When Chalmers frames the mind-body problem by asking how the body effects the mind, it makes me wonder whether he leaves room for any free will. Granted, this can only be a preliminary question, as I have just started the book. At any rate, I think he does. Under the first part of the mind-body problem, he admits that there is "fertile ground" for discussion as to how a functional analysis of human psychology should run. He mentions that beliefs and desires might play a causal role (read: indeterminism), and even says that there might not be strict laws connecting psychological states with behavior. I am really interested to see the structure he imposes on the dialogue going on right now in the philosophy or mind, the questions he asks, and the theory he proposes.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
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8 comments:
Hate to be a plot-spoiler:
He mentions that he thinks the world, 'in all probability' is causally closed, in which case there would be little room for libertarianism.
Also, since mental states are epiphenomenal mental states play no causal role in the world, and this means that there is no such thing as libertarianism.
"he thinks the world, 'in all probability' is causally closed"
so far in my reading this seems to represent his view, but he seems (so far) to not be directly concerned with the question of free will. there are a number of passages in which he mentions that causality is ill understood.
on p. 150 he even says "it is possible that when causation is better understood we will be in a position to understand a subtle way in which conscious experience may be causally relevant"!
If libertarianism obtains then behavior cannot be analyzed without making reference to mental states; mental states, for libertarianism, are the causes of my behavior (at least the type of behavior that I'm responsible for) . Assuming this, it's logically impossoble that I have a zombie replica of myself (in terms of my behavior), for a zombie has no mental states, and therefore such a 'replica' would not have the same type of causes-of-behavior I do.
I have a sneaking hunch that Chalmers becomes a skeptic about causation to save his zombie argument.
PS- I think that Chalmer's view is somewhere between epiphenomenalism (on my view) and property dualism (on a charatable read). He's no substance dualist though....
"If libertarianism obtains then behavior cannot be analyzed without making reference to mental states; mental states, for libertarianism, are the causes of my behavior (at least the type of behavior that I'm responsible for) . Assuming this, it's logically impossoble that I have a zombie replica of myself (in terms of my behavior), for a zombie has no mental states, and therefore such a 'replica' would not have the same type of causes-of-behavior I do. "
right of course. i am saying that my reading of Chalmers is that the whole point of the Zombie argument is to demonstrate that once you are finished describing the physical, there is more left over. the zombie argument is always intended at reductive materialists.
so while your argument is correct, i think that the point of the zombie argument can be preserved in a reconfiguration of the zombie argument that makes room for libertarianism.
such a reconfigured argument could go something like this:
there is a world molecule for molecule identical to ours, and indistinguishable from a third-party view. and yet because this other world is not accompanied be mental states, the "zombies" in this other world behave differently. therefore reductive materialism is false.
but this complicates the message of the zombie argument, while Chalmers doesn't seem to be concerned with questions of human freedom. he is concerned with explaining why physical systems are accompanied by conscious experiences. so it is more concise to go his route for his purposes, i think.
but check this out, even if libertarianism is true in this world, and in this world mental states play a causal role, isn't it still broadly logically possible that a duplicate world could have existed in which everything looks and behaves the same, and yet it is populated by zombies without qualia? in such a zombie world then, according to most libertarian models of responsibility including yours and mine, zombie's !. wouldn't have freedom, and 2. wouldn't be responsible. their behavior would be caused physically, or directly by God if you prefer, but the point is that if you try, you can imagine a world physically identical to ours, but without individual mental states. therefore mental states are not physical. therefore dualism.
...but I admit that I am still a mere philosophical neophyte who hasn't even finished the book.
i will admit this, however. that chalmers himself, even if i want to argue he maintains a view with room for libertarianism, does not seem to hold to libertarianism at all. and you're right - he seems to be a property dualist at best.
in fact, he gets pretty explicit:
"The arguments in the last chapter establish that consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical, but this is not to say that it does not supervene at all. There appears to be a systematic dependence of conscious experience on the physical structure in the cases with which we are familiar, and nothing in the arguments of the last chapter suggests otherwise. It remains as plausible as ever, for example, that if my physical structure, were to be replicated by some creature in the actual world, m conscious experience would be replicated, too. So it remains plausible that consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical. It is this view--natural supervenience without logical supervenience--that I will develop.
