an actual infinite temporal regression of physical members such as days is impossible I agree with. But I believe that there are a potentially infinite number of physical terms, meaning that the set that contains each day of time is a potentially infinite set. Specifically, it has a beginning (creation), but it will not have an end. Thus, the cardinality of the set of days that exist or have existed is finite (it includes however many days have passed since creation), but its cardinality (the number of days in the set) will always be increased as days pass. God has no intention that I know of to stop creating and/or sustaining the passing of days.

But this is to say nothing of an actual infinite. If by denying the possibility of an actual infinite Craig is required to believe that the number line does not contain members that are real objects (and informed by his other writings we can be confident of this), then I disagree. I think that numbers are real, that they are objects, and that the set of all whole numbers is infinite, in fact, there are many infinite sets of numbers.

At any rate, I can give an example of a meaningful, coherent subtraction of an infinite set from another infinite set. Let's subtract all whole negative numbers from all whole numbers:

Set X {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
- Set Y {...-3, -2, -1}
= Set Z {0, 1, 2, 3..}

So the cardinality of X is aleph-null, and so is that of the sets Y and Z. Here is where I feel that Craig has misunderstood the nature of transfinite arithmetic. For by "the same number of guests" Craig really means 'the same cardinality of the set of guests'. Let me explain. I believe Craig's contrual is something like the following.

Aleph-null
- Aleph-null
= Aleph-null

Thus, the cardinality of the set produced by the difference in the cardinalities of the sets X and Y is the same as the cardinalities of each set. This would not be a problem, but for other instances of transfinite subtraction, and Craig gives a few. Consider another example,

Set X {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
- Set X {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
= Set Z' { }

The cardinality of X is aleph-null, and when X is subtracted, the resulting set Z' is empty, and therefore has a cardinality of 0:

Aleph-null
- Aleph-null
= Zero

Furthermore, we can construct all kinds of examples of subtracting infinite sets from other infinite sets such that the difference may be virtually any number. Consider,

Set A {1, 2, 3...}
- Set B {2, 3...}
= Set C {1}

The cardinality of A is alpeh-null, and the cardinality of B is aleph-null, but the cardinality of C is 1. Thus:

Aleph-null
- Aleph-null
= One

Therefore, subtracting an infinite set with a cardinality of aleph-null from another
set with a cardinality of aleph-null is an operation that is not well defined, and it is useless to us.

But is this the whole picture? Hold that thought, and follow me while I retrace a famous logical contradiction drawn from the principle of square roots:

√25 = 5
√25 = -5
∴ 5 = -5
But 5 ≠ -5

The above fallacy lies in the incompleteness of the statement √25 = 5, and the incompleteness of the statement √25 = -5. Rather, the two should be resolved with the statement √25 = ±5.

Similarly, I believe that Craig's fallacy is one of incompleteness. As I stated last time, one has not exhaustively defined a set if one has merely described its cardinality. Thus the operations within the ilk:

Aleph-null
- Aleph-null
= One

are not complete. While the unhelpful statement that 'aleph-null - aleph-null = 0 or 1 or 2 or n or aleph-null', isn't well defined, it is coherent. However, there is no reason to only perform transfinite arithmetic at the level of cardinalities. In fact, I can think of a very good reason not to perform transfinite arithmetic at the level of cardinalities...

In the last post I gave an application of the set theory paradigm that went like this

If the intersection of a set X and a set Y is empty, and the cardinality of X is 3, and the cardinality of Y is 2, then the cardinality of the union of X and Y is 5.

But, what if the intersection of X and Y is not empty? In such cases, even transfinite addition becomes undefined. For example, the intersection of a set X {1, 2, 3} and a set Y {2, 3, 4} is the set Z {2, 3} such that to add the cardinalities of X and Y would look like this:

3
+ 3
= 2

But we know that this is not a true equation. However, if the members of the set with a cardinality of 3 and the second set that also has a cardinality of 3 are defined, then the intersection of the two sets is coherent:

Set X {1, 2, 3}
∩ Set Y {2, 3, 4}
= Set Z {2, 3}

Thus, adding cardinalities is just as "absurd" as subtracting cardinalities. But this is exactly what Craig does when he subtracts 'an infinite number of guests' from 'an infinite number of guests' to get 'an infinite number of guests'. He calls an absurdity what is in reality an undefined expression. He should rephrase his expression to say that 'there is some infinite set D such that a proper infinite subset E of D may be subtracted from D, resulting in a third infinite subset F'.

