Mind-Body Problem According to Chalmers & Feser

I always framed the infamous mind-body problem as something like 'how can a truly non-physical object produce any physical effect, or effect any physical object?'. It is easy to see the problem when it comes to movement. If you happen to deny that telekinesis is possible, and yet affirm that your immaterial soul is MOVING your material body, how do you reconcile those beliefs?

Edward Feser, who teaches philosophy at Pasadena City College, defines the problem a little differently in his book. He calls it the "interaction problem", and argues that it doesn't undercut any arguments for dualism, or constitute an argument for materialism. It is simply a question about dualism. Namely it is the question "how do the mind and body interact". He conjures an understanding of the basic problem for his readers, but doesn't make the framework of the question transparent. His view of the problem differs from my old view in that it questions how the mind and body interact, not just how the mind effects the body.

I just started reading David Chalmers' book on consciousness, which has proved fascinating so far. I really appreciate the depth of research and earnestness reflected in his prose. He nuances the mind-body problem a little further, by splitting it into two parts.

First he distinguishes terms for the purpose of his arguments. Namely, he decides to use the term "psychological" in its cognitive scientific sense. So, he uses "psychological" to basically mean "behavioral". Therefore psychological matters are those concerning data available to the outside world. One can examine how a stimulus produces a given behavior, and this is a psychological experiment.

This Chalmers distinguishes from "phenomenal", which relates to first-person experiences. A phenomenal property is "what it is like" to experience thus and such (Chalmers borrows Nagel's terminology at several junctures).

He then states that this division of mental properties divides the mind-body problem into two problems, or rather two parts.

The first part of the mind-body problem is psychological, and goes something like "how could a state of a physical system play such-and-such a causal role?" (p. 24 in the paperback version of "The Conscious Mind"). This sort of question, he contends, is mostly dissolved into smaller technical problems. Without belittling the search for answers to such problems, he brings up the "harder", second part of the mind-body problem.

To Chalmers, the phenomenal aspects of mind give rise to unsolved mysteries. He says that for all the progress cognitive science has made, it "hasn't shed significant light on the question of how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious experience" (p. 25). He sort of rephrases it as "how could a physical system give rise to conscious experience?" (Ibid.).

He characterizes the two parts of the mind-body question into (1) the link between the physical and psychological, and (2) the link between the psychological and the phenomenal. So while we have good ideas about how physical systems can react and learn and remember, or we at least know where to look for answers to questions about such things, we have no clue about how such psychological affairs cause experiences. And even more baffling than 'how' is 'why'.

Setting the psychological question aside, Chalmers' version of the mind-body problem differs from Feser's and mine in that it asks how the body can effect the mind.

Where do I stand now?

I have direct and indirect philosophical reasons to prefer some sort of substance dualism to materialism. This is because I believe I have strong independent evidence for the existence of a nonphysical God, and in favor of the veracity of the Bible, which discusses "souls". I hold my dualism extremely tentatively though. Meaning, the details are sketchy, and my position is tender. What of the mind-body problem? I have no idea man...

Teach me, Chalmers...