The arguments do not lead us to a dualism such as that of Descartes, with a separate realm of mental substance that exerts its own influence on physical processes. The best evidence of contemporary science tells us that the physical world is more or less causally closed: for every physical event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is no room for a mental "ghost in the machine" to do any extra causal work. A small loophole may be opened by the existence of quantum indeterminacy... in any case... it remains plausible that physical events can be explained in physical terms, so a move to a Cartesian dualism would be a stronger reaction than is warranted.
The dualism implied here is instead a kind of property dualism: conscious experience involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical properties of that individual, although they may depend lawfully on those properties. Consciousness is a feature of the world over and above the physical features of the world. This is not to say it is a separate "substance"; the issue of what it would take to constitute a dualism of substances seems quite unclear to me. All we know is that there are properties of individuals in this world--the phenomenal properties--that are ontologically independent on physical properties"
It's but premature to bring this up, but I'll do it anyway. Them main objection to Chalmer’s train of thought it the problem of explanatory irrelevance; that is, qualia, as he characterizes it, plays no causal role whatever. So when I say “I believe that there is a tree over there”, an explanation of my believing such does not entail that I’m conscious, for I could be a zombie. I find this assay baffling: surely it’s essential to explaining my belief that there is a tree over there is relevant to my mental content.
I think this problem arises because Chalmer’s grants way too much to the materialists, which in turn has the consequence that his zombie argument proves too much. For instance Chalmer’s is willing to grant the materialists that behavior can be explained neurologically, and better yet, he seems willing to grant that neurobiology itself doesn’t need explanation, but rather neurology is the explanation of everything else. And here is where I think the intractable philosophical issues ensue.
Assuming methodological naturalism, when we come to phenomenon like cellular biology, and more relevant, neurobiology, we see neurons firing or DNA replicating, and certain neurons firing move my arm, and certain DNA replications lead to the growth of new cells. The naïve scientist (of the methodological naturalistic sort) sees this happen over and over again, and therefore thinks it some sort of basic pseudo-law. They conclude, with predictable results, that DNA just replicates itself, and that neurons of a certain sort cause arms moving.
Call me too Cartesian, but I find this whole process of empirical research silly. Just because neurons are part of the causal process of arms moving, it doesn’t follow that neurons are the things that moves arms, and nothing else moves them. Just because time and time again DNA molecules replicate themselves, it doesn’t follow that DNA is the cause of its own replication, and that nothing else does.
If you assume from the get go that the only types of causes in the world are the ones that empirically verifiable, than the empirical story is the only story, and then consciousness of course becomes irrelevant. But the problem then is that Chalmers thinks of all of these things are true, yet he still finds himself conscious and he can’t deny it, he tries to combine the two: (1) there is really consciousness, and (2) the empirical story is the only story. Since the empirical story doesn’t involve consciousness, it naturally follows that all consciousness is explanatorily irrelevant. And the zombie argument is a rehearsal of this fact.
You’ll see later too, that he also flirts with pansychism, the view that rocks are conscious too- and he has to flirt with this too because neurobiology is IRRELEVENT to consciousness, and therefore anything whatever can be conscious.
This, on my humble view, is a product of fundamentally assuming a bottom up view of the universe (that is, thinking that the most basic parts of the universe are atoms), while all the while being a realist about consciousness. If we just drop the bottom up view of the universe, and adopt a top down view instead, we’ll have a much more cohesive picture. The top down view of the universe says that I have a neural structure because my soul has organized matter in way that it can interact with universe, the reason why my DNA replicates is because my soul has a nature that causes its body to replenish itself so it can better relate to the physical world. Rocks don’t have brains because they don’t have souls, and because they don’t have souls they also don’t have consciousness.