I believe I have given an example of such an operation:

Set X {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
- Set Y {...-3, -2, -1}
= Set Z {0, 1, 2, 3..}

While Craig believes that Hilbert's Hotel is absurd, I can imagine such a hotel as existing. Picture this:

You are standing, facing the hotel. You look to the left, and you can see the building extending beyond sight. You look to the right and sure enough, the hotel rooms continue on beyond your visual range. God has constructed this hotel by the power of His word, and He sustains its existence. You walk straight ahead, which leads you to room #0, which is the clerks office. She tells you that all the room #'s are occupied, but she thinks she can squeeze you in. She makes an announcement over the loud speaker that every occupant of a room with a positive number is to move to the room with the number one above his. You walk outside and turn around to face the hotel again. Now you begin to see every occupant in the rooms to your right open their doors, walk farther right, and enter into the next rooms. This leaves room #1 open, and you walk in and place your luggage on the fold-out table you remove from the closet. Hilbert's 'Hotel is a strange place' you think, but you're sure they make their money.

In set theory terms, the cardinality of the set containing all room numbers is aleph-null. Moreover, the cardinality of the set containing all guests is aleph-null, and when you check in, the resulting set has an additional member (you), but it also has the cardinality aleph-null. And yet, just like in the examples I gave above, this phenomenon is coherent (and now even conceivable). But am I failing to handle his argument in its full force?

Let's explore Craig's illustration a little more. One example of absurdity he gives is:

But Hilbert's Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician gave it out to be... Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not according to the mathematicians-but just ask the woman who makes the beds!

I judge Craig to be accurate when he says that there is "one less person in the hotel". But he is mistaken when he accuses "the mathematicians" of disagreeing. What I think he means is that mathematicians would maintain (and I think rightly so) that the cardinality of the resulting set is the same as the initial set. But this does not mean that the initial set didn't lose a member! What Craig should say is something like 'in the set H containing all the hotel room numbers {-1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}, the guest in room #1 leaves, represented by the removal of the set I, {1} from H, resulting the set J {-1, 0, 2, 3...}. And yet, the cardinality of H is aleph-null, and the cardinality of the set J is also aleph-null, even though J contains one less member than H (J is a proper subset of H)'. Allow me to express this in a linear fashion:

Aleph-null
- One
= Aleph-null

As I demonstrated earlier, this is not a logical contradiction, for the subtraction of a finite number from aleph-null results in aleph-null. More specifically, the subtraction of a finite number of members from an infinite set with the cardinality of aleph-null results in an infinite set with the cardinality of aleph-null as well, even though the resulting set is a proper subset of the original set. In the example Craig gives:

Set H {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
- Set I {1}
= Set J {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 2, 3...}

So the guest in room #1 may leave, and this is not absurd. But that was just the subtraction of a finite number of members from an infinite set. Can we also meaningfully subtract an infinite number of members from an infinite set? Craig says

Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don't talk to that laundry woman! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any less people in the hotel

By this I understand Craig to be expressing a phenomenon that goes something like 'in the set H containing all the hotel room numbers {-1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}, the guests in rooms with odd numbers leave, represented by the removal of the set L {1, 3, 5...} from H, resulting in the set M {-1, 0, 2, 4, 6...}. And yet, the cardinality of H is aleph-null, and the cardinality of the set L is also aleph-null, and the resulting set M has a cardinality of aleph-null even though M contains less members than H (specifically, M is a proper subset of H). Thus, the difference between the infinite set H and the infinite set L is another infinite set'. Allow me to express this in a linear fashion:

Aleph-null
- Aleph-null
= Aleph-null

As I demonstrated earlier, this is not a logical contradiction either, for just as the square root of 25 is 5 or -5, so the subtraction of aleph-null from aleph-null may be 0 or 1 or 2 or n or aleph-null. And although this is coherent but not meaningful, meaning may be added by simply defining the members in each infinite set:

Set H {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}
- Set L {1, 3, 5...}
= Set M {...-3, -2, -1, 0, 2, 4, 6...}

Thus, Craig's argument is demonstrated to be unsuccessful in revealing any absurdity. As far as a clear and persuasive argument for the fact that the universe had a beginning, permit a modest formulation of my own. I have offered such arguments before, but will briefly indulge once again.

