Do physical facts determine species or not, Mr. Chalmers?

Not that this is highly relevant to the overarching discussion that Chalmers is dealing with, but I am having trouble understanding something specific in his book.

Namely, I do not understand whether Chalmers believes that physical facts (e.g., the "location of every particle") determine which species an organism belongs to.

Here is what's causing my confusion:

On p. 34 he says "It is... conceivable that PHYSICALLY IDENTICAL organisms could be members of DIFFERENT SPECIES, if they had different evolutionary histories".

BUT, on p. 35 he says that a being who knows "the location of every particle in the universe... has all the information it needs to determine... which systems belong to the SAME SPECIES... As long as it... has a full specification of the microphysical facts, no other information is relevant."

Now, here is what I think the overarching points are that he is making in this section of this chapter:

"Supervenience is a relation between two sets of properties: B-properties-intuitively, the high-level properties--and A-properties, which are the basic low-level properties." (p. 33).

I think he is saying that the physical world is built bottom-up: once physics is complete, chemistry is explained. And that chemical properties "supervene" on particle physic properties means that you can find patterns when you zoom out. Similarly, biological properties supervene on chemical properties, so that when you are done describing the chemical properties of a physical system, the biological properties are fixed - there is no room for them to budge - they supervene on the lower level properties.

I think in the first quote, from p. 34, he is saying that two physically identical organisms have identical higher-level ("B") properties, because the physical properties of a system determine that system's biological properties. And yet two physically identical organisms can have different evolutionary pasts, and therefore be categorized differently in that sense. He gives the example of the Mona Lisa, versus a replica. Since they are physically identical (numerical identity and "bare particularity" aside), they have the same A, and B properties. For example, they have paint in the same spots (an A-property?), and THEREFORE have "blue" in the same spots (a B-property?). BUT because they have different pasts (one was painted by Leonardo), they are valued differently.

In the second quote, from p. 35, I think Chalmers is saying that having the physical facts is all you need to determine what kind of species an organism is - the physics of the animal determine what it is.

So in the first quote, I think he uses "species" in a technical sense, which includes evolutionary descent (an "extrinsic" property), whereas in the second quote he uses "species" in a straightforward sense, which includes only the present "intrinsic" properties of the organism.

So it is just a minor semantic problem that Chalmers has - an incidence of slightly unclear or unhelpful writing, not any argumentative flaw. Shame on you, Mr. Chalmers; I know where your home-page is...