All this to say is that we need to reintroduce teleology into our scientific enterprises, and if we just grant that we are conscious, we must include this fact into a theory about the world.
everything you're saying makes a lot of sense. namely, what you perceive to produce chalmers' view is exactly what he says he does: take the scientific orthodoxy of the day seriously, and yet insist on taking consciousness seriously. i also agree with your claims about purely empiricist methods.
yet there are some issues that need answers from the Cartesians of today. for example: when we take data from the world, empirically and rationally, and organize it in a way that makes sense, we observe in every documented case, that matter and energy are conserved. in order for something without either matter or energy to have any causal influence whatsoever on something with matter and/or energy, it must somehow create matter or energy. in other words, for nonphysical soul to exert influence on a physical body would require the creation of new energy.
i can buy the idea of energy being created - i mean, it all had to get here in the first place - but since we have been measuring it, we haven't found any such cases.
so, if for a nonphysical soul to influence a physical body it requires the creation of new energy, and if we have never documented the creation of new energy, then we have never documented a case of Cartesian dualism.
does this entail that Cartesian dualism is false? no. perhaps we haven't run an adequate test. we should measure the actual net energy that a given human body has, and then record exactly how much it takes in, and how much it puts out. We can see if the budget is balanced, or if the body puts out more energy than it takes in. honestly though, it seems highly unlikely. humans need food to live. thermodynamics have an impact on us, we break down, and sheer will power won't keep us from aging.
one time we were discussing this "mind-body problem" in the starbucks and you said that maybe there is a location in the brain where energy leaves this realm, and another place where it enters back in. in this way, the budget can be balanced, and yet the new energy can be exerted according to the will of the individual. physical systems still play a role - no one is doubting that, i think - but under such a view so does the soul.
to me this opened up a new possibility. in fact, one can think of all kinds of possible situations to explain the conservation of matter and energy under a Cartesian worldview. who cares if this is exactly how it works? it is one logically possible situation, undercutting the materialist's qualm.
even still, i think that modern Cartesians have a lot of work to do in updating their theory to respond to modern scientific findings.
but back to your reply.
"The naïve scientist (of the methodological naturalistic sort) sees this happen over and over again, and therefore thinks it some sort of basic pseudo-law. They conclude, with predictable results, that DNA just replicates itself, and that neurons of a certain sort cause arms moving. "
ironically, it seems that they should be reading more hume! but my question is about ockhams razor: modern physical science is out to merely observe and describe. why postulate nonphysical entities who play causal roles, when it doesn't seem necessary from a descriptive vantage point?
i guess i could reword it like this: what argument for Cartesian dualism evidences not only the existence of nonphysical substances (which I personally am basically convinced of, i think), but also the notion that they play a causal role (which i am less sure of, although being biased by independent evidence for libertarian freedom, i want to accept)? if you could address a naive yet unbiased and logically-minded materialist scientist for as long as you want, how would you convince him that there are nonphysical substances that exert influence on the physical world?
finally, i have this identification with chalmers so far:
"There appears to be a systematic dependence of conscious experience on the physical structure in the cases with which we are familiar, "
firstly, when i burn my arm, it hurts. secondly, when i damage my brain it alters my conscious states, and eventually even my behavior. why do these things basically correspond to conscious states in a one-to-one manner?
“yet there are some issues that need answers from the Cartesians of today. for example: when we take data from the world, empirically and rationally, and organize it in a way that makes sense, we observe in every documented case, that matter and energy are conserved. in order for something without either matter or energy to have any causal influence whatsoever on something with matter and/or energy, it must somehow create matter or energy. in other words, for nonphysical soul to exert influence on a physical body would require the creation of new energy.”