The morning after your first night's stay in Hilbert's Hotel, you put on your pajamas and open your door to pick up the copy of the L. A. Times whose thump against your door woke you up. You look up, and with the hotel to your back, you look to your right and see a crowd of runners gathered in front of the clerk's office. You inquire as to the event, and your neighbor in room #2 explains that there is to be a race, whose participants will start the race in front of room #-∞. 'How can they ever get started?' you ask. 'They will never stop walking down the line of negative numbered rooms' you assert. 'And as soon as they decide to turn around and begin the race, the room in front of which they do so will necessarily be finite, not infinite!' you argue, beginning to get concerned. 'There is no room whose number is -∞. Each room has a finite number, but the set of all rooms is infinite! Even if God Himself allows them to run toward the clerks office where the finish line is while He constantly pulls them in the direction of the negatively numbered rooms, their running will be in vain, for whatever progress they make will be more than cancelled out by God's pull - they can neither start nor finish the race'. You try to warn the runners, but they ignore you and take off toward the infinite. You feel sorry for the runners, whose racetrack is the set of rooms with negative numbers {...-3, -2, -1}. And furthermore, to get started, they have to cross that same track while searching for the starting line! How can they cross a distance that consists of a set of rooms with the cardinality aleph-null? How can they cross it twice?

Such a mental exercise demonstrates the absurdity of positing a universe whose temporal past extends infinitely. While it is coherent to posit a universe with a beginning and no end, it is incoherent to say that the universe never got started - never had a beginning. For, with today as the finish line of the race (and indeed, today has come to pass), the cursor of history - the ontological "now" - will have to transgress a set of days whose cardinality is aleph-null. This is logically impossible.

Therefore, while Craig's Hotel argument is susceptible to an undercutting defeater, there is another argument that may take its place, rendering his overall cosmological argument stronger.

A Novice Argument for the Utility and Coherence of Transfinite Subtraction

Below I lay out a set of definitions that I currently understand to constitute the basic paradigm of set theory. I then construct an argument, using those definitions, for the coherence and utility of transfinite subtraction. I can identify no logical contradiction so far, and I find the argument of interest because Craig says that one "cannot do inverse operations like subtraction in transfinite arithmetic with infinite quantities". I happen to believe that my objection to this point in Craig's "Kalam Cosmological Argument" is not fatal, but I shall not explicate that position here.

DEFINITIONS
Set – A collection of members
Member or Element – An object in a set
Proper subset – A set X whose every member belongs to another set Y, while Y includes members who do not belong to X
Equality – The state of a set X with another set Y, while X contains every one of and only the members of Y
Cardinality – The size of a set
Finite – The state of a set X whose members may be put into a one to one correspondence with the set {1, 2, 3… n}
Potential infinity – The state of a set X whose members may be put into a one to one correspondence with the set {1, 2, 3… n}, but whose cardinality may always be increased
Infinite – The state of a set X whose members may not be put into a one to one correspondence with the set {1, 2, 3… n}
Aleph-null or Aleph-naught – The cardinality of the set containing all rational numbers
Aleph-one – The cardinality of the set containing all real numbers
Aleph-n – The cardinality of the set containing the next higher cardinality than the set whose cardinality is aleph-(n-1).
Union – The set of the members of a set X and the members of a set Y
Intersection – The set of the members of a set X who also belong to a set Y
Power set – A set X of all possible subsets of a set Y. The set of a powerset has a larger cardinality than any subset of the set Y.

AN EXAMPLE OF ADDITION UNDER THE SET THEORY PARADIGM
If the intersection of a set X and a set Y is empty, and the cardinality of X is 3, and the cardinality of Y is 2, then the cardinality of the union of X and Y is 5.

ARGUMENT FOR THE UTILITY AND COHERENCE OF TRANSFINITE SUBTRACTION
One has not exhaustively defined a set if one has merely described its cardinality. For example, the set X, containing the members {1, 2, 3} has a cardinality of 3, and the set Y, containing the members {4, 5, 6}, also has a cardinality of 3. However, X is not equal to Y. “Infinity” is not a number; it is the state of any infinite set. Thus, the union of the set A whose member is {-1} and the set B whose members include zero and all positive whole numbers {0, 1, 2, 3…}, is to produce a set C with the members {-1, 0, 1, 2, 3…}. B and C are both infinite sets. However, C includes one member who is not in B, namely, {-1}. Therefore, C has a larger cardinality. It is therefore not a logical contradiction to say ‘infinity plus one is infinity’. Such a statement is unclear however, as it does not specify the members of either infinite set referenced, or the specific member (e.g. 1, 2, or 3) who is being added to the first infinite set.

Thus informed, transfinite subtraction becomes possible. For example, the above mentioned infinite set C minus the member -1 is the infinite set B. Thus, ‘infinity minus one is infinity’ is merely the statement ‘there is some infinite set D, that contains some member E, such that E may be subtracted from D, and D remains in the state infinite’.