If you want to fluster a physicist, ask him what in the heavens energy is. We never observe energy; it’s still as theoretical postulate to explain the movement of matter. Surely we observe matter moving, but no man has ever seen energy…
“i can buy the idea of energy being created - i mean, it all had to get here in the first place - but since we have been measuring it, we haven't found any such cases.
so, if for a nonphysical soul to influence a physical body it requires the creation of new energy, and if we have never documented the creation of new energy, then we have never documented a case of Cartesian dualism.”
Again, give me a non tautological definition of energy that I can empirically observe, and you can’t just show me energy’s effects, I want you to show me energy in essence, and then I’ll answer your questions.
"The naïve scientist (of the methodological naturalistic sort) sees this happen over and over again, and therefore thinks it some sort of basic pseudo-law. They conclude, with predictable results, that DNA just replicates itself, and that neurons of a certain sort cause arms moving. "
“ironically, it seems that they should be reading more hume! but my question is about ockhams razor: modern physical science is out to merely observe and describe. why postulate nonphysical entities who play causal roles, when it doesn't seem necessary from a descriptive vantage point?”
For the record, I’m a realist about causation in the following cases:
-Density:I think the density of matter explains its behavior, when it’s the behavior of matter we are discussing. For instance, if we ask why air an airplane can move through the air, but my hand cannot go through an airplane, we can enlist the density of matter as a sufficient explanation.
-Agency: I know I’m the cause of my intentional behavior, and nothing else is, and therefore I’m a realist about causation when it comes to agency.
- Modality: The modal status of objects in the universe have a causal story to tell: If there were no form RED in the universe, than nothing in particular could be red, and therefore the from RED is cause of the particular red. And so I’m realist about modality what modality entails about causation.
What I’m an anti-realist about, causally speaking:
Anything that does not fit into, or is not strongly related to the domains I said I was a realist about. Why, because all other types of causal inferences are done inductively, and all inductive inferences fall short of referencing the true cause of a phenomenon. For if such references did reference the true causes of phenomenon, such inferences would no longer be inductive….
“i guess i could reword it like this: what argument for Cartesian dualism evidences not only the existence of nonphysical substances (which I personally am basically convinced of, i think), but also the notion that they play a causal role (which i am less sure of, although being biased by independent evidence for libertarian freedom, i want to accept)? if you could address a naive yet unbiased and logically-minded materialist scientist for as long as you want, how would you convince him that there are nonphysical substances that exert influence on the physical world?”
The introspective process of coming to realize that nothing makes sufficient sense of why you do what you. Agency is fundamental to understanding ourselves, and no ‘science’ that doesn’t assume agency to be both indispensable and fundamental doesn’t deserve such a title.
finally, i have this identification with chalmers so far:
"There appears to be a systematic dependence of conscious experience on the physical structure in the cases with which we are familiar, "
I would say that his zombie argument, and the especially the two points of view he’s attempting to synthesize, do serious violence to such a statement.
firstly, when i burn my arm, it hurts. secondly, when i damage my brain it alters my conscious states, and eventually even my behavior. why do these things basically correspond to conscious states in a one-to-one manner?
On my view, the brain and whole body is the system which permits the mind to interact with the world; and since God wanted the Imago Dei to interact with matter, the one-to-one correspondence between mind and matter must be systematicor else dysfunction would be manifest. But we must never be so impressed by God’s design to deceive ourselves into thinking that there really is no distinction between mind and matter. And to the person looking for reasons to think there is such a distinction, I would have to point out the cases where the causation is from ‘top-down’ like when I decide to move my arm- my brain responds by firing neurons. The current story is that there is no ‘me’, and neurons moved my arms, and nothing else. And about pain, pain is tricky because its intentional content is directed at its material cause. But think of Phenomenonal content cases that have no material content in their intention: think of being happy or being depressed. Surely our being happy and being depressed has something to do with matter, but the phenomenal content of such concepts have no material constitution: my happiness is located nowhere, and no sum total of atoms will be my depression, nor will they secrete it.
"We never observe energy"
...I gotta go.
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