[Update: I know blog at Philosophia Swingrovia.]

the barbarian sees red!

I had a discussion with my new found friend Tim; a guy I met at my Starbucks. Of the many discussions and disagreements we’ve gotten into, one of them is the following. I questioned the assumption many people seem to think is obviously true; namely, the proposition that “one cannot know a thing unless one has something else to compare it to.” Why think this is true? And the reply went something like, “because without the ability to make a distinction between any two things, one cannot be aware of anything in particular.” So I went experimenting in my thoughts and came up with the following scenario:

Imagine there is a barbarian (by ‘barbarian’ I mean a man who knows no language nor any language users) who lives in a rainforest paradise with birds and trees and all sorts of other wonderful created things, but unlike most rainforests known to man this particular rainforest and everything in it is colored red, and no thing in the forest is any color besides red, and all things in the forest are the same hue or red. Imagine further that our barbarian has the same sort of vision, lighting conditions, and neural network, such that, everything going on with us when we see red also goes on with our barbarian. So the question is, does our barbarian know the forest is red? I imagine he would be seeing the same thing we do when we see red, but of course he wouldn’t know there is other possible colors than red, or even further that there is such a thing as natural-kind ‘colors,’ since anyone who knows about the natural kind colors would have to be aware of at least two. Bust despite all of this, isn’t it the case that our barbarian sees red when he looks at everything in the forest? Would he have a name for phenomenon of red? Probably not, since I think in most cases words are created in response to distinctions, and our barbarian knows of no other color to distinguish the color he sees. So if we asked him, “Mr. Barbarian, do you see red?” He probably wouldn’t know what we are referring to, because the thing we’re referring too (the red he sees) would be so universally manifested that he would unconsciously assume that the red he sees is not something distinct from everything else in the rainforest. But despite all this, is he not seeing the same hue of red we see when we see the same hue of red he sees? He’s got to be seeing the red in the forest, and this is true despite the fact he wouldn’t be able to communicate his knowledge to us. To claim that “one cannot know a thing unless one has something else to compare it to”, one must show how the above stated scenario is not only improbably but logically impossible. And good luck showing that…

Proverbs 19:11

Good sense makes one slow to anger,
and it is his glory to overlook an offense.

Romans 12:18

If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.

Does an Uncaused Universe Prove Atheism?

Suppose Quentin Smith succeeds in demonstrating that the actual universe began to exist without being caused to exist. Does this entail atheism?

An easy counter-example: there exists a theistic God, who did not cause the unviverse, and yet the universe began to exist.

The inability of a Quentonian argument to constitute positive proof of atheism does not prove theism, it just undercuts the potency of such an atheistic argument. If his argument is successful however, it will undercut all cosmological arguments, decreasing the reasons that some theists have for believing that God exists.

The difficulty in positively proving atheism is cited by some atheists as a point of persuasion, as if to say, "sure, my argument does not logically entail atheism proper, but no argument can, so give me a break". I have not been persuaded that it is necessarily the case that no argument can prove atheism, or theism for that matter. This is a point whose converse I am willing to grant for the sake of argument however.

My main point? Arguments that undercut theistic arguments do not entail atheism and vice versa.

My question to you: what types of enterprises seem likely candidates to succesfully provide positive evidence for atheism?

Patience and Freedom

Patience is an aspect of the fruit of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22).
Love is patient (1 Cor. 13:4).

Can we conclude then, that God, whose nature and charatcer contain the maximal degree of every good attribute, is patient?

What does it mean to be patient? The Oxford American Dictionary defines it as "able to wait without becoming annoyed or anxious". This will suffice.

What does it mean for God to be patient? If God's nature, character, and decisions are causally sufficient to determine the existence and behavior of each and every object, and there exists no object outside of God or that which He sufficiently determines to exist and behave, then the only possible way for God to be patient is for Him to be patient with Himself.

However, doesn't the essence of patience require that the patient respectfully endure the existence or action of an object outside himself? For calling God "patient" implies the temptation of annoyance ar anxiety. But how can God be tempted to be annoyed or anxious with Himself? Is God schizophrenic?

I answer "no". I think God is patient with objects who act independently of Him and contrary to His will. I am forced to conclude that their power to do so was given them by God for a good reason, and they are only permitted to act by God's decree. But just as Jesus emptied Himself (Phil. 5-11), and sovereignly chose to not apply His power and right to be equal with God, so I believe God soveriengly choses to not apply His power and right to sufficiently determine every event. No, He allows persons the dangerous and yet beautiful and enabling power of free will.

Your thoughts? Does the Divine attribute of patience imply the free will of